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A bstract
This thesis provides an economic analysis of bank risk-taking, addressing the relation between 
stability and competition, the efficiency of demandable debt as an incentive device for bankers, 
and the interaction between the structure of credit relationships, bank monitoring and loan 
rates.
Chapter 1 reviews the literature on stability, regulation and competition in banking. The 
survey is organised around two dimensions of instability: vulnerability to runs and panics, and 
excessive risk taking. It turns out that the existing literature largely ignores the impact of 
competition on stability and on the optimal regulatory design. The very few models addressing 
these issues do not provide conclusive results.
Chapter 2 goes deeper on the phenomenon of bank runs. A unified framework is presented 
within which the main literature is outlined and compared.
Chapter 3 develops a model that analyses both the benefits and the costs of market discipline 
as an incentive device for bankers. It is shown that demandable debt, by allowing for the 
possibility of runs, can induce bankers to monitor their projects. However, market discipline 
comes at a cost. Since depositors are not equally informed about bank future solvency, they 
may commit mistakes in their withdrawal decisions, forcing the closure of a solvent bank or 
permitting the continuation of an insolvent one.
Chapter 4 turns the attention to the lending side, developing a model of overlapping moral 
hazard problems between banks and firms. The aim is to study how the number of bank 
relationships affects banks’ monitoring decisions and how these affect loan rates and firms’ 
choice between single and multiple relationships. It is shown that multiple lenders monitor less 
than a single lender, but they don’t necessarily require higher loan rates. The firm’s choice 
between single and multiple relationships is not univocal, depending on the severity of bank 
moral hazard as compared to firm moral hazard.
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Introduction
The role of financial intermediation is one of the fundamental issues in theoretical economics 
and finance. The efficiency of the process through which savings are channelled into productive 
activities is key for growth and general welfare. In some economies, often in an earlier stage of 
their development, banks perform most of this financial intermediation through loan contracts. 
In other economies, in particular those with favourable legal systems, capital markets allow 
more firms to tap investors directly through the issuance of debt securities. However, whatever 
the relative orientation of the financial systems, banks always play a special role in financial 
intermediation. They can be regarded as a ’vehicle’ to solve problems of asymmetric information 
between lenders (ultimately savers) and borrowers (ultimately firms investing for the purpose 
of producing goods). They specialise in assessing the relative viability and profitability of the 
different projects put forward by entrepreneurs. Hence, they will be particularly involved in the 
type of firm projects in which the informational disadvantages of ’savers’ are relatively high.
Banks are not only special in that they ’produce’ information about investment projects 
but also in the way they raise their funds. In fact, they rely to a significant extent on (many 
small) short-term demandable deposits, which they pool and then invest in long-term loans to 
production firms. This maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities makes banks play the 
additional role of providers of liquidity to depositors but, also, exposes them to the possibility 
of runs (and systemic crises). This vulnerability to runs (and to systemic crises) represents the 
source of bank instability originating on the liability side of the balance sheet. A second source 
of instability relates to bank risk-taking on the asset side. Because of their substantial financing 
from many small, relatively uninformed depositors and an often-existing public safety net in
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response to the previously mentioned vulnerability, banks can be particularly prone to taking 
on ’excessive’ risk in the choice of which projects to finance.
Bank stability, both on the liability and on the asset side, is influenced by a variety of 
(partly interlinked) factors, which can be decomposed into those related to the endogenous 
functioning of private markets and those more related to public policies. Within the former 
category bank stability is influenced, on the one hand, by macroeconomic fluctuations and, on 
the other hand, by microeconomic market structures and the competitive environment. For 
example, it matters whether the financial system is more bank-based or more market-based, 
how large is the number of banks and their firm lending relationships, how interbank lending 
relationships are structured, how important is the ’special’ deposit financing as compared to 
equity or bond financing, and how important is the degree of information asymmetries between 
both creditors and banks, as well as between borrowers and banks.
Regarding public policies, one can again distinguish between the macroeconomic and the 
microeconomic side, but also between ’ex ante’ and ’ex post’ policies. ’Ex post’ policies relate to 
crisis management, once a financial instability has materialised, whereas ’ex ante’ policies relate 
to the maintenance of a stable environment in the first place. On the macroeconomic side, bank 
stability is particularly affected by monetary policies, but also by fiscal policies (both ’ex ante’ 
and ’ex post’). On the microeconomic side, bank stability is influenced ’ex ante’ by financial 
regulation, prudential supervisory practices and payment system oversight, special competition 
policies for the banking sector (e.g. special regulations for market entry, mergers and acqui­
sitions or collusive agreements) and ’ex post’ by deposit insurance arrangements (however, in 
some countries they are private or semi-private) as well as lender of last resort interventions to 
individual banks (’micro LOLR’).
The present thesis discusses several key aspects of bank stability among those enumerated 
above, following primarily a theoretical approach. The main emphasis is on the microeconomic 
side. It is organised in four chapters, whose content and main conclusions I summarise below.
Chapter 1 provides an extensive review of the theoretical literature on bank stability, reg­
ulation and competition. The survey is divided into two parts, each of them organised around 
the two dimensions of instability previously described: vulnerability to runs and systemic crises
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(bank fragility on the liability side) and excessive risk taking (bank moral hazard problem on 
the asset side).
The first part of the chapter focuses on the problem of bank stability and the measures 
that aim to preserve it. It starts with reviewing selected contributions on the problem of bank 
fragility (both individual runs and systemic crises) and the need for public intervention, with 
particular emphasis on deposit insurance schemes and lender of last resort facilities, i.e. ex 
post micro policies. Then, it analyses the moral hazard problem induced by ill-designed public 
regulation and safety net arrangements and discusses the proposals advanced to ameliorate 
them. These are divided into two categories: The first, defined as regulation-oriented, includes 
proposals for the reform of deposit insurance pricing and bank closure policy. The second 
category, defined as market-oriented, relates to the proposal of scaling back deposit insurance 
in order to reintroduce market discipline in the form of uninsured depositors’ monitoring.
The second part of chapter 1 turns the attention to the impact of competition on stability 
(i.e. the micro market side), both from a positive and a normative angle. The main scope is 
to examine whether the presumed negative impact of competition on bank stability (in both 
senses) finds support in the theoretical literature. It turns out that the existing models largely 
disregard these issues, focusing on situations of perfect competition or total monopoly. The very 
few models that endogenise aspects of industrial organisation in banking are then reviewed. At 
the present stage, however, the results are still far from being conclusive.
Chapter 2 adds an in-depth literature analysis of the bank run phenomenon, adopting a 
uniform modelling framework within which the main theoretical contributions can be outlined 
and compared. Two types of theories are distinguished: models that focus on the role of banks 
as providers of flexibility to depositors in their timing of consumption and models that focus 
on the agency relation between the banker and his depositors. These two categories, denoted 
as ’first generation’ literature and ’second generation’ literature, respectively, provide different 
explanations for the occurrence of bank runs and draw different conclusions concerning their 
efficiency or inefficiency. Depending on the reasons behind depositors’ decisions to withdraw 
prematurely, first generation models see runs as irrational events (’sunspot’ approach) or as 
depositors’ rational responses to the arrival of poor information on the bank’s future solvency 
(’asymmetric information’ approach). Information-based runs are efficient if based on perfect
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information, since they force the liquidation of valueless assets. Second generation models 
consider the threat of runs as discipline device for bankers’ moral hazard problems. Runs are 
information-based and their efficiency depends on whether depositors base their withdrawal 
decisions on noisy or perfect information.
In chapter 3 ,1 develop a model that analyses both the benefits and the costs of demandable 
debt, one of the micro factors influencing bank stability from the liability side. Expanding on 
the ’second generation’ literature described in chapter 2, a moral hazard problem between a 
banker and his depositors is analysed. I investigate whether demandable debt, by allowing the 
possibility of runs, can constitute an efficient incentive device.
A banker needs to raise deposits to invest in an illiquid project. The project is risky and its 
success probability is higher when the banker (privately) decides to monitor than when he does 
not. Deposit contracts can be either of a more long-term nature or demandable at any time. 
With the former, depositors can demand a predetermined repayment only at maturity. With 
the latter, they have the right to withdraw at any point in time. Starting from a situation with 
standard debt in which the banker finds it optimal not to monitor the project, the analysis shows 
that demandable debt can induce him to change to monitoring. This is because this contract 
allows depositors to discipline the banker by triggering a run whenever they (rationally) expect 
the value of the bank’s assets to be low.
However, market discipline can come at a cost. When depositors are heterogeneously in­
formed on the value of the bank’s assets, those who are uninformed may commit ’mistakes’ in 
their withdrawal decisions. They may either leave their deposits at the bank when prospects 
are low, or withdraw them when prospects are high. The former error leads to the continuation 
of an insolvent bank; the latter error can induce informed depositors to ignore their informa­
tion and join the withdrawal queue. When this is the case, an inefficient information-based 
run occurs, which forces a solvent bank into liquidation. The inefficiency of market discipline 
originates within a single bank and does not depend on the imposition of a sequential service 
constraint rule. Rather, it is due to both the informational externality of depositors’ withdrawal 
decisions and the illiquidity of the bank’s assets.
As described above, banks are valuable because of their superior ability to reduce the in­
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formational asymmetries that plague direct lending relative to other financial institutions. The 
extent to which banks are effective in playing this role, however, depends on their incentives to 
monitor. One main factor that influences banks’ monitoring decisions is the structure of credit 
relationships. Banks can choose to monitor their borrowers with different intensity depending 
on whether they are the only or one of several lenders to the firm. These decisions affect, in 
turn, the cost of loans and the firms’ choice between single and multiple credit relationships. 
Chapter 4 addresses these issues by developing a one-period model with overlapping moral 
hazard problems between banks and firms.
An entrepreneur seeks bank financing to undertake a project. He operates subject to a moral 
hazard problem. He may prefer not to exert effort and enjoy a private benefit instead of being 
diligent and increasing the success probability of the project. Banks can force the entrepreneur 
to behave well through monitoring. However, monitoring is not contractible and is costly, 
exhibiting diseconomies of scale. This creates a bank moral hazard problem: Banks choose the 
monitoring intensity as to maximise their profits, which depend on the size of monitoring costs, 
on the entrepreneur’s behaviour and on the number of lenders. The firm can borrow either from 
one bank or from two banks. The equilibrium levels of monitoring and the loan rates depend 
on which structure of bank relationships the firm chooses.
The analysis shows that multiple lenders always exert a lower level of discipline than a single 
lender. This is because they face duplication of effort and sharing of benefits in monitoring. 
However, as a consequence of diseconomies of scale in monitoring, multiple lenders do not 
necessarily require a higher loan rate.
The entrepreneur’s choice between single and multiple relationships is not univocal. It 
depends rather on the relative severity of bank moral hazard as compared to firm moral hazard. 
In general, he prefers a single lender when bank moral hazard is weak and multiple lenders 
when bank moral hazard is strong. For intermediate values of bank moral hazard, the firm’s 
choice depends on its own inclination for moral hazard. The greater the private return for 
the entrepreneur when he does not exert effort, the more likely the firm will find it optimal to 
borrow from two banks, although it may require a higher loan rate than with a single bank.
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Chapter 1
Stability, Regulation and 
Com petition in Banking
1.1 Introduction
Bank stability has always been a major public concern. Episodes of bank runs and widespread 
bank failures have plagued the history of many countries, motivating the introduction of bank 
regulation and its successive modifications.
The course of events and, in particular, the US experience suggest two possible connotations 
of the term ’’instability”: The crises that occurred in the 1930s show that the banking system 
is fragile since it is vulnerable to runs and panics; the massive distress that came to light in 
the 1980s and 1990s demonstrates that intermediaries may have strong incentives to assume 
excessive risk, both on the asset and the liability side and that, as a result, the system has a 
high probability of failure.
The potential instability of the banking system is the fundamental rationale for the intro­
duction and the development of regulation. In most countries the institution of the safety net, 
namely a form of deposit insurance and a lender of last resort, has been the response to bank 
fragility; the implementation of important new regulatory legislation in the last decades and 
the wide ongoing debate over regulatory reforms on the academic front are the reactions to the 
solvency crises experienced by banks in the 1980s and 1990s.
The debate on financial stability and regulatory reforms concentrates on instruments that
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prevent fragility and ameliorate incentive problems, largely ignoring the effects that different 
market structures and competition among banks can have on the safety of the banking sector. 
Curiously, the literature on banking stability and regulation focuses mostly on situations of 
either perfect competition or total monopoly.
Competition in banking has traditionally been seen with suspicion, because of a general feel­
ing that it exacerbates both problems of fragility and of excessive risk taking. These presumed 
destabilising effects have justified the imposition of measures to prevent excessive competition. 
Many countries have regulated the structure of their banking sector for a long time with interest 
rate ceilings, entry barriers, ownership limits and asset restrictions. The wave of liberalisation 
and deregulation that occurred in the 1980s has not been entirely smooth. It has been described 
as a major cause of the crises that happened in the last two decades. As a result, prudential 
regulation has been strengthened and harmonised across countries and deposit insurance has 
been reformed and extended.
These developments have renewed the debate on the presumed trade-off between competition 
and stability. They have induced scholars to introduce ’’industrial organisation aspects” in the 
analysis of bank stability and in the design of the optimal regulatory policy. At the present 
stage, however, the results are still far from being conclusive.
The object of this chapter is to examine the academic literature on bank stability, both 
from a positive and from a normative angle. In the first part of the chapter, I review selected 
contributions addressing the problem of bank fragility and the need for public intervention. 
Then, I analyse the distortion that public arrangements, such as deposit insurance and lender of 
last resort, can create in terms of bank excessive risk taking (the so called moral hazard problem) 
and the proposals suggested to ameliorate it. In the second part of the chapter, I survey the 
recent literature on competition and stability, both regarding fragility and excessive risk taking, 
and regarding the implications of different market structures for the optimal regulatory policy. 
While I focus the survey on the theoretical aspects of the debate on stability, regulation and 
competition, I will complement the theory with some empirical findings.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 focuses on the specificity and fragility of 
the banking system, stressing the difference between individual banks’ vulnerability to run 
(section 2.1) and systemic crises (sections 2.2 ). Section 3 discusses the introduction of public
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interventions, in the form of deposit insurance schemes and lender of last resort function (the 
so-called safety net), which aim to prevent the fragility of the system. Section 4 describes the 
moral hazard problem in banking as a consequence of a de facto complete deposit insurance. 
Section 5 analyses theoretical contributions on the lively debate prompted by recent banking 
distress, reviewing proposals for the reform of deposit insurance pricing (section 5.1), on the 
importance of regulatory monitoring and bank closure policy (section 5.2) and on the role 
of market discipline (section 5.3). The subsequent sections concentrate on the link between 
competition and stability: Section 6 presents recent contributions on the effect of competition on 
bank fragility; section 5 describes those relating to the interrelations between market structure 
and excessive risk taking; section 8 focuses on the importance of market structure for regulatory 
reforms. Section 9 concludes.
1.2 The Specificity and Fragility o f the Banking System
The theory of financial intermediation has provided disparate reasons for the uniqueness of 
banks and the need of regulation. Banking theory has aimed firstly to explain the mere existence 
of banks and, then, their vulnerability to individual runs and systemic crises, seen as inherent 
to the nature of banking itself.
In the 1970s, the reasons for the existence and the main functions of intermediaries were 
traced back in the reduction of transaction costs,1 in the optimisation of portfolios and maturity 
transformation,2 and in the improvement of collateral and contractual clauses.3
In the 1980s, greater importance was attributed to informational asymmetries in explaining 
the failure of competitive markets and the emergence of intermediaries. In a market char­
acterised by asymmetric information, intermediaries can improve social welfare: They have 
economies of scale in producing information and sending signals on project quality, which is 
private information of entrepreneurs,4 they have technological economies of scale in monitoring 
their borrowers5 and provide insurance to depositors who are uncertain in their timing of con­
g e e  Benston and Smith (1976).
2See Baltensperger (1980), Deshmukh et al. (1983).
3See Smith and Warner (1979).
4 See Leland and Pyle (1977).
5 See Diamond (1984).
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sumption.6 These characteristics are the key elements of bank specificity: They explain banks’ 
advantages relative to an autarkic situation in which individual investors act directly but, at 
the same time, they expose intermediaries to the risk of fragility.
In the following, I describe the problem of bank fragility, making a distinction between 
individual and systemic crises. Individual fragility concerns single intermediaries’ vulnerability 
to runs. Systemic fragility relates to the failure of a considerable number of institutions or of 
the system as a whole. The latter can be the result of a negative aggregate shock and/or of the 
propagation of negative individual shocks.
1.2.1 Individual B anks’ Vulnerability to  Runs
The key elements for the occurrence of individual runs are the maturity transformation that 
banks operate by investing short-term deposits in long-term assets, and the informational asym­
metries existing between banks and their clients. Banks offer deposit contracts, which allow 
lenders to withdraw a nominal and fixed amount on demand. Insofar as banks use these deposits 
for illiquid and/or risky loans, there is the possibility of a liquidity crisis. If the proportion of 
depositors that withdraw their deposit early exceeds that expected by the bank, the interme­
diary may not be able to fulfil the withdrawal requests even if it sells a part or all of its assets. 
When this is the case, a bank run has origin: Depositors’ massive early withdrawal demands 
force the bank to sell all its assets and to close down.
The combination of maturity transformation, that is short and fixed liabilities against long 
and illiquid assets, and of a liquidity premium, that is the costly liquidation of long term assets 
before maturity, explains the role of intermediaries as liquidity providers and, at the same time, 
their fragility. Bank runs can be irrational or information-induced events, depending on the 
different reasons behind the unexpected early withdrawals by depositors and on the type of 
asymmetric information between banks and their clients.
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) show that runs, when they occur, are an unfortunate and 
undesirable side effect of a contract whose only purpose is to provide consumption flexibility to 
depositors. They depict bank runs as multiple-equilibrium phenomena, which are exclusively 
related to the illiquidity of bank assets. If, for any reason, depositors loose confidence in future
6See Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
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bank solvency, they start to withdraw early and the bank is emptied of funds. As a consequence, 
the risk-sharing mechanism, achievable when depositors leave their funds at the bank until asset 
maturity, breaks down and welfare is reduced. Given the deterministic structure of bank asset 
returns, the run emerges as a bad Nash equilibrium in which depositors start withdrawing 
prematurely because they just believe others will do so.
Thus, in the multiple-equilibrium approach, runs are a self-fulfilling rational coordination 
failure due to "sunspots”. An alternative explanation for the occurrence of bank runs is that 
they are tied to changes in fundamental variables rather than to unpredictable variables. A 
negative shock on bank asset increases the probability that banks are unable to meet their 
commitments. If depositors anticipate the impending shock, they try to withdraw their funds 
and force the closure of the bank.7 Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) provide a formal support 
to this alternative explanation.8 Introducing a random structure of bank asset returns, they 
show that bank runs are information-induced, in that they are depositors’ rational responses 
to the arrival of negative information regarding the state of bank investment.
The relationship between the bank and its depositors is now characterised by a bilateral 
asymmetric information: The bank knows depositors’ aggregate consumption preferences but 
cannot distinguish the type of each depositor withdrawing early; further, depositors do not know 
the value of bank asset returns. At the interim period, a consumption shock is realised and some 
depositors turn out to be impatient; at the same time, some other depositors receive a signal 
related to the future bank asset value. If this signal is adverse enough, informed depositors 
join the queue of depositors withdrawing for consumption needs. Given the illiquidity of bank 
long-term assets, a rational, information-based run originates.
In a context characterised by shocks to bank asset returns, to the fraction of depositors that 
receive information on bank asset in the interim period and to the proportion of depositors 
wishing to withdraw early, Chari and Jagannathan (1988) show that bank runs can be both 
information-induced and panic phenomena. In other words, runs can happen either when some 
depositors have received negative information about bank future solvency or when nobody 
has received any signal. Panic runs are modelled as a signal-extraction problem: Uninformed
7Empirical evidence shows that most of the observed runs were tied to changes in fundamental variables 
rather than to unpredictable variables. See, for example, Gorton (1988).
8The pioneer but informal model of information-induced bank run is Bryant (1980).
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depositors know that other depositors may be informed on future bank asset returns and they 
try to infer the state of bank solvency from the size of the withdrawal queue at the bank. Since 
the proportion of depositors withdrawing for consumption reasons is not observable, uninformed 
depositors may not be able to distinguish if a long withdrawal queue is due to some informed 
depositors receiving a negative information or only to a large proportion of agents desiring to 
consume early. A panic run generates when uninformed depositors confuse a high liquidity 
shock with fear of insolvency, that is when they withdraw although no one is informed about 
the bank future solvency.
To sum up, individual bank runs result from either/both a coordination failure among 
depositors or/and an expectation of poor performance of the bank. In terms of efficiency, 
the sunspot runs are clearly inefficient as they drive a solvent institution into failure; the 
information-based and the panic runs may be efficient. The former are efficient if depositors 
have correct information on the state of bank solvency but inefficient if depositors withdraw 
mistakenly on a solvent institution; the latter are efficient or inefficient depending on whether 
the bank forced into liquidation would turn to be solvent or insolvent if the run did not take 
place.
1.2.2 System ic Crises: A ggregate Shock or Propagation o f Individual D is­
tresses
A major concern in banking is the occurrence of a systemic crisis, that is the occurrence of 
massive simultaneous bank failures. The risk of systemic crises is considered as the main 
rationale for policy interventions. Given the importance of the debate, among both academics 
and policymakers, centred on the terms systemic crises and systemic risk, I find it useful to 
provide first some conceptual definitions and then review the literature accordingly.
As recently argued by De Bandt and Hartmann (1999), the term systemic crisis can be given 
a narrow and a broad interpretation. The former refers to the situation in which the failure of 
one bank, or even only the release of bad news about its state of solvency, leads in a sequential 
fashion to the failure of numerous other banks or of the system as a whole. The latter includes 
also the simultaneous failure of many banks, or the crash of the system as a whole, as a result of 
a generalised adverse shock. In other terms, a systemic crisis in the narrow sense occurs when
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an idiosyncratic shock to a single institution propagates through the system causing a chain 
of subsequent failures. Differently, a systemic crisis in the broad sense may also be the direct 
consequence of an aggregate shock, which hits many institutions simultaneously. In both cases, 
a necessary condition for the occurrence of a systemic crisis is that the institutions affected by 
the shock, either in a first round (in case of an aggregate shock) or in a second round (in case 
of the propagation of an idiosyncratic shock), fail as consequence of the shock itself. Therefore, 
it cannot be identified as systemic crisis, neither in the narrow nor in the broad sense, the 
circumstance in which the occurrence of a shock, either idiosyncratic or aggregate, has adverse 
effects on the institutions affected but does not provoke the failure of any of them.9
Given the above definition of systemic crisis, the term systemic risk can be denoted as the 
risk, or the probability, that a systemic crisis, either in the narrow or in the broad sense, occurs.
In the following, I concentrate on systemic crises in the narrow sense and review the related 
literature. The extent to which the mechanism for the propagation of an idiosyncratic shock 
through the system can be explained has important policy implications. The existence of a 
systemic risk in the narrow sense is indeed considered as the most relevant motivation for 
central banks’ intervention.10
The Contagious Run and the Domino Effect
As already observed, the concept of systemic crisis in the narrow sense refers to the disruptive 
situation caused by the propagation of failures from one bank to the other. This strong spillover 
effect, defined as contagion, can take place through two channels: the information channel and 
the credit channel.11 The former refers to the mechanism through which a run on a single 
bank causes runs on other banks (contagious run). The latter refers to the propagation of the 
difficulties faced by a bank to others linked to the failing one through the payment system 
and/or interbank markets (domino effect).
A contagious run is a term used to describe the spread of the effects of a run from one
9For example, it is not a systemic crisis the situation in which the release of negative information about one 
institution or its failure leads to negative abnormal returns on the stock of other banks without causing their 
failure.
10Note however that in practise it can be difficult to distinguish the precise source of a systemic crisis as 
macroeconomic shocks and propagation of failures can be interwined.
11 See, for example, Schoenmaker (1996a).
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or more banks to others. In particular, it is used to describe the situation in which a run 
at a particular intermediary makes depositors at many other institutions withdraw massively. 
The banking literature has identified two types of contagious run depending on the reasons 
behind the propagation of depositors’ loss of confidence from one institution to the other: pure 
(industry specific) contagion and noisy (firm specific) contagion. Pure contagion arises when 
negative information about one bank, such as fraud or low returns on specific risky assets, 
adversely affects all other banks, including those that have nothing in common with the first 
one. Noisy or firm specific contagion occurs when the failure of one bank reveals a bad, even if 
noisy, signal about other banks with common characteristics. In other words, if a run on a bank 
occurs, depositors at banks with similar asset and liability structure to the failing one fear that 
their banks are also vulnerable to the same economic shock and demand their deposits back. 
The more similar the banks are in size, location and markets served, the more likely it is that a 
greater number of banks will be affected and the greater the intensity of the contagion will be.
The two types of contagious run resemble the two different explanations for the emergence 
of an individual bank run. The mechanism underlying the change in depositors’ beliefs about 
future solvency across banks is similar to the one underlying the loss of confidence by depositors 
within a single bank. A contagious run is the negative externality generated by the occurrence 
of an individual run, which can be irrational or information-induced. Indeed, industry-specific 
contagion is sometimes referred to as non-informational contagion while bank-specific contagion 
is usually referred to as informational, rational contagion.12
The second propagation mechanism of individual difficulties refers to the credit channel. 
The propagation of bankruptcy from one financial institution to another through the interbank 
market and/or payment systems is seen nowadays as the major source of systemic risk. To 
the extent that interbank relations are neither collaterized nor insured against, an institution’s 
distress may trigger a chain of subsequent failures. In particular, institutions linked to the 
failing one may incur a liquidity or an insolvency problem depending on the intensity of the 
linkage and on the shock correlation in the system.
Payment systems represent the most important interrelations among banks. Their internal
12In this sense, the industry-specific contagion is like the ’’sunspot phenomenon” described in Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983) and the bank-specific contagion is information-induced like the run in Jacklin and Bhattacharya 
(1988).
arrangement determines how individual shocks propagate and therefore the severity of the risk 
of contagion. Depending on the timing and the methodology of settlement, payment systems 
can be classified in net settlement systems (only net balances are settled and at a certain point 
in time), pure gross systems (payments between members are settled without netting and a 
certain point in time), real-time gross systems (payments between members are settled without 
netting and occur immediately for every transaction) and correspondent banking (payments are 
settled bilaterally between a correspondent bank and members of a group of small or foreign 
banks). Net systems incorporate a lower risk of contagion than pure gross systems but a higher 
risk than real-time gross systems.
The two vehicles of contagion, the information channel and the credit channel, can work in 
conjunction as well as independently. In principle, a domino effect can take place even without 
a contagious run and a contagious run does not necessarily require the existence of interrelations 
among banks. In most cases, however, a systemic crisis (in the narrow sense) is the result of 
the propagation of an individual failure through both channels.
Surprisingly, the risk of contagion has received attention in academic research only very 
recently. The former models of system-wide runs, which consider the banking sector as a 
whole cannot explain the risk of contagion but only generalised crises.13 The analysis of the 
propagation mechanism requires multiple banking systems.
In the following, I review the recent models of contagion. I distinguish between contributions 
which model contagion through the information channel only (Chen (1999)), those that model 
contagion only through the credit channel (Rochet and Tirole (1996b)) and those that model the 
propagation of single failures through both the two channels. This last class of models can be 
further divided in models of contagious runs and domino effect through the interbank market 
(Aghion, Bolton and Dewatripont (1999), Allen and Gale (2000)) and models of contagious 
runs and domino effect through payment systems (Freixas and Parigi (1998), Freixas, Parigi 
and Rochet (1999)).
Chen (1999) analyses the contagious nature of runs in a model where banks do not interact
13The described models of individual bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Jacklin and Bhattacharya 
(1988), Chari and Jagannathan (1988)) as well as Allen and Gale (1998), Alonso (1996), Postlewaite and Vives 
(1987) can all be interpreted as models of system-wide crises, that is of systemic runs caused by an aggregate 
shock.
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through the payment system or the interbank market. He shows that runs at some banks may 
cause panic among depositors and generate runs at other banks. Depositors at one bank are 
heterogeneously informed about the outcome of the bank’s investments. Some depositors receive 
perfect interim information on the bank’s prospects while some others remain uninformed. The 
informed depositors have an advantage over the uninformed depositors as they can withdraw 
earlier when they receive bad bank-specific information and not be rationed from the sequential 
service constraint. Given this, the uninformed depositors have incentives to respond to any 
information available in the economy before the bank-specific information is revealed. Failures 
of other banks can be one information source. A large number of bank failures implies that 
the prospects of the remaining banks are likely to be poor. Although this information is 
noisy, uninformed depositors may respond to it and withdraw, thus forcing informed depositors 
to withdraw as well. When this is the case, a noisy (firm specific) contagion occurs. The 
contagious nature of runs relies on the imposition of the sequential service constraint rule in 
depositors’ repayment and on the information externalities generated by banks’ failures.14
Rochet and Tirole (1996b) address the issue of contagion in a model of interbank lending, in 
which they emphasise the trade-off between the risk of propagation of individual bank failures 
and peer monitoring among intermediaries. Interbank lending arises because of banks hetero­
geneity: Some banks are good at collecting deposits but have poor investment opportunity 
while some others have plenty of investment opportunities. The former have then an incentive 
to lend to the latter and also to monitor them. This creates the scope for interbank lending and 
scope economies, and represents the potential source of systemic risk. If the borrowing bank 
incurs a distress because of a liquidity shock, the lending bank may be affected and be forced 
to shut down. In particular, the lending bank’s continuation depends on the liquidity shock 
it may encounter and the realised profit or the loss generated by the interbank loan which, in 
turn, is a function of the borrowing bank’s outcome. The higher the liquidity shock faced by 
the borrowing bank, the more likely the closure of the lending bank.15
Aghion, Bolton and Dewatripont (1999) focus on the propagation of runs in a model where
14Chen (1999) addresses also the issue of whether bank runs are an efficient incentive devices for bankers’ 
moral hazard problems, as I will discuss in section 5.3.
15 As stressed by the authors, the exact details of contagion occurence depend on a number of institutional 
features, such as how the borrowing bank meets the liquidity shock and priority rules on borrowing bank’s profits.
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multiple banks interact in the interbank market. Banks are subject to a liquidity shock that 
makes them unable to repay depositors. In order to prevent depositors from running, illiquid 
banks can engage in interbank lending. If the system has enough liquidity, no failures occur: 
Illiquid banks are bailed out by their liquid counterparts and all depositors are repaid. When an 
individual bank fails, a contagious run arises: Depositors at other banks interpret the failure of 
a specific bank as signal of global illiquidity in the system and precipitate a run. The presence 
of an interbank market reduces the likelihood of failure of an individual bank but, at the same 
time, may trigger the propagation of runs.
The structure of interbank markets is the key factor for the risk of contagion also in Allen 
and Gale (2000). Banks hold inter-regional claims (deposits) on other banks to insure against 
liquidity preference shocks. If there is no aggregate uncertainty, the banking system is stable 
and the first best allocation of risk sharing is achieved. If, on the other hand, there is an 
excess aggregate demand for liquidity, the financial linkages among banks may turn out to be 
a disaster: In order to provide more consumption to depositors and to avoid the liquidation of 
long-term assets, banks start to withdraw deposits in other regions. This mutual liquidation 
denies liquidity to the troubled region that may then experiment a run. Depending on the 
structure of the cross holdings of deposits among banks, the individual crisis propagates through 
the economy. If regions are well connected (complete interbank market), the contagion is 
avoided. If connections among regions are limited (incomplete interbank market) and liquidity 
shocks are strong enough, then contagion may arise.
Contagious run through the payment system is the focus of Freixas, Parigi and Rochet 
(1999). They construct a model in which both liquidity and solvency shocks may affect banks 
located in different locations. Geographical consumption preferences cause liquidity shocks: 
Depositors may want to consume in a location different from where they have their deposits. 
They can satisfy their geographical consumption needs either by withdrawing their funds and 
transferring cash (holding of liquidity assets) or by transferring deposits from one bank to 
another (payment system). When banks are subject only to liquidity shocks, two equilibria are 
possible. In one equilibrium, depositors do not run and payment systems are efficient in reducing 
the opportunity costs of holding liquid assets (credit line equilibrium). In the other equilibrium, 
all depositors run and banks have to liquidate all their assets (speculative gridlock equilibrium).
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In case of both liquidity and (idiosyncratic) solvency shocks, the stability of the banking system 
depends on the architecture of payment flows: The closure of an insolvent institution is less 
likely to propagate to the entire system when payment systems are well diversified, that is 
when credit lines are uniformly distributed among banks. However, diversified systems are 
more unstable with respect to the insolvency of an institution, that is they are less capable to 
absorb losses of insolvent active banks without generating systemic withdrawals (the so-called 
resiliency).
In a former paper, Freixas and Parigi (1998) tackle the question of the optimal design of 
payment systems. The focus is on the trade-off in terms of risk of contagion and efficiency 
associated with real-time gross settlement and net settlement. The framework is a Diamond- 
Dybvig type model enriched with stochastic investment returns and geographical consumption 
preferences. Payments across banks located in different regions can be made either by directly 
transferring liquidity (gross system) or by transferring claims on the assets of the bank in the 
other location (net system). The gross system entails high liquidity costs but it is free of 
contagion; the net system economises on liquidity but exposes banks to contagion because of 
the transfer of asset claims from one location to the other.
On the empirical level, studies aiming to quantify the likelihood and the intensity of conta­
gion in the banking sector appear controversial. This is somewhat surprising, given the critical 
importance that the existence of systemic risk has in the debate on the need for banking regu­
lation and supervision.16
With reference to contagious run, Kaufman (1994) argues that only bank-specific contagion 
is significant in the spread of an individual distress over the banking system. Using the loss 
to shareholders or deposit rates paid by banks other that the failing one as measures of the 
breadth of contagion, he finds that contagious run occurred only for banks in the same market 
or product area as the initially affected one in the pre-Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) and in the post-FDIC era.17
Regarding the credit channel, Kaufman (1994) does not find strong evidence on the im­
16In the following I review only the main empirical literature on bank contagion. For an extensive survey of 
the empirical literature of systemic risk, see De Bandt and Hartmann (1999).
17 Other papers analysing contagious run in the Pre-FDIC era are Saunders and Wilson (1998) and Calomiris 
and Mason (1997). Neither of the two papers finds evidence of contagion, that is of generalised runs triggered 
by the release of bad news on the solvency of a bank or on the failure of a single institution.
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portance of interbank exposures as mechanisms transmitting shocks from failing to solvent 
banks. In the Continental Illinois failure in 1984, for example, no correspondent bank suffered 
solvency-threatening losses. But the no propagation effect in Continental Illinois crisis may 
have depended on the low losses the bank suffered at the time it failed. Continental Illinois was 
indeed timely closed and the value of its assets was almost preserved. Schoenmaker (1996b) 
argues that if the Federal Reserve and the FDIC had not protected uninsured deposits at Con­
tinental Illinois, its failure might have caused a chain of bank failures. Using data from a period 
without a central bank acting as a lender of last resort, he shows that there is risk of contagion 
in banking since bank failures are dependent.18 This finding suggests a role for central banks 
in assisting distressed banks, whose failure may have a systemic impact.
1.3 The Safety Net: D eposit Insurance Schemes and th e Lender 
of Last Resort
The potential vulnerability of the banking system to runs and systemic crises is one of the 
major factors leading many scholars and policymakers to conclude that banks are unique and 
need to be regulated. In particular, systemic risk constitutes the fundamental rationale for the 
introduction and the development of the safety net arrangements, namely a form of deposit 
insurance and a lender of last resort facility.19 20
Although both the two instruments represent a form of insurance for the banking system, 
they differ in their task, scope, time of application and contractual arrangement. Traditionally, 
deposit insurance is assigned the task of protecting individual depositors by granting them 
the reimbursement of their claims in case of bank distress. As formally shown by Diamond 
and Dybvig (1983), this contractual arrangement is effective in preventing the occurrence of
18Schoenmaker (1996a) derives an autoregressive Poisson model, which adresses explicitly the possible spillover 
effects from one troubled bank to other banks and apply it to a data set of monthly bank failures under the US 
National Banking System from 1880 to 1936.
19This is clearly argued, among many others, by Gerald Corrigan, a former President of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, and reported in Kaufman (1994), ”It is the systemic risk phenomenon [...] - more than any 
other - that constitutes the fundamental rationale for the safety net arrangements that have evolved in this and 
other countries”.
20Investors' protection is often advocated as the other main reason for the need of regulation in the banking 
system, especially for the introduction of deposit insurance.
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runs without reducing banks’ ability to transform short-term liabilities into long-term assets. 
A demand deposit contract with government deposit insurance achieves optimal risk sharing 
among depositors as unique Nash equilibrium. Government’s ability to levy non-distortive taxes 
and deposit insurance guarantee induce depositors not to withdraw prematurely. Consequently, 
bank asset liquidation policy is independent from the volume of withdrawals, no strategic issues 
of confidence arise and no bank runs take place.
The lender of last resort (LOLR) facility is assigned the task of preventing the emergence 
of systemic crises (in the narrow sense) by supplying liquidity to individual banks in distress.21 
The exact scope and form of central bank intervention are highly controversial in the academic 
literature. The debate expresses four different views:22 the classic, the modern-pragmatic, the 
monetarist and the free banking. The main controversy among these schools centres on the 
trade-off between the benefits (prevention of contagion) and the costs (distortion of incentives- 
moral hazard problem) of bailing out distressed banks.23
According to the classic view,24 central banks have a role in lending freely at time of crises 
in order to avert panics. Loans should be made at a penalty rate and only against good 
collateral, so to be extended to illiquid but solvent banks. LOLR rules should be well defined 
and publicly announced. This should discourage banks from using central bank facilities to 
finance current operations and should prevent an indiscriminate rescue of all institutions. The 
ideas of market failure and of central banks having superior information on bank solvency are 
the main arguments for the necessity of LOLR interventions.25
21 Note that crisis management includes three courses of action: ’’taxpayer money solution”, ’’private money 
solution” and ’’central bank money solution” (Padoa-Schoppa (1999)). The first refers to the injection of taxpay­
ers’ money by Finance Minister; the second consists of the injection of private money by banks or other market 
participants; the third one refers to the injection of money created by central banks. The central banks money 
solution represents the LOLR function, in the strict sense. However, central banks often play a coordinating role 
for the private money solution to materialise. In terms of the models of contagion presented in section 2.2.1, the 
central bank should simply act as a coordinating device to prevent the contagion due to the incompleteness of 
markets in Allen and Gale (2000) and that due to a speculative gridlock in Freixas et al. (1999). Differently, 
the central bank should act as LOLR to prevent the fundamental gridlock which occurs in Freixas et al. (1999) 
when the closure of an insolvent bank jeopardises the stability of the entire system.
22See, for example, Bordo (1990).
23 The moral hazard problem, as well as the too big to fail doctrine, will be examined in details in the next 
section.
24The classical school is associated with the works of Thornton (1802) and Bagehot (1873).
25 According to Bagehot (1873), the market mechanism is unable to deal with bank liquidity shocks because 
of the presence of asymmetric information about bank solvency. This causes intermediaries not to be able to 
transmit credible information on the true asset value during a crisis.
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The modern-pragmatic view of LOLR focuses on the uncertainty about the true value of 
bank assets. Goodhart (1987) argues that it is virtually impossible, even for the central bank, 
to distinguish illiquidity from insolvency at the time the LOLR should act. Further, banks 
demanding such assistance are under a suspicion of insolvency since they could otherwise raise 
funds from the market. If illiquidity is inextricably connected with likelihood of insolvency, 
then central bank ability to lend only to solvent institutions may be hindered. Still, there is a 
role for LOLR intervention: Central banks should extend the emergency facility to individual 
banks whose distress may propagate to the entire system. Whenever the social cost of a bank 
failure is larger than its private cost, the central bank should enlarge discount window loans 
to individual banks. This does not have to imply a systematic and indiscriminate rescue of all 
banks: As the private cost of risk taking is reduced if the bank is rescued, the LOLR, as any 
insurance scheme, induces banks to take greater risk. Consequently, it is crucial that central 
banks prevent only the failures of individual banks, which are expected to have a systemic 
impact.
The monetarist school suggests a more restricted use of LOLR facility. Goodfriend and 
King (1988) argue that there is no need for central bank’s discount window loans to individual 
banks since open market operations are sufficient to deal with systemic liquidity crises. In other 
words, LOLR should intervene at the macroeconomic level but not at the microeconomic level. 
The rationale is the idea that the central bank is neither better informed nor more capable to 
deal with information problems than the private sector. Also, it may be under political pressure 
to extend loans to weak banks.
Proponents of free banking have an even more extreme position.26 They argue that no 
LOLR facility is needed and that public interference in the monetary system is the main cause 
of instability. Competitive forces would lead to an efficient and stable banking system where 
the possibility of systemic crises would be remote.
Despite the variety of opinions expressed in the academic debate, central banks actually act 
as LOLR in most countries and follow a rather uniform policy: They do bail out distressed 
financial institutions on the ground of eliminating the risk of contagion; they do not commit to 
a specific line of action but do use ” constructive ambiguity” in making their decisions on which
26 See, among others, White (1984) and Dowd (1989).
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banks they are likely to rescue. The use of discretion in LOLR policy should prevent banks 
from taking full benefit of the LOLR support and from increasing their risk.
The academic literature has recently provided some theoretical support to the LOLR policy 
implemented by central banks. Goodhart and Huang (1999) formalise the importance of the 
risk of contagion in central bank closure/rescuing decisions from a macromonetary perspective. 
There are two crucial aspects in the model: Policymakers cannot discern the state of solvency 
of institutions demanding liquidity; the cost of bank failure rises more rapidly with the size 
of the failing bank than the cost of bank rescue. In a static setting, the optimal behaviour 
of the LOLR is to support bigger banks and to let the smaller fail. This result justifies the 
use of constructive ambiguity: In order to prevent commercial banks from increasing their 
risk position, the threshold size for the LOLR support should not be publicly announced. In 
a dynamic setting, where the risk of contagion and/or the moral hazard problem of LOLR 
are introduced, the optimal LOLR policy is more complex. If contagion is the main concern, 
the central bank has an excessive incentive to rescue banks and the equilibrium risk level is 
consequently high. If moral hazard is the main concern, central bank incentives reduce largely 
and do not depend on bank size. When both contagion and moral hazard axe considered, the 
central bank incentives to rescue banks are stronger than in the single period setting but weaker 
than in the dynamic setting with only contagion.
Freixas (1999) provides a rationale for the use of constructive ambiguity from a microeco­
nomic perspective. In a cost-benefit analysis for bailing out banks, he finds that the optimal 
LOLR policy depends on the liability structure of the bank in distress -the amount of uninsured 
debt- and on central bank ability to credibly commit to a given policy. In the non-commitment 
case, the LOLR follows a pure strategy where support is provided to all banks with a low 
level of uninsured debt. In the commitment case, the LOLR may be a mixed strategy where 
LOLR is extended randomly to banks fulfilling the uninsured debt requirement. The use of a 
mixed strategy in the optimal LOLR policy is interpreted as the foundation of the constructive 
ambiguity policy.
Central bankers’ claim that the provision of LOLR helps in preventing contagion finds some 
support in the empirical evidence. Miron (1986) shows that the LOLR provision in the US has 
effectively limited the frequency of systemic crises. He finds that the creation of the Federal
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Reserve Board in 1914 reduced the probability of having a panic -in a given year- from 0.316 
to only 0.005 in the period 1914-1928. A similar result is found by Bordo (1990). Comparing 
the US and the UK in the years 1870-1913, he finds that the former experienced four massive 
crises and the latter had none in spite of the evident similarities in the business cycles of the 
two countries.27
1.4 The ” Moral Hazard” Problem
After about half a century of relative world-wide stability, massive bank failures occurred in 
1980s and 1990s in both industrialised and developing countries. Systemic crises arose in such 
different economies as the United States, Nordic countries, Russia, Japan, Chile, Argentina, 
Indonesia and Mexico. Regulators in United Kingdom, Italy, Germany and France intervened 
to rescue individual institutions in distress. Crisis management required huge injections of 
public resources: The cost of the bail-out policy amounted to 3.2 percent of GDP for the 
Saving&Loans in US,28 ranged from 2.8 to 4.0 percent in Scandinavian, was equal to 4 percent 
in Norway, to 6.4 percent in Sweden and to 8 percent in Finland; the rescue of Japanese banks 
costed more than $100 billion; the rescue of the Credit Lyonnais, whose losses were unofficially 
estimated about $10 billion, was the most massive single rescue up to that time experienced by 
the French government.29
The new wave of crises has spurred numerous studies on the causes of the problems and 
has contributed to renew the debate on the optimal design of financial regulation. According 
to most economists, one of the main causes of these crises was the excessive risk taking on the 
part of banks.
Concerning US experience, for example, Edwards and Mishkin (1995) show that banks 
became more fragile in the 1980s since they expanded their traditional lending activities in 
riskier areas and started to pursue new, off-balance-sheet, activities. The massive losses on
27The LOLR system was created in 1866 in the "UK while only in 1914 in the US.
28In the period 1984-1991 the United States experienced the failure of more than 1400 Saving & Loans and 
1300 commercial banks. James (1991) estimates that total losses on assets occured in the shorter period 1985-88 
averaged 30 percent of the failed bank’s assets. Losses on assets are measured as the difference between the book 
value of assets and the recovery value net of the direct expences associated with the failure.
29Data are from Caprio and Klingebiel (1996).
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loans realised during the 1980s and the peak reached in 1987 witness the decline in bank asset 
quality. Similar evidence is also found by Boyd and Gertler (1993) in an analysis of bank assets 
and liabilities over the post-war period.
Several elements can explain the increased risk exposure of most banking systems in the last 
two decades. One of most recognised is the moral hazard problem induced by ill-designed deposit 
insurance schemes and by the de facto complete protection offered by regulators implementing 
forbearance and (often) systematic bail out policies.
The moral hazard problem, as by-product of safety net arrangements, entails two forms of 
excessive risk taking:
- deposit insurance induces banks, especially those poorly capitalised, to undertake greater 
risks since depositors do not have any incentives to monitor their banks’ asset value;30
- a systematic use of LOLR facilities encourage banks to take more risk since they can rely 
on future bailout in case of distress.
Several studies analyse the potential distortions of the safety net, whether in the form of 
deposit insurance or LOLR facilities, from a theoretical perspective. Merton (1977) formalises 
the moral hazard risk of fixed-rate deposit insurance by using option theory. He argues that if 
deposit premia are risk-insensitive, banks may take on higher risks in order to maximise the put 
option value implicit in the deposit insurance. Boot and Greenbaum (1993) show that a fixed- 
rate deposit insurance induces banks to monitor their borrowers less. Under the assumptions 
of convex monitoring costs and risk neutral agents, a profit maximising bank faces a concave 
objective function that reaches its maximum at an inefficient level of monitoring whenever the 
bank finances itself with fully insured demand deposits 31
The severity of the moral hazard problem induced by the LOLR facility depends on the 
likelihood with which distressed financial institutions are bailed out. If central banks could 
credibly commit to rescue only illiquid banks, the moral hazard problem would be minimal: 
Bankers would have no incentives to take on excessive risk because they would anticipate they
30Empirical evidence on the thrift industry during the 1980s shows that capital deficient and insolvent Saving 
& Loans were the mostly involved in riskier non-traditional activities in order to maximise the value of deposit 
insurance (see, for example, Kane (1985)).
31 Note that already Diamond and Dybvig (1983) recognize that their result on the optimality of a complete 
deposit insurance relies heavily on the assumption of riskless technology. Indeed, the authors observe that once 
the choice of bank portfolio risk is taken into account, a moral hazard problem would exist and the introduction 
of a complete deposit insurance might distort bank incentives.
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would fail in case of insolvency. However, such a policy may be neither credible nor optimal. 
Firstly, as mentioned before, the central bank may not be able to distinguish the state of 
solvency of banks demanding assistance; secondly, the central bank might choose to provide 
assistance to a potential insolvent institution if its failure would endanger systemic stability. 
In other words, in order to limit the risk of contagion, insolvent institutions might be rescued 
and this, in turn, reintroduces the risk of moral hazard. As formally showed by Goodhart and 
Huang (1999), when LOLR decisions are based on both risk of contagion and moral hazard 
problem, the optimal policy is characterised by a positive risk of moral hazard. This is the 
minimum level consistent with the minimisation of the risk of contagion.
If the provision of LOLR assistance to an individual distressed institution, even if insolvent, 
depends on the potential effects that its failure would have on the system, it is more likely 
that large-size banks and banks occupying key positions in the channels of contagion would 
be rescued. This is the rationale behind the so-called ’’too big to fail” (TBTF) policy often 
implemented by central banks. The term TBTF refers to a menu of policies, varying from 
assistance provision at the discount window to direct infusion of capital and protection of 
uninsured depositors, that central banks pursue in favour of large or important banks. The 
anticipated disparity of treatment between small and large (or important) banks in distress 
might result in an indiscriminate subsidy in favour of these latter.32 Nevertheless, TBTF may 
be an optimal LOLR policy to limit the social costs entailed by individual bank failures. This 
is formally shown by Goodhart and Huang (1999) in the case of big banks in distress, and by 
Freixas, Parigi and Rochet (1999) in the case of distressed banks having key positions in the 
payment system.
Another source of moral hazard induced by LOLR intervention is the so- called ’’too many to 
fail” policy (TMTF), which refers to the simultaneous bail out of a large number of institutions. 
Mitchell (1998) analyses the optimality and the distortions of the TMTF policy in formal terms. 
The crucial element of the model is the interplay between banks and regulators: Banks have 
to choose between passively rolling over loans in default or actively pursuing their claims; 
the regulator has to choose whether to monitor bank financial state and how to handle bank
32 In a study of US banks’ behaviour in the 1980s, Boyd and Gertler (1993) find supporting evidence of the 
risk taking effect induced by TBTF policy.
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failures. If banks are discovered to have been passive or to be insolvent, the regulator has to 
decide whether to monitor them further, and then decide the proper action, or just to rescue 
them. The choice depends on the cost of the two policies, which, in turn, is a function of the 
number of institutions in distress: For a given number of distressed banks, a TMTF policy 
is implemented whenever recapitalisation is the least costly option. Given the possibility of a 
future massive bailout, banks have more incentives to be passive. In particular, also banks that 
are financially distressed but still solvent may choose to be passive if they find it optimal to 
collude in order to trigger TMTF. In equilibrium, the regulator’s behaviour will depend on the 
fraction of distressed banks expected to be insolvent, on the cost of recapitalising banks and on 
the likelihood that solvent institutions will implicitly collude to trigger TMTF policy.
The controversy on the two distortionary LOLR policies can be considered as part of the 
debate on ’’rules versus discretion” in regulatory bailout and, more generally, in crisis manage­
ment. Supporters of a clearly stated set of rules consider the TBTF and TMTF policies just as 
a negative consequence of the ambiguity of central bank intervention. This discretionary power 
would result in a transfer of wealth from small to large banks and in an unconditional rescue of 
a large number of institutions in distress. On the contrary, supporters of regulatory discretion 
consider an ambiguous policy as necessary to bring in some market discipline and to deal better 
with the trade off between systemic risk and moral hazard implicit in crisis management.33
Another aspect of the ’’rules versus discretion” issue relates to the well known dichotomy 
’’flexibility versus laxity”. As pointed out by Rochet and Tirole (1996a), a public system has 
an undeniable advantage relative to a private one in that, by levying tax or issuing money, 
it does not encounter confidence crises. Such a flexibility, however, may become laxity if the 
public system is not rigorous enough. When regulatory standards, such as bank closure criteria, 
are weakened, the so-called forbearance policy can take place. This is defined as the decision 
of allowing an insolvent institution to remain open. Similarly to the case of systemic LOLR 
intervention, if banks anticipate they will be allowed to operate even if insolvent, they have 
strong incentives to take on high risks. As the Saving & Loans debacle confirms, this may result 
in greater losses and more failures than if regulators implemented tougher closure policies.34
33See, for example, Goodhart (1987).
34 See, for example, Kane (1990).
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Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) argue that forbearance policy is nothing but the failure of 
the so-called ’’representative hypothesis”. They study the role of the allocation of control rights 
to external investors as an incentive device to deter bank moral hazard. In the optimal rule, 
control should be allocated to debtholders when the bank performs poorly. However, since 
depositors are small, uninformed and free-riders, they need to be represented by an agent, the 
regulator, who should act as a large uninsured depositor and implement the optimal closure 
policy. The ’’representative hypothesis” works successfully only if regulator’s objective function 
is the minimisation of depositors’ losses. Whenever the regulator pursues other interests, such 
as reputation, or he is resource constrained, he may become too passive and the ’’representative 
hypothesis” fails. The regulator may undertake the so-called ’’regulatory gambling” policy, that 
is he may conceal banks difficulties in the hope that a positive shock will recapitalise them in 
the future without any further intervention.
1.5 The R esponses to  the Moral Hazard Problem
The new wave of bank crises has contributed to renew the debate on the optimal design of 
financial regulation among both policymakers and academics. Several proposals have been put 
forth to reduce the moral hazard problem induced by the safety net arrangements and the 
protective attitude of regulators.
The debate proposes two approaches: One, which can be defined as regulation-oriented, 
focuses on how to reform deposit insurance, how to induce regulators to intervene optimally, 
and how to strengthen prudential regulation, particularly in the form of capital requirements; 
the other, which can be as defined market-oriented, suggests to scale back deposit insurance 
and impose greater market discipline on banks in the form of uninsured claimholders’ (either 
depositors or other debtholders) monitoring.
Proposals on the reform of deposit insurance focus on the premium structure as a crucial 
element in the design of the optimal insurance scheme.35 Risk sensitive premia may represent 
an incentive mechanism for bankers’ risk taking even in the presence of asymmetric information 
between banks and the deposit insurer.
35 Other crucial parameters, which I will not discuss here, are the nature, public or private, and the funding 
sources of the deposit insurer. On these issues, see, for example, Baltensperger and Dermine (1987).
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Proposals on central bank intervention rely on the idea that effective regulatory monitoring 
and tough closure policy are important factors in limiting bank risk. The analysis of regulators’ 
incentives to monitor and to close banks is crucial especially when creditors have no incentives 
in disciplining banks because of complete deposit insurance.
Proposals on the strengthening of prudential regulation centre on the common belief that 
larger capital ratios reduce bank risk taking. High capital levels should promote stability in 
two ways: First, they represent a cushion to absorb losses, thus reducing the likelihood of 
failure; secondly, with more stake at risk, bankers should have fewer incentives to take on 
risk. However, theoretical results on the effects of capital requirements on bank risk taking are 
controversial. Kareken and Wallace (1978) show that bankers’ incentives to take on risk decrease 
with the introduction of capital requirements when banks maximise the equity value and seek to 
exploit deposit insurance. On the other hand, in a high mean-variance framework with utility- 
maximising banks, Kahane (1977) finds that capital requirements are not only ineffective in 
controlling risk but they may even induce bankers to choose riskier assets.36 Similarly, Boot 
and Greenbaum (1993) find that the introduction of capital requirements may worsen bank 
moral hazard as it may reduce monitoring effort and, hence, bank asset quality.37
More recent contributions suggest to analyse the efficacy of capital ratios in more general 
frameworks, which take into account other regulatory tools, such as deposit insurance, regula­
tory monitoring and bank closure policy. The idea is to investigate the complementarity and/or 
the substitutability of capital ratios with other regulatory incentive devices. Another impor­
tant strand of literature focuses on how to appropriately compute capital requirements. Two 
examples are the value-at-risk models for market risk and the pre-commitment approach.38
In the following, I review some selected theoretical contributions to the debate on how to
36Keeley and Furlong (1990), however, criticise Kahane’s approach for its inconsistency and claim that capital 
requirements are effective prudential devices. With a similar approach to Merton (1978), the authors show 
that capital ratios prevent intermediaries from choosing excessive risky assets since they reduce the value of the 
implicit option available to an insured bank. Negative effects of capital requirements on bank risk taking are 
however found also in Koehn and Santomero (1980), Besanko and Kanatas (1996) and Gennotte and Pyle (1991).
37 Also Hellwig (1995) regards capital requirements as an inadeguate regulatory response to banking excessive 
risk taking. He argues that an exaustive theoretical analysis of the implications deriving from capital require­
ments, both at micro and macro level, is still lacking and that capital regulation cannot substitute uninsured 
creditors’ monitoring of bank asset value, as argued, for example, in Dewatripont and Tirole (1994).
38 See Freixas and Rochet (1997) for a more detailed survey on the effects of capital requirement on bank risk 
taking (the so-called portfolio approach to solvency regulation) and Goodhart et al. (1998) for an overview of 
the new techniques for risk management.
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ameliorate bank moral hazard problem. In particular, I focus on the following issues: i) risk 
sensitive deposit insurance premia; ii) regulatory monitoring and bank closure policy; iii) role 
of market discipline.39
1.5.1 R isk-Sensitive D eposit Insurance Prem ia
The idea of risk sensitive deposit insurance is that, if bank asset risk can be accurately deter­
mined, then it is possible to eliminate any advantage from increasing risk through an adequate 
adjustment of the insurance premium. The practical problem is that the implementation of 
this proposal requires information that is often not available to regulators.
Insurance pricing cannot be conditioned directly on bank risk profile if banks have private 
information about their asset value and the investments they undertake. In this case, the insurer 
can try to acquire some information either thorough costly periodic audits and examinations or 
through the design of a risk sensitive pricing system that induces banks to disclose their private 
information. Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor (1992) study the feasibility of such a system in a 
context where banks’ type and asset choice are not observable to the deposit insurer. They show 
that a deposit insurance pricing linked to banks’ observable reported capital can induce banks 
to reveal their type and to make the appropriate asset choice. However, this is not possible if 
the deposit insurance premium is fairly priced, that is if the deposit insurer has to break even on 
each individual institution, and the banking sector is perfectly competitive. A fairly priced and 
completely risk-sensitive deposit insurance is implementable only if banks have access to rents, 
either through explicit regulatory subsidies or restricted entry into banking. The reason is that 
if banks do not have any rents, they are indifferent to the capital structure and high-risk banks 
find it optimal to mimic their low risk peers when deposit insurance premia are risk-adjusted.
Thus, fairly priced deposit insurance is incompatible with a competitive credit market in 
which private information and moral hazard distort the equilibrium. Successful sorting instru­
ments are charter values, induced by entry restrictions, or deposit-linked subsidies accomplished 
by an insurance pricing scheme inversely linked to capital requirement. Nevertheless, the design 
of contracts that would arise in a competitive insurance market may not be the appropriate
39 Other interesting proposals, which I will not discuss in this chapter, include cash asset reserve require­
ment, limits on discount window borrowing and portfolio restrictions. On the debate about these issues see 
Bhattacharya, Boot and Thakor (1998).
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objective for bank regulators in the presence of important externalities in the banking industry, 
such as informational asymmetries or risk of contagion.40
Freixas and Rochet (1999) question the result of incompatibility between fairly priced de­
posit insurance and competitive banking market argued by Chan, Greenbaum and Thakor 
(1992). They show that under more general assumptions on bank operating costs, fairly priced 
deposit insurance becomes possible in a competitive banking system, even when an adverse se­
lection problem is present. However, such a scheme is not desirable, since the optimal premium 
schedule would entail a subsidisation of the less efficient banks by the more efficient ones.
Gianmarino, Lewis and Sappington (1993) study the optimal design of a risk-adjusted de­
posit insurance scheme in a context where monopoly profit-maximising banks have private 
information on their environment and activities, and the regulator maximises social welfare, 
which is given by bank profits less the social costs of government involvement and of financial 
failures. The key result is that the first best level of asset quality cannot be achieved in the 
socially optimal deposit insurance scheme. This is because of the trade-off between information 
asymmetries and costly government intervention: Since deposit insurance is financed through 
distortive taxes, the regulator has to limit the informational rents accruing to banks, which, 
in turn, will not have adequate incentives to choose the first best level of asset quality. So, an 
incentive-compatible deposit insurance pricing scheme is not optimal: The benefits in terms of 
higher asset quality are not counterbalanced by the distortions in terms of costly regulatory 
intervention necessary to achieve incentive-compatibility.41
1.5.2 R egulatory M onitoring and Bank Closure Policy
With full deposit insurance, creditors do not play any active role in monitoring and disciplining 
banks. Regulators act on behalf of depositors to limit bank risk taking. The analysis of 
how to provide regulators with the appropriate incentives to implement the optimal level of 
monitoring and to take the proper actions becomes crucial. As noted by Tirole (1994a), the 
design of an optimal incentive scheme for public regulators is not straightforward because some 
of their performance variables are not easily measurable and their actions are often driven by
40 The sacrifice of fair price deposit insurance for the achievement of the optimal level of safety and soundness 
is, for example, suggested by Berlin, Saunders and Udell (1991).
41 Similar results are obtained by Bensaid, Pages and Rochet (1995).
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informal incentives, such as political and career concerns. Therefore, the regulator may be 
easily distorted away from undertaking the optimal action.
This is formally demonstrated by Boot and Thakor (1993). They consider a two-period 
model in which (i) in each period the bank chooses the investment risk (ii) the regulator monitors 
the bank asset choice in the first period and selects the level of bank capital at which to close 
the bank. The regulator’s monitoring is imperfect and depends on his quality. The result is 
that if there is even a little uncertainty about the regulator’s ability to monitor, he will not 
implement the optimal bank closure policy. Indeed, when the regulator cares also about his 
monitoring reputation, he chooses to close the bank at a lower capital level than what would 
be socially optimal. This is because the closure of a bank induces the market to down-grade 
its beliefs about the regulator’s monitoring ability. The more lax closure policy induces bank 
managers to choose a higher level of risk in both the two periods.
To sum up, a self-interested regulator purses a sub-optimal bank closure policy, which, in 
turn, induces banks to take on more risk. A similar result arises when monitoring banks is costly 
and the regulator is not benevolent. In this case, bank risk taking can be controlled by providing 
the regulator with adequate incentives to monitor, or, alternatively, by using complementary 
and/or alternative regulatory tools. Campbell, Chan and Marino (1992) study the optimal 
incentive contract between depositors and regulators. They use a static framework where the 
banking sector is perfectly competitive, depositors choose the capital requirements and the reg­
ulator has to monitor the bank asset choice. Monitoring technology is costly effort-related and 
the greater the effort, the greater the probability that the monitoring is perfectly informative. 
If the regulator is benevolent and his monitoring effort is observable, monitoring and capital 
requirements are at the first best levels, capital requirements are lower than without monitoring 
and depositors gain from the increased liquidity service of deposits. Conversely, if the regulator 
is self-interested and his actions are not observable, monitoring and capital requirements depart 
from the first best levels. Thus, depositors have to design an appropriate incentive scheme for 
the regulator, taking into account his personal resource constraint. When the regulator’s lim­
ited liability constraint is not binding, the first best solution is still attainable. The regulator 
expends the right monitoring effort in order to avoid the penalty imposed in the case of bank 
insolvency. When the regulator’s limited liability constraint is binding, only the second best
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solution is achievable since providing the regulator with the right incentives is too costly.42 The 
first best level of bank moral hazard deterrence can be achieved only through higher capital 
requirements and lower monitoring activity. So, if the regulator is benevolent or his limited 
liability constraint is not binding, direct monitoring and capital requirements are alternative 
mechanisms to limit bank risk taking incentives. Otherwise, they become complementary.
Apart from informational problems and/or inadequate incentives for regulators, other fac­
tors can preclude the implementation of optimal regulatory policies. Mailath and Mester (1994) 
investigate regulators’ incentives to close intermediaries in a dynamic framework, in which they 
introduce credibility concerns and a social opportunity cost of closing a bank. The analysis 
focuses on the interaction between banks’ current and future risk taking and closure rules. 
Profit-maximising banks have to choose between a riskier and a less risky project and their 
choice is observable to the regulator. The authors show: (i) the implementation of the clo­
sure policy depends on the regulator’s objective function and, in particular, on whether he is 
welfare-maximising or cost-minimising;43 (ii) both types of regulator fail to implement a ’’clear 
cut” closure policy, that is they do not close all insolvent banks and do not let all solvent banks 
operate. This is because the closure threat may be not credible and, therefore, ineffective in 
deterring bank risk taking.
Thus, forbearance may have different connotations. It needs not indicate that a regulator is 
passive or fraudulent. It may also indicate that the regulator faces a credibility problem with 
being tough if closing a bank is costly. Furthermore, forbearance may emerge as part of an 
optimal closure policy when bank assets are subject to market risk. This is argued by Nagarajan 
and Sealey (1995) in a context where banks operate under a moral hazard problem and their 
portfolio returns are subject to both specific and market risk. The authors show that the optimal 
regulatory policy involves promptly closure of banks that fail when good market conditions
42 The regulator’s personal resource constraint limits the penalty that can be imposed. So, when this constraint 
is binding, the first best monitoring level can be induced only with a compensation package composed of a higher 
reward in the case of bank solvency and a lower penalty in the case of bank insolvency. Then, depositors optimally 
trade off the value of monitoring against the cost of inducing the monitor to exert effort and find it profitable to 
rely more on capital requirements than on monitoring to deter bank risk taking.
43 The welfare-maximising regulator cares about the payoff of all agents and, therefore, he takes into account 
the social opportunity cost of closing a bank, in the form of forgone intermediation service. The cost-minimising 
regulator is only concerned with his insurance payments to depositors. There is not a univoque correspondence 
between thoughness of closure policy and regulator’s objective. Indeed, the cost-minimising regulator may have 
either stronger or weaker incentives to leave the bank open than the welfare-maximising regulator.
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prevail and forbearance (although with a certain probability) of banks that fail when market 
conditions are poor. The optimal policy include also a minimum capital requirement so to 
prevent banks from undertaking a ’’gambling for resurrection” behaviour, but it is independent 
of the deposit insurance pricing.44 This latter only influences the regulator’s profit condition: 
The regulator can break-even under a risk-sensitive deposit insurance scheme, whilst he may be 
obliged to offer a subsidy under a flat-rate pricing scheme. The irrelevance of deposit insurance 
pricing for the design of the optimal regulatory policy suggests that the risk-shifting problem 
induced by a fixed-rate deposit insurance may be overestimated if not analysed within a more 
comprehensive regulatory package.
The optimality of the forbearance policy remains however a controversial issue in the aca­
demic debate. More research is needed. The scope of the forbearance policy needs to be 
investigated in richer frameworks, which consider also other relevant parameters, such as mar­
ket structure. A first attempt in this direction is Acharya and Dreyfus (1989). They find that 
the closure policy of a cost-minimising regulator depends on the spread between the expected 
rate of return on bank assets and the interest rate on deposits, which is in turn a function of 
market structure. In particular, they show that when this spread is low, banks face a positive 
probability of being closed when the ratio of assets-to-deposits falls below an endogenously 
determined threshold level. Since this level is greater than one, healthy banks may be closed 
in a competitive environment. Differently, when the spread is sufficiently large, the regulator 
always finds it optimal to let banks operate. Thus, in a monopoly setting all banks are allowed 
to operate, whilst in a competitive setting bank solvent banks may be closed.
1.5.3 T he R ole o f Market D iscipline
The basic idea of the market-oriented approach is that a system without deposit insurance 
could credibly restore discipline on banks. Some policymakers have argued that a market- 
based monitoring system, where depositors discipline banks by threatening to withdraw their 
funds, would limit regulatory forbearance and would provide a credible threat of bankruptcy.45
44The ’’gamble for resurrection” behaviour refers to banks’ incentives to maximise risk when they are let 
operate even if insolvent.
45See, for example, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (1990) and Broaddus (1994). Also Boyd and Gertler 
(1993) sympathize with the idea of scaling back deposit insurance in order to reintroduce market forces.
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46 Depositors at uninsured banks would have an incentive to run as soon as they have doubts 
about the solvency of the intermediary, thus forcing a tough and rapid closure.
Some contributions have analysed the incentive effects of demandable debt on bank risk 
taking. Calomiris and Kahn (1991) show that the threat of bank liquidation disciplines the 
banker when he can fraudulently divert resources ex post. Their analysis focuses on the issue 
of costly acquisition of information by depositors and gives a rationale for the imposition of 
the ’’sequential service constraint” in the repayment of depositors. Calomiris and Kahn regard 
bank runs as always beneficial since they prevent fraud and allow the salvage of some of the 
bank value. The result is then that any extra market intervention, such as deposit insurance 
or central bank facilities, is both unnecessary and undesirable because it would only lower 
depositors’ welfare.
This may not hold any more when bank runs arise from the co-existence of heterogenous 
depositors (informed, uninformed and ’consumption-oriented’ depositors ). As I will show 
in chapter 3, market discipline can be effective in resolving the moral hazard problem that 
arises when depositors do not know whether bankers are monitoring the projects they finance. 
However, market discipline may come at a cost. When depositors are not equally informed about 
the future value of bank assets, withdrawals caused by a liquidity shock may be confused with 
future insolvency and cause uninformed depositors to precipitate a run. Likewise, withdrawals 
due to upcoming insolvency may be confused with a liquidity shock and dissuade depositors 
from running. Bank runs may be, therefore, costly and imperfect disciplinary devices for 
bankers. This result suggests a role for extra market interventions: Any attempt to make market 
discipline work should entail adequate regulatory measures aimed to eliminate its inefficiencies.
Another possible inefficiency of market discipline stems from the contagious nature of bank 
runs. Chen (1999) shows that depositors’ monitoring can prevent the banker from liquidating 
the long-term project at the interim date and investing in an inefficient short-term project. 
However, market discipline may be inefficient because depositors at one bank may withdraw 
their funds from their bank in response to failures of other banks. That is, runs at some banks 
may cause runs at others. Since the contagion is based on noisy information, it entails sociar
46Debtholders can exert discipline on banks also through the pricing of their claims. See, for example, Benston 
et al. (1986) and Calomiris (1998).
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costs.
As I will discuss further in chapter 3, the two explanations of the inefficiency of market 
discipline differ in the mechanism generating such inefficiency. While in the model I develop in 
chapter 3, the source of inefficiency originates inside the bank and disruptive runs can occur 
even if some depositors are already informed on the value of their bank’s assets, in Chen’s model 
it originates outside the bank and contagion takes place before depositors at one bank receive 
precise bank-specific information. In this sense, the sources of market discipline inefficiency in 
two contributions are complementary.
One plausible objection to the proposal of relying on depositors’ monitoring to discipline 
bank risk taking is that small retail depositors, even if uninsured, would have little incentives to 
monitor. However, recent empirical evidence supports the market-oriented approach. Park and 
Peristani (1998) and Peria and Schmukler (1998), among others, show that both in developed 
and developing economies depositors do react to the deterioration of banks’ balance sheet. They 
find that depositors, whether small or large, punish risky banks by withdrawing their funds or 
by requiring higher interest rates.
1.6 C om petition and Fragility of the Banking System
In the previous sections, I have reviewed the literature on bank fragility, excessive risk taking 
and regulation. In particular, I have analysed contributions aiming to explain why the banking 
sector is vulnerable to individual runs and systemic crises, why it needs to be regulated, how 
public intervention creates distorsions in terms of excessive risk taking, and which measures 
can be adopted to ameliorate bank moral hazard problems. Risk-sensitive capital requirements 
and deposit insurance premia, and tough bank closure policy have been analysed as potential 
devices to control bank excessive risk taking. Also, market discipline in the form of uninsured 
depositors’ monitoring has been suggested as effective measure.
One aspect that has been largely ignored by the banking literature concerns the relationship 
between competition, stability and regulation. Most of the contributions reviewed so far pay 
very little attention to the strategic interaction among banks and ignore the effects of market 
structure on bank stability and on the effectiveness of the measures aiming to preserve it.
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Most of the models assume that banks operate in a perfectly competitive environment or in 
a monopoly setting. For example, models of bank runs analyse the effects of demandable 
debt offered by banks operating either in a competitive or in a monopoly setting. In both 
circumstances, runs emerge in equilibrium either as a consequence of depositors’ coordination 
failure or as depositors’ rational response to the arrival of negative information about bank 
future solvency. These models do not tell in which market structure the banking system is more 
likely to be unstable. Neither they do explore the effectiveness of the safety net arrangements 
and of other regulatory measures in different market settings.
In the following, I review the few theoretical contributions that address the relationship 
between competition, stability and regulation. In line with the previous sections, I present 
firstly the models addressing the link between market structure and fragility, and, secondly, 
those focusing on market structure and excessive risk taking. Finally, I describe the models 
on competition and regulatory reforms. Note that only few of the contributions I will discuss 
attempt to endogenise aspects of industrial organisation. The majority of them just compare 
the equilibria achievable in different market setting without taking into account any strategic 
interaction among intermediaries.
The link between financial fragility and competition among banks is analysed by De Palma 
and Gary-Bobo (1996). The model focuses on the relationship between Cournot competition on 
the loan market and depositors’ withdrawal decisions. Intermediaries issue demandable deposits 
and grant loans to limited liability firms. Loans are subject to macroeconomic shocks and can 
be liquidated prematurely only at a cost. After depositing their funds at a bank, depositors 
receive information on the future bank solvency and decide whether to withdraw their deposits 
or to wait. If they decide to withdraw, an information-based run occurs. Depositors’ decisions 
depend on their probabilistic beliefs about the uncertain returns of bank investments. Such 
beliefs are described by a bimodial density function, which represents their hesitation between 
two views of the world in a state of crisis. The Cournot competition on the loan market, 
together with depositors’ bimodial belief distribution, generates multiple equilibria: In the safe 
equilibrium, banks offer a small amount of loans at a high interest rate and bear no bankruptcy 
risk. In the risky equilibrium, banks supply a large amount of loans but are subject to a positive 
probability of runs when depositors receive a bad signal.
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Since depositors are uninsured and there no capital requirements in the model, De Palma 
and Gary-Bobo suggest to interpret their analysis as a theory of deregulated banking compe­
tition. Consequently, the results suggest that a deregulated system with market imperfection 
is potentially highly fragile. However, coordination problems among depositors can emerge 
also independently of competition and, consequently, can occur in any market configuration. 
This is shown by Matutes and Vives (1996) in a model that introduces product differentiation 
and network externalities in the classic framework of Diamond (1984). Unlike in Diamond, 
banks cannot fully diversify their portfolios, even if there are economies of scale, and, as a 
consequence, they can fail. The distress probability of a bank is endogenously determined by 
depositors’ expectations, which are self-fulfilling due to scale economies. A bank perceived to 
be safer commands a higher margin and a larger market share, which, in turn, makes it actually 
safer because of better diversification. The self-fulfilling character of depositors’ expectations 
implies multiple equilibria. Possible equilibria include corner solutions, where one bank is out 
of the market, and even no banking. This event is interpreted as a systemic crisis or, consis­
tently with Diamond and Dybvig (1983), as a sunspot run. The bad equilibrium is due to a 
coordination problem among depositors, which arises for reasons similar to those encountered 
in the network literature, irrespective of the competition on the deposit market.
The relationship between competition and bank fragility is also analysed by Smith (1984). 
He uses a Diamond and Dybvig (1983) framework where banks compete to attract depositors 
that have different probability distributions over the dates of withdrawal. When information 
is perfect, there exists a Nash equilibrium that achieves the optimal contract: Banks attract 
depositors by announcing state contingent vectors of first and second period interest rates and 
break even on each type of deposit offered. Conversely, if an adverse selection problem is 
present, that is if depositors only know their own probability of withdrawals, there may not 
exist a Nash equilibrium. This is due to the fact that the equilibrium contract, either pooling 
or separating, is destroyed by the possibility of banks offering positive profit contracts to a 
specific segment of depositors. When this is the case, the banking system in not viable or, in 
other terms, is unstable. Thus, competition for deposits makes banks fragile in an environment 
characterised by adverse selection problems.
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1.7 M arket Structure and Excessive Risk Taking
Competition in banking has traditionally been blamed for excessive risk taking. High bank 
charter values have been regarded as a strategic regulatory instrument, justifying the imposition 
of structural limitations and/or the allowance by governments of collusive agreements among 
banks.
The deregulation wave that occurred in the 1980s has been considered as a major cause of 
the moral hazard problem that contributed to trigger the massive bank crises in the last two 
decades. The Saving and Loans debacle showed how the competitive pressure from mutual funds 
on the deposit market and the subsequent release of some regulatory constraints induced many 
thrift institutions to undertake riskier activities, thus increasing their probability of failure. 
Edwards and Mishkin (1995) argue that the excessive risk taking observed in the U.S. system 
in the 1980s was nothing but banks’ response to their diminished profitability in an attempt 
to maintain their position as financial intermediaries. Banks’ lower profitability was, in turn, 
a consequence of greater competition in financial markets, which decreased the cost advantage 
that banks had in acquiring funds and undercut their positions in the loan market.
Keeley (1990) provides empirical support to the hypothesis that enhanced competition in­
duces banks to take greater risk through a reduction of their charter values. In a study on 
US banks over the period 1970-1986, he finds that those with more market power had a lower 
default risk, as reflected in lower risk premia on large and uninsured CD’s. Furthermore, he 
argues that the banking system was stable until the 1980s, despite the presence of a fixed- 
rate deposit insurance scheme, because high charter values were effective in countervailing its 
perverse effects. Once the regulatory constraints were eased in the 1980s, the charter values 
decreased and banks started to assume greater risks in the pursuit of the risk engendered by 
deposit insurance.
Moving from Keeley’s results, some papers (the so-called ’charter value’ literature) have 
analysed, from a theoretical perspective, the incentive effects of high charter values for bank 
risk taking. Besanko and Thakor (1993) build a model of relationship banking to examine 
the effects of interbank competition on bank portfolio choice. Lending relationships between 
intermediaries and borrowers provide banks with informational advantages over other lenders 
and, consequently, with informational rents. To the extent that the bank and the borrowers
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share these rents, both parties have an incentive in continuing the relationship. Thus, despite 
the presence of risk-insensitive deposit insurance, banks are induced to limit their risk exposure 
in order to enjoy the value of the relationship. However, as the banking industry becomes more 
competitive, relationship banking decreases in value and, in turns, banks take more risk.
Boot and Greenbaum (1993) reach similar results. They develop a two-period model in 
which banks can affect the payoff distribution of investment projects through costly monitor­
ing. Banks have different monitoring abilities, which are not observable. Monitoring increases 
banks’ expected profits in two ways: On the one hand, it decreases project risk; on the other 
hand, it improves banks’ reputation as capable monitors, thus lowering their subsequent fund­
ing costs. Funding-related reputational benefits and rents are then substitute mechanisms for 
limiting bank risk exposure. Incentives based on reputation are available only to banks that 
are uninsured. By fixing banks’ future funding costs, risk-insensitive deposit insurance destroys 
the funding benefits related to reputation, thus discouraging monitoring and inducing excessive 
risk. This is especially undesirable when increased competition reduces monopoly rents.
However, the negative link between competition and excessive risk taking becomes blurred 
in richer frameworks where banks use more than one instrument in dealing with asymmetric 
information. Caminal and Matutes (1997a) develop a static model in which banks can use 
monitoring and credit rationing to deal with a moral hazard problem on the part of the entre­
preneur. The two instruments are imperfect substitute incentive devices: Monitoring is costly, 
whilst credit rationing reduces the potential gain from trade. If the bank does not monitor, it 
reduces credit in order to induce entrepreneurs to choose the appropriate investment project. 
The model compares the outcomes of two extreme market structure, namely monopoly and 
Bertrand competition on the loan market. Two countervailing forces determine the loan size 
and, consequently, asset risk in equilibrium: On the one hand, when banks enjoy high market 
power, they tend to set higher lending rates and higher levels of monitoring, thus decreasing 
the proportion of credit-constrained borrowers. On the other hand, given a level of monitoring, 
a higher interest rate worsens the firm incentive problem, which in turn tightens the credit 
constraints. If the first effect is sufficiently strong, monopoly leads to higher interest rates and 
greater loan size. Due to the assumption of multiplicative aggregate shocks, this implies that a 
monopoly bank faces a higher failure probability than a competitive bank. As a consequence,
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the relationship between market power and failure probability is ambiguous: Since a monopoly 
bank acquires more information and uses less credit rationing, it may be more exposed to 
macroeconomic uncertainty, leading to a higher bankruptcy probability.
1.8 C om petition and Regulatory Structure
As discussed insofar, the existing theoretical models are not sufficiently robust to deliver clear 
conclusions on the link between competition and stability, in both dimensions of fragility and 
excessive risk taking. Some models show that competition undermines stability, whilst some 
others conclude that instability arises irrespective of competition and, even, that monopoly 
settings may be more unstable than competitive environments.
As a consequence, also the normative implications of the relationship between competition 
and stability axe not well understood yet. Existing contributions tend to indicate that com­
petition and regulation influence each other and that, as a consequence, the effectiveness of a 
particular regulatory measure cannot be assessed independently on the market structure, which, 
in turn, may change with the new regulatory environment.
Matutes and Vives (1996) extend their analysis on competition and fragility, by investigat­
ing the welfare effects of deposit insurance. They show that deposit insurance prevents the 
coordination problem among depositors, thus eliminating the risk of fragility. However, de­
posit insurance implies a welfare trade-off: On the one hand, it prevents bank collapses and 
tends to enlarge the market. On the other hand, by ensuring that all banks are active, it 
may preclude the realisation of desirable diversification and may induce fiercer competition for 
deposits, which, in turn, increases the failure probability of banks. The net welfare effects of 
deposit insurance are ambiguous and cannot be assessed independently of the market structure. 
Also, by extending the market, the introduction of deposit insurance has the potential effect of 
changing the market structure from one where banks have local monopoly power to one where 
they compete.
Turning to the impact of competition on excessive risk taking, regulation can affect the way 
in which charter values are generated and, in turn, affect their impact on banks’ incentives 
to take risk. Nagarajan and Sealey (1995) argue that when higher margins are the result of
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a forbearance policy that extends the expiration of equity holders’ call option, they may not 
result in higher quality of bank assets. In particular, high charter values provoke excessive risk 
taking when they are generated by a non-optimal forbearance policy.
Thege results suggest also that the perverse link between competition and stability may be 
corrected by adjusting regulation to the structural changes in banking. This could be done, 
for instance, through effective closure policy or risk-adjusted deposit insurance. Cordelia and 
Yeyati (1998) investigate the impact of competition on the determination of deposit interest 
rates and on bank risk taking behaviour under different deposit insurance arrangements. They 
develop a model of spatial competition where banks choose privately their portfolio risk and 
face an imperfectly elastic demand for financial services. Under fixed-rate deposit insurance, 
enhanced competition increases deposit rates and risk. Indeed, a lower product differentiation 
among banks increases the interest rate elasticity of deposit supply and induces tougher price 
competition and lower margins, thus reducing banks’ incentives to limit risk. Conversely, under 
risk-adjusted deposit insurance, deposit rates and asset risk are lower than under a flat-rate 
pricing scheme. When risk information is disclosed to the deposit insurer who can charge a 
risk-based premium on deposits, banks can credibly commit to reduce asset risk, thus reducing 
the cost of funds and improving their overall performance.
The welfare implications of enhanced competition on bank risk taking under different deposit 
insurance schemes are also examined by Matutes and Vives (2000). They develop a model of 
product differentiation where banks subject to limited liability compete for deposits and their 
failure entails social costs. Banks choose the risk of their portfolio and the deposit rate, whilst 
investors decide how much to deposit at each bank. The risk of banks’ portfolios can be either 
observable or unobservable by investors; deposits can be either uninsured or insured. In the 
latter case, deposit insurance pricing can be either flat or risk-sensitive. In an uninsured market, 
high failure costs and intense competition lead to excessive deposit rates. The more competitive 
the market, the larger the set of failure costs for which the deposit rates are excessive. In the 
limit case of perfect competition, deposit rates are always excessive, independently of the size of 
failure costs. Uninsured market performance can be improved through deposit rate regulation, 
which can maximise welfare when bank asset risk is observable, whilst needs to be complemented 
with investment restrictions when bank asset risk is not observable.
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Deposit insurance modifies banks’ incentives to set deposit rates and to take on asset risk. 
Flat deposit insurance makes banks more aggressive in deposit rate setting, thus inducing them 
to maximise asset risk, irrespective of the costs of failure. Both deposit regulation and asset 
restrictions are needed to improve welfare. Risk-sensitive deposit insurance generates lower 
equilibrium levels of deposits rates and asset risk than uninsured markets. However, when 
failure costs are high, welfare may still be improved by introducing deposit rate ceilings.
1.9 Conclusions
This chapter has reviewed the main theories on the issue of bank stability and regulation. In 
particular, it has highlighted two connotations of the term instability, fragility and excessive 
risk taking, and has reviewed the literature accordingly. The vulnerability of banks to runs 
and systemic crises results from the specificity of intermediaries as liquidity providers and 
from the informational asymmetries characterising bank activities. The moral hazard problem 
of excessive risk taking is a distorsion created by an inadequate structure of the safety net, 
namely the way in which deposit insurance and the lender of last resort function are designed.
The bank crises that occurred in the last two decades have prompted a rethinking on how to 
preserve the soundness of the banking system, with particular concern on how to structure de­
posit insurance, regulatory interventions and capital requirements. The contributions surveyed 
in this chapter stress the potential of a risk-based deposit insurance and of a reduction of deposit 
insurance coverage in order to reintroduce market discipline in the form of uninsured deposi­
tors’ monitoring. Further, they stress the importance of regulators’ objective functions and the 
difficulty of providing regulators with adequate incentives to avoid laxity in the circumstances 
where forbearance is not part of the optimal regulatory design.
The literature on bank stability largely disregards the implications of different banking 
structures for the safety of the sector. The general argument is that competition worsens sta­
bility. For example, a perfectly competitive setting may be incompatible with a fairly-priced and 
incentive-compatible risk-adjusted deposit insurance, since its implementation requires banks 
to earn positive rents. Market power is seen as a mitigating factor of bank risk taking, since 
high margins act as a buffer against portfolio risk and increase the cost of bankruptcy.
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Nevertheless, the relationship between competition and stability becomes elusive in richer 
models, which consider imperfect competition and endogenise aspects of industrial organisa­
tion. Recent contributions suggest that coordination problems among depositors causing bank 
fragility can emerge independently of competition. Also, they show that a monopoly bank may 
face a higher failure probability than a competitive banking industry.
The relationship between competition and stability has important normative implications. 
Policy instruments and market structure influence each other: The effectiveness of a particular 
regulatory measure depends on the industrial setting, which, in turn, may change once the 
regulatory measure is implemented. The few contributions addressing the optimal regulation 
design in models of imperfect competition suggest that, even if competition hurts stability, its 
negative effects can be ameliorated by designing financial regulation appropriately.
To conclude, despite the general feeling that competition induces higher instability in bank­
ing, the theoretical literature is still far from being conclusive. The results on the link between 
competition and fragility, and on market structure and risk taking are still ambiguous. To 
achieve a better understanding both on the positive and normative aspects of the relationship 
between competition and stability, additional research is needed in several directions. First, 
the link between market structure and bank fragility is worth further study: models of runs 
and panics should be extended to situations of imperfect competition. Second, the effects of 
imperfect competition on bank risk taking should be examined in richer frameworks, which 
consider competition on both the loan and the deposit market. Third, on the normative side, 
further analysis is needed to evaluate the effectiveness of regulatory reform proposals.
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Chapter 2
The Bank Run Phenomenon: A  
Selective Review of the Literature 
within a Uniform Framework
2.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the phenomenon of bank runs, examining in detail the main theoretical 
literature on this topic.
The term ’’run” refers to the situation in which many or all depositors at one bank attempt 
to withdraw their funds simultaneously, forcing the bank to liquidate all its assets and to close 
down. Banks’ fragility originates in the peculiar structure of their balance sheets. They issue 
liquid liabilities in the form of demandable deposit contracts and invest in illiquid assets in 
the form of loans, which are costly to liquidate before maturity. This maturity transforma­
tion explains banks’ role as providers of liquidity to depositors and, at the same time, their 
vulnerability to runs.
The literature on bank stability has suggested different explanations for depositors’ with­
drawal decisions, which have implied different conclusions concerning the efficiency of runs. 
They have been regarded as ’’unfortunate and undesirable side-effect of demandable debt” in 
the literature of the early ’80s, as a ’’rational response of depositors to the arrival of nega­
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tive information, although sometimes erroneous” at the end of the ’80’s, as ’’perfect discipline 
devices” in the early ’90s and as ’’inefficient discipline device” very recently. These different 
connotations of the term ’’runs” derive from the different issues addressed in the literature in 
the course of time.
Two sets of questions have dominated the literature on bank stability: (1) Why are banks 
unstable? What are the costs of their instability? (2) Why have banks used demandable debt 
as the primary means of funds if it entails higher costs than other available means of financing, 
such as standard debt or equity?
The chapter is organised around these two sets of questions. The contributions on bank 
runs are divided into two categories, depending on the issues they address. The first category, 
defined as the ’’first generation” literature, focuses on the role of banks as providers of flexibil­
ity to depositors in their uncertain timing of consumption and regards runs as a consequence 
of the maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities. Depending on the mechanism trig­
gering depositors’ decisions to withdraw prematurely, contributions belonging to this category 
see runs as irrational (’’sunspot” approach) or information-based (’’asymmetric information” 
approach) events. The second category, defined as the ’’second generation” literature, examines 
the agency problems existing between a bank and its depositors and considers the role of runs 
as discipline devices for bankers’ moral hazard problems. Depending on whether depositors 
base their withdrawal decisions on perfect or noisy information, runs are now seen as efficient 
or costly incentive mechanism.
Before reviewing the literature, I describe a general model which I use as common framework 
in describing the contributions of both generations. This should facilitate the understanding of 
the different approaches of the literature, and the relation between these and the model I will 
develop in chapter 3.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the general framework used for the 
description of the literature. Section 3 analyses the main first generation models, making 
a distinction between the ’’sunspot” approach and the ’’asymmetric information” approach. 
Section 4 presents the second generation models, emphasizing whether runs are seen as efficient 
or inefficient discipline devices.
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2.2 The General M odel
In this section I develop a model which I use as general framework in describing the bank run 
literature.
Assumptions
1) Consider a three-date economy (T=0,l,2) with a single good. At date 0 investment is 
undertaken. At dates 1 and 2, investment returns are realised and agents consume.
2) TECHNOLOGY: There are two technologies available: a short-term storage technology, 
which transforms each unit of good at date 0 into one unit of good at date 1; a long-term 
technology, which converts one unit of good at date 0 into R  > 1 units of good at date 2. The 
long-term technology can be either deterministic or stochastic. In the latter case R  takes up 
two values, H  and L, with probability p and 1 — p, respectively, with H > 1 ,  0 < L < 1  and 
pH +  (1 — p) L>  l .1 The investment is perfectly divisible.
The long-term production process can be interrupted prematurely at a cost: Each initial 
unit of investment in the long-term technology yields a return I  < 1 if liquidated at date 1. This 
assumption captures the idea that investments are illiquid. In particular, it finds its explanation 
in the investment irreversibility in the case of deterministic technology and in the information 
advantage that investors have on the return R  in the case of stochastic technology.
Table 1 summarises the technologies available in the economy.
TECHNOLOGY
oIIEh 4 II
CMIIEh
Short term - 1 1 0
Long term - 1 t < l R =  <
/
R  > 1 if deterministic 
f  H >  1 p
< if stochastic 
[  1 >  L  >  0 1 - p
Table 1: Technology
3) DEPOSITORS: There is a continuum of depositors (consumers) who are endowed with one 
unit of good at date 0 and none at the other times. Consumers are all ex ante identical but
^ h e  case of deterministic return corresponds to the limit case p —► 1 and H  =  R.
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become either of type 1 or of type 2 at date 1 after a preference shock is realised. Type 1 agents 
are impatient, as they value today’s consumption more relative to tomorrow’s consumption. 
In the extreme case, they are assumed to die at date 1 and, therefore, to care only about 
consumption at that date. Conversely, type 2 agents prefer tomorrow’s consumption to today’s 
consumption and, in the extreme case, they derive utility only from consumption at date 2. 
More specifically, consumers’ utility functions are given by:
Ul (cii,C2 \ )=  u(cn) +Piu(c2i) for type 1 agents 
U2(ci2 , C22) =  u{c\2 ) +  P2u(c22) for type 2 agents
where is the consumption at date i of an agent of type j  and p{ is the intertemporal discount
factor with 1 > p2 > P\ > 0. Thus, p{ describes the degree of agents’ impatience. The
utility functions are smooth if p{ > 0 with i =  1,2, and they are comer when p1 =  0 and 
p2 > 0. In both cases, the utility functions Ux : R++ —> R  (with i =  1,2) are assumed to be 
twice differentiable, increasing, and satisfying the Inada conditions u'(0) =  00 and u'(00) = 0. 
Further, U% is assumed to be either strictly concave (u < 0) or linear (u =0) .  In the former 
case, agents are risk averse and their relative risk aversion coefficient, RRA = —cu!'(c)/u'(c), 
can be either bigger or small than one. In the latter case, agents are risk neutral.
Each agent has a probability t of becoming of type 1 and 1 — t of becoming of type 2. 
The probability t can be either a constant (no aggregate uncertainty) or a stochastic variable 
(aggregate uncertainty). In this case, t is assumed to be discrete with probability function q. 
As agents are ex ante identical, their ex ante utility function is given by:
U =  tUl {cu,C2i) +  (1 — t)U2(ci2,C22)-
Storage of goods is not allowed between dates 0 and 1, whilst it is allowed between dates 1 and 
2 .
4) INFORMATION: When the long-term technology is stochastic, the realisation of the return 
R  is publicly known only at date 2. However, a fraction a  of type 2 agents receives at date 
1 a signal s on the future value of R. The signal is the same for all depositors and can be 
either perfect or partial. In the former case, s corresponds to the future realisation of R ,
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that is s G {H,L}\ in the latter case, s is described by the distribution of ex post beliefs to 
which it could lead. The posterior beliefs, p and 1 — p, are consistent with the priors, that is 
p = where p3 is the value of p given that s is observed.
Observing the signal s can be either free or costly. When it is free, the fraction a  of 
informed depositors is either constant or stochastic, in which case it assumes the values a  or 0 
with probability r  and 1 — r, respectively. When observing the signal is costly, the fraction a 
of informed depositors is an endogenous variable of the model.
At date 0, agents do not know which type they will become and whether they will receive the 
signal at date 1 or not.2 At date 1, the preference shock and the signal s are privately observed. 
Further, the realisations of the variables t and a, if stochastic, are not publicly observable in 
the economy.
5) INTERMEDIARY: There is an intermediary in the economy, which collects individuals’ 
endowments and invests them in the technology available. Let Z  be the fraction of funds 
invested in the short-term technology and 1 — Z  that in the long-term technology. The bank 
can be either a mutual fund, which operates in a competitive sector and make zero profits, or 
a profit maximising institution, which operates in a monopoly industry.
In exchange for deposits, the bank offers individuals a demandable contract that gives them 
the right to withdraw per unit of investment either the amounts x\ at date 1 and X2 at date 
2 or the amounts y\ at date 1 and 2/2 at date 2. The amounts X{ and yi with i = 1,2 depend 
on the assumptions regarding the structure of the banking sector and depositors’ risk aversion, 
as specified below. Even if Xi and yi are designed at date 0 for the different depositors’ types, 
type 2 depositors can imitate type 1 agents and ask for type 1 withdrawal whenever they find 
it optimal to so.
6) DEPOSITORS’ REPAYMENT: At date 1 depositors decide whether to withdraw or leave 
their funds at the bank until date 2. All individuals withdrawing prematurely submit their 
withdrawal demands either sequentially or simultaneously and the bank uses the investment 
returns to repay them. If the bank is solvent, depositors receive the amount promised in the 
contract. Otherwise, depositors are repaid according to either a sequential service constraint
2 This assumption will not hold in Chen (1999), where depositors know at date 0 whether they will receive 
the signal at date 1 or not.
rule or a pro-rata rule. In the former case, the bank serves its depositors sequentially on a 
first-come, first-served basis until it exhausts its resources. In the latter case, the bank deals 
with customers simultaneously and resources are distributed proportionally among them.
7) TIMING: Figure 1 summarises the timing of the model. At date 0 individuals deposit their 
funds at the bank in exchange for a demandable debt, which entitles them to withdraw a pre­
determined amount in each period. Then, the bank invests. At date 1 each depositor discovers 
his type and, in the case of stochastic long-term technology, the fraction of informed type 2 
agents receives the signal s. Following this, all depositors make their withdrawal decisions.
If all depositors behave according to their true type (that is if each of them demands the 
withdrawal designed in the deposit contract for his type), the bank can satisfy their withdrawal 
demands and continue until date 2, when the long-term technology produces its return and 
claims are settled. Conversely, if depositors misreport their types and demand for type 1 
withdrawal, a bank run is originated: The bank liquidates all the investment and is closed 
down, whilst depositors are repaid according to either the sequential service constraint or to 
the pro-rata rule.
T=0 T=1 T=2
deposit contract 
determined; 
agents deposit 
their funds and 
the bank invests
Figure 1: Timing
Equilibrium
| depositors
preference make their
shock realised; withdrawal
eventual signal decisions;
received the bank
may liquidate 
investment
| claims
investment are settled 
returns 
realised
The equilibrium consists of two elements: the deposit contract at date 0 and depositors’ with­
drawal decisions at date 1. The contract is signed at date 0 and is conditional neither on 
depositors’ withdrawal decisions at date 1 nor on the signal s. It depends only on how many
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agents will turn to be of type 1 and of type 2, if known at date 0.3
a) THE DEPOSIT CONTRACT: The optimal contract choice problem for the deposit contract 
is solved by the vector \I> =  {cjj, cj2»c2i,c22» >  where c*j is the optimal consumption for an 
agent of type j  at date i and Z  is the fraction of deposits invested in the short-term technology. 
Under the assumptions of perfectly competitive banking system and deterministic long-term 
technology, the vector ^  satisfies:
U* =  max tU1(cn,c2i) + (1 -  t)U2(ci2, c22) (1)
{ey}
subject to:
tcn  +  (1 -  t)ci2 < Z  (2)
tc2i +  (1 -  t)c22 < i?(l -  Z) (3)
Uj (cij,c2j) > Uj (cik, C2k) With j ,k  = 1,2 and j  ^  k. (4)
Expressions (2) and (3) are the resource balance constraints for periods 1 and 2 respectively. 
Expressions (4) is the incentive compatibility constraint that guarantees that type j  depositors 
will prefer type j  withdrawal (cij,c2j) to type k withdrawal (cifc,c2jt).
The maximisation problem changes slightly when the long-term technology is stochastic as 
the amounts c2i and c22 and the expected utility function depend on the realisation of the 
return R. Expression (1) becomes:
U* =  maxE {tU1(cn ,c2i(R)) +  (1 -  t)U2(c12,c22 (R))} (l')
R
and the constraint (3) is given by:
t C 2 l H  + (1 -  t ) c 2 2 H  < H(1 — Z) (3')
tC21L +  (1 — t)c22L < - (^1 — Z). (3/;)
3 As it will be clear below, the inflexibility of the deposit contract to the signal s can play an important role
in determining the occurence of runs. The bank could indeed avoiding runs by making the contract conditional
on the signal s (Alonso (1996)).
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The solution to the above maximisation problem depends on the assumptions concerning agents’ 
risk aversion and the shape of their utility function. When the problem is solved, the bank sets 
its contract terms so that x\ =  c*l5 X2 =  , yi — cj2 and 2/2 =  cJh-
In the case of smooth utility functions and risk averse agents with RRA>1, the optimal
contract gives:4
c;2 < c*n
cl 1 > 1
C21 ^  °22 ^  R -
In the case of smooth utility functions and risk averse agents with RRA<1, the optimal contract 
gives:5
c 12 <  c i i  <  1
°21 <  °22-
Clearly, with comer utility functions, and independently of RRA, c |2 =  cjj =  0 obtains.
Finally, when depositors are risk neutral, they just consume their initial unit of deposit at 
date 0 and an amount equal to R  at date 2.6
The different assumptions concerning agents’ risk aversion, the liquidation value of long­
term technology I  and the rule used to repay depositors are the crucial ’’technical” factors 
triggering a bank run.
The determination of the deposit contract changes when the assumption of perfectly com­
petitive banking system is removed and the bank operates so as to maximises its profits. In 
this case, depositors are offered a contract which allows them just to break even and the bank 
retains all the surplus.
b) DEPOSITORS’ WITHDRAWAL DECISIONS'. Depositors make their withdrawal decisions
4 This resembles the solution in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), except for the fact that preferences are smooth 
here instead of corner.
5 This is the solution in Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988).
6 With risk neutral depositors, there is no reason to solve the maximisation problem since there is no optimal 
risk sharing among depositors (see, for example, Chari and Jagannathan (1988)).
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at date 1, after the realisation of the preference shock and the observation of the signal s 
by informed type 2 depositors in the case of stochastic long-term technology. Type 1 agents 
report truthfully their type to the bank and demand the repayment c*x at date 1 and djj at 
date 2 in the case of smooth preferences. The decision of type 2 agents is more complex and 
depends crucially on the assumptions concerning the long-run technology (deterministic versus 
stochastic, and the amount of the liquidation value), depositors’ risk aversion and the repayment 
rule (sequential service constraint or pro-rata). Given the importance of depositors’ withdrawal 
decisions in triggering bank runs and their differences across the different approaches, I will 
describe them in detail in the analysis of the single models.
2.3 The ’’First Generation” Literature
This literature emphasizes the role of banks as providers of flexibility to consumers who are 
uncertain about the timing of consumption. Demandable debt permits depositors to satisfy 
their unexpected consumption needs by giving them the right to withdraw at any point in time. 
However, demandable debt makes banks vulnerable to runs. The short-term characteristic of 
liabilities together with the illiquidity of long-term assets imply that banks may not have enough 
funds to satisfy all depositors’ withdrawal demands. When this is the case, a bank run takes 
place and intermediaries liquidate all the assets and close down.
The first generation literature can be divided into two streams depending on the mecha­
nism triggering depositors’ decisions to withdraw prematurely. The first category, started by 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), considers bank runs as an unfortunate and undesirable effect of 
demandable debt, which aims to provide depositors with insurance against liquidity shocks. 
Runs are purely random events (’’sunspots”), which occur if depositors lose confidence in the 
bank’s solvency despite the fact that its investments are not risky.
In contrast, the second category, to which Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) and Chari and 
Jagannathan (1988) belong, considers runs as triggered by a bilateral asymmetric information 
between the bank and its depositors. On the one hand, the bank does not observe depositors’ 
type and therefore their true consumption needs; on the other hand, the bank invests in a sto­
chastic technology and depositors are asymmetrically informed on the return of its investment.
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In this framework, runs become systematic events triggered by the arrival of negative interim 
information on the bank’s future solvency. More precisely, they are both information-induced 
and panic phenomena. The latter refers to the situation in which runs occur even though no 
one has received any negative information about the bank’s investment returns.
The precise nature of runs derives from the assumptions on the liquidation value of the long­
term technology and on depositors’ risk aversion. If, as in Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), 
the long-term technology is totally illiquid and depositors are not very risk averse, bank runs 
are triggered by the decision of informed type 2 depositors to misreport their type and demand 
type 1 withdrawal profile, when they receive sufficiently negative information. Absent any 
information, a run would not occur. Conversely, if the long-term technology is only partially 
illiquid and depositors are risk neutral, as in Chari and Jagannathan (1988), the bank is forced 
to liquidate all its assets and close down only if all depositors demand their funds back at date 
1. Depending on the realisation of the stochastic variables of the model, it can happen that a 
run occurs even though no one has received any information about the bank’s future solvency.
To sum up, the first generation literature provides different reasons for the occurrence of 
bank runs. In Diamond and Dybvig (1983), a run is a self-fulfilling phenomenon which occurs 
when each depositor anticipates, for whatever reason, that the others will run. In contrast, the 
’’asymmetric information” approach considers runs as more rational phenomena, triggered, as 
in Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988), by the arrival of sufficiently negative interim information 
about the bank’s future solvency, or even, as in Chari and Jagannathan (1988), even by the 
fear that some depositors have received such a negative information.
In the following sections, I analyse the three main first generation models in detail, men­
tioning some other works that have originated from them. I outline these models within the 
general model described in the previous section, pointing it out only the aspects which differ 
significantly from it.
2.3.1 T he ’’Sunspot” Approach
The work by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) provides the first formal analysis of the role of banks 
as providers of insurance to depositors against the risk of a liquidity shock. The focus is on the 
characteristics of demandable debt. This is the means through which banks can offer liquidity
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to depositors, at the same time becoming vulnerable to runs.
In particular, the authors show that the deposit contract supports two equilibria. If depos­
itors have confidence in the bank’s solvency, the economy reaches the ’’good” equilibrium in 
which banks provide allocations superior to those of competitive markets. They can implement 
the optimal insurance contract and reach the optimal risk sharing among depositors. However, 
if depositors lose confidence in the bank’s solvency, the economy reaches the ’’run” equilibrium 
in which all depositors panic and withdraw their funds prematurely as they anticipate the bank 
will run out of funds. The run equilibrium entails a real cost in terms of welfare reduction 
as it forces the bank to interrupt production, thus breaking the optimal risk sharing among 
depositors.
Assumptions
1) T=0,l,2 and a single good.
2) TECHNOLOGY: There is a short-term storage technology and a long-term technology with 
a deterministic return R  and liquidation value I  =  1. Table 2 summarises the technology 
available.
TECHNOLOGY r  =  o T =  1 T =  2
Short-term -1 1 0
Long-term -1 £ = 1 R  > 1 deterministic
Table 2: Technology
3) DEPOSITORS: Each depositor has a probability t of becoming of type 1 and a probability 
1 — t of becoming of type 2. As t is deterministic, there is no aggregate uncertainty and t and 
1 — t correspond to the actual fractions of agents of type 1 and 2, respectively. Depositors have 
comer utility functions given by:
U \c n ) =  w(cn) for type 1 agents 
U2(c2 2) = u(c2 2) for type 2 agents
where Cy is the consumption at date i of an agent of type j .  Depositors are risk averse (un < 0) 
with RRA>1, that is — cuN(c)/vf(c) > 1.
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The ex ante utility function is therefore given by:
U -  t u ( c n )  + (1 -  t)u(c22)-
4) INFORMATION: There is no interim information regarding the value of the return R  since 
it is deterministic.
5) INTERMEDIARY: The bank is structured as a mutual fund and operates in a perfectly 
competitive sector. In exchange for deposits, it offers individuals a contract that gives them 
the right either to withdraw, per each unit of investment, x\ at date 1 or 2/2 at date 2.
6) DEPOSITORS’ REPAYMENT: Depositors’ withdrawal demands at date 1 are satisfied on a 
first-come, first-served basis as long as the bank has funds. Those at date 2 are instead subject 
to a pro-rata rule. Formally, the effective repayments to depositors are given by:
0 if f j  >
V2 ( f ,xi )  = m ax{R(l -  X i f ) / ( 1  -  f ) , 0 }
where Vi is the repayment that depositors receive at date i ,  f j  is the number of withdrawers’ 
deposits serviced before agent j  as a fraction of total deposits; /  is the proportion of deposits 
withdrawn at date 1.
7) TIMING: Figure 2 summarises the timing of the model.
T=0 T=1 T=2
1
deposit contract
1 1
depositors
1
1
determined; preference make their remaining
agents deposit shock realised withdrawal depositors
their funds; decisions; repaid conditional
the bank invests bank may on the aggregate
liquidate withdrawals
Figure 2: Timing investiment at date 1
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Equilibrium
The equilibrium consists of the deposit contract at T =  0 and of depositors’ withdrawal decisions 
at date 1.
a) THE DEPOSIT CONTRACT: The optimal contract choice problem for the deposit contract 
is solved by the vector ^  =  {cj1?c2 2 ^ }  satisfying:7
U* =  max tUl (cn) +  (1 -  t)U2(c2 2) (5)
{Cii}
subject to:
tcn  < Z  (6)
( l - t ) c 22 < R ( l - Z )  (7)
U \c u ) > U \c 22) (8)
V 2{c22) > U2(cn ) (9)
where c*j is the optimal consumption for an agent of type j  at date i, Z  is the fraction of deposits 
invested in the short-term technology, constraints (6) and (7) are the resources constraints at 
dates 1 and 2, and constraints (8) and (9) are the incentive compatibility constraints.8
The bank sets the contract terms x\ and 2/2 equal to the optimal consumption levels and
C22, which satisfy:
u ' ( c\ 1) =  R u '(<Z2) (10)
*cll +  [(1 — =  1 (11)
1 ^  C11 < 2^2 ^  R" (12)
Condition (10) equates the marginal utility to the marginal productivity; condition (11) is the 
total resource constraint. The relations in (12) derive from the assumptions of RRA>1 and 
R >  1.
7The assumption of comer  utility function implies C21 =  =  0 in the optimal contract.
8 Note that constraint (8) is redundant as, given the shape of the utility functions, it is always satisfied.
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Expression (12) shows that the deposit contract offers insurance to depositors and is Pareto 
improving relative to the autarchy situation in which individuals invest directly and have a 
consumption stream c\\ =  1 and C22 = R -9
b) DEPOSITORS' WITHDRAWAL DECISIONS: Depositors’ withdrawal decisions at date 1 
are determined as Nash equilibria in pure strategy. The deposit contract supports two Nash 
equilibria. In the first one, defined as the ’’good” equilibrium, depositors choose the withdrawal 
decisions embedded in the contract at date 0: The t agents of type 1 withdraw at date 1, 
obtaining the repayment xi =  c |l5 and the 1 — t agents of type 2 wait until date 2, as they 
anticipate that only type 1 agents withdraw prematurely. These withdrawal decisions constitute 
a Nash equilibrium since they satisfy the incentive compatibility constraints (8) and (9). Given 
others’ decisions, each agent finds it optimal to choose the consumption stream designed for his 
own type.
In the other equilibrium, defined as the ’’run” equilibrium, all depositors panic and withdraw 
at date 1. Independently of their true types, all depositors report to be of type 1 and demand 
the repayment c*j. As c*j > 1 and the liquidation value of the long-term technology is equal 
to one {I =  1), the bank has to liquidate all its assets at date 1. Given the sequential service 
constraint, depositors joining the queue before 1/c^ others obtain the full amount c^, and 
the 1 — 1 /cjj agents arriving late are rationed and obtain nothing. This situation is a Nash 
equilibrium since each depositor finds it optimal to withdraw given that all others will do 
it. The incentive compatibility constraint for type 2 agents (expression (9)) is now violated 
because they get a higher utility by withdrawing at date 1 than by waiting until date 2, that is 
l/c*n u2(c*u ) > u2(0).
Runs are an equilibrium only ifx i =  cj1 > l .  If £1 =  1 and I =  1, runs would never occur as 
type 2 agents would not worry about others’ behaviour and the bank’s future solvency. Indeed, 
independently of how many depositors withdraw early, the bank would have enough resources
9 In autarchy, a market opens each period where individuals can exchange their consumption good. Since all 
agents are identical at T  =  0, they may want to exchange goods only at T  =  1 and at T  =  2. The price at 
T  =  1 of consumption at T  =  2 is equal to R- 1 . At this price agents will never exchange goods and they cannot 
do better than producing goods for their own consumption. Therefore, agents choose c u  =  1 and C 2 2  =  R in 
autarky, as type 1 agents will always interrupt production at T  =  1 while type 2 agents will continue it until 
T =  1.
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to fully satisfy type 2 depositors’ demands at date 2.10 In such equilibrium, the deposit contract 
would reach the same allocation as in the case of autarchy and the intermediary wouldn’t deliver 
any Pareto improvement relative to competitive markets.
Conclusions
The deposit contract allows the economy to reach two different equilibria. The first one, de­
fined as the ’’good” equilibrium, is characterised by optimal risk sharing among depositors and 
constitutes a Pareto improvement relative to the autarchy situation. The second equilibrium, 
defined as the ’’run” equilibrium, occurs when all depositors panic and withdraw their funds 
prematurely. As a consequence, the bank is emptied of funds and the optimal risk-sharing 
mechanism breaks down. This happens because the face value of deposits is larger than the 
liquidation value of the bank’s assets. The run equilibrium is a worse outcome for both types 
of depositors than the autarchy equilibrium since certain returns of 1 and R  for each type are 
replaced by uncertain returns of mean 1. Intermediaries are vulnerable to runs because they 
transform liquid deposits into illiquid assets and provide depositors with an insurance against 
their preference shock. Without these activities, they would not be vulnerable to runs but 
would not play any role in the economy. Thus, a deposit contract without the risk of runs does 
not provide any liquidity service.
Since the good equilibrium dominates holding assets directly, individuals choose to deposit 
their funds at the bank, provided that the run equilibrium occurs with a low enough probability. 
The selection between the two equilibria is assumed to depend on some commonly observed 
random variables, such as sunspots. If the sunspot does not occur, the economy reaches the 
good equilibrium. Otherwise, it reaches the run equilibrium. If the sunspot occurs with low 
probability, depositors are still willing to deposit their funds at the bank. This explanation 
of equilibrium selection is somewhat incomplete as it relies on some exogenous variables, the 
sunspots, which are absent in the model. Postlewaite and Vives (1987) investigate the equi­
librium selection problem further and show the existence of a unique equilibrium that involves 
a positive probability of runs. In their analysis the bank run is associated with a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma situation in which depositors withdraw at date 1 for self-interest rather than for con­
l0Formally, with xi =  1, it holds V 1( f j 11) <  V2(f,  1) for any 0 < fj  <  f-
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sumption needs. This approach has the merit of eliminating the exogenous sunspot elements 
and the multiplicity of equilibria. However, recognising the suboptimality of demandable debt, 
it fails to explain its use in the real world.
The existence of a run equilibrium in Diamond and Dybvig is not a robust result. Type 2 
depositors’ decision to withdraw prematurely depends crucially on the rule used for depositors’ 
repayment (sequential service constraint), on the assumptions regarding depositors’ relative risk 
aversion coefficient (RRA > 1 and hence c*x > 1), the liquidation value of long-term technology 
(£ = 1) and the shape of depositors’ utility function (corner preferences). The run equilibrium 
can be eliminated by modifying any of these assumptions. Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) 
show that using a pro-rata rule for depositors’ repayment at date 1, instead of the sequential 
service constraint rule, would remove the run equilibrium since type 2 depositors would not 
have any incentive to withdraw prematurely;11 Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) argue that 
the run equilibrium is eliminated if depositors are not too risk averse, that is if the relative 
risk aversion coefficient is less than 1. In this case, maintaining the assumption of i  =  1, the 
bank would not run out of funds at date 1 even if more than t depositors withdrew, since the 
repayment promised to type 1 depositors, c*1} would be less than 1.
Bank runs in Diamond and Dybvig can be eliminated also by some modifications of the 
deposit contract. If the fraction t of type 1 depositors is deterministic, the bank can predict 
exactly how many type 1 depositors there will be and can therefore promise to redeem on de­
mand at date 1 only t withdrawal demands and postpone the others at date 2. This ’suspension 
of convertibility’ clause guarantees optimal returns and eliminates the occurrence of runs as its 
anticipation prevents type 2 depositors from withdrawing prematurely.
The suspension of convertibility arrangement breaks down if the fraction t becomes stochas­
tic. This is because the bank cannot predict how many depositors turn to be of type 1 and is 
therefore unable to select an appropriate threshold of withdrawals at which to suspend payments 
at date 1. However, runs can still be eliminated when t is random by introducing government 
deposit insurance. This arrangement guarantees that the promised amount will be paid to all 
agents, thus making it convenient for type 2 depositors not to withdraw prematurely. The 
deposit guarantee is honored through taxes imposed on depositors withdrawing early. Unlike
11 On the importance of the sequential service constraint, see also Wallace (1988).
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the bank, which must provide sequential service constraint, the government can impose taxes 
on an agent after he has withdrawn. Therefore, the amount of the tax depends on the realised 
total value of withdrawals / .  Depositors withdrawing early are taxed if /  > t, that is if the total 
withdrawals are greater than the maximum realisation of the fraction t of type 1 depositors, 
and not otherwise. The amount of the tax is such that the after-tax proceeds at date 1 never 
exceed those at date 2. Since depositors are concerned with after-tax payoffs, no type 2 agents 
withdraw at date 1. Thus, deposit insurance satisfies the incentive-compatible constraints and 
achieves the optimal outcome as unique equilibrium if the government can finance it through 
non-distorsive taxes.
2.3.2 T he ” A sym m etric Inform ation” Approach
The seminal paper of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) provides only a partial justification for the 
occurrence of runs. As the investment returns are certain, there is no reason why depositors 
should lose confidence in the bank’s solvency and panic. Therefore, runs have a pure speculative 
origin. The story that agents observe some random variable in the economy, as sunspots, is 
not well founded and does not find support in the empirical evidence. Gorton (1988) finds that 
runs occurred in the US before the introduction of the federal deposit insurance occurred in 
time of recessions and were caused by changes in fundamentals. In particular, the author finds 
that bank crises were tied to low performance of banks’ loan portfolios or high failure rates of 
small firms. Thus, runs were triggered by the arrival of some negative information regarding 
the future performance of banks.
The asymmetric information approach aims to explain fundamental bank runs (which are 
justified by a poor performance of the bank’s investment) and to combine them with speculative 
runs (which are due to fears of a poor performance of the bank’s investments). The main element 
of the analysis is the uncertainty of the bank’s investments and the information that some type 
2 depositors may receive at date 1. A fundamental run takes place when, as in Jacklin and 
Bhattacharya (1988), it is caused by informed type 2 depositors’ decision to demand type 1 
withdrawals. A run combines fundamental and speculative elements when, as in Chari and 
Jagannathan (1988), it is triggered by all (informed and uninformed) type depositors’ decision 
to demand type 1 withdrawal profile.
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In what follows, I analyse the papers of Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) and of Chari and 
Jagannathan (1988), describing in detail the different factors triggering a run in the two models.
Information-based Bank Runs
Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) regard runs as triggered by the arrival of negative interim 
information regarding the bank’s future performance. The main elements of the analysis are the 
assumptions concerning depositors’ utility functions, the uncertainty of the bank’s investments 
and the interim information on the bank’s future performance available to some depositors.
Assumptions
1) T=0,l,2 and a single good.
2) TECHNOLOGY: The long-term technology is now stochastic and cannot be liquidated early. 
Table 3 summarises the technologies available and their returns.
TECHNOLOGY T  = 0 T =  1 T  = 2
Short-term -1 1 0
Long-term -1 e = o
~ ( H >  1 p
R  = < stochastic
[ 1 > L > 0  1 — p
Table 3: Technology
3) DEPOSITORS: Each depositor has a probability t of becoming of type 1 and 1—t of becoming
of type 2. The variable t is deterministic. Both types of depositors have smooth preferences
given by:
^ 1(cn,C2i) =  u(cn) +  piu(c21) for type 1 agents
U2(ci2 ,C2 2) =  u(ci2) +  p2uip2 2) for type 2 agents
where Cij is the consumption at date i of an agent of type j ,  p{ is the intertemporal discount 
factor with 1 > p2 > pi > 0. Individual are risk averse (un < 0) with RRA<1, that is 
—cu"(c)/u,(c) < 1.
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The ex ante utility function is given by:
U = tUl {ciic2i) +  (1 -  t)U2(ci2 ,c22 )-
4) INFORMATION: At date 1 a fraction a of type 2 agents, defined as informed, observes 
a signal s on the future value of bank’s assets. The signal is partial and is described by the 
distribution of posterior beliefs p about the probability of success, i.e. that the bank’s asset 
return is R.
5) INTERMEDIARY: The bank is structured as a mutual fund and operates in a perfectly 
competitive sector. It offers depositors a contract which gives them the right to withdraw per 
unit of investment either the amounts xi at date 1 and X2 at date 2 or the amounts y\ and p2 
at dates 1 and 2, respectively. The uncertainty of the promised repayment at date 2 is due to 
the stochastic character of the long-term technology.
6) DEPOSITORS’ REPAYMENT: Depositors withdrawing at date 1 are repaid according to 
the sequential service constraint rule. Those at date 2 are repaid proportionally.
7) TIMING: Figure 3 summarises the timing of the model.
T=0 T=1 T=2
1
deposit contract
i
i
i
depositors
i i
| remaining
determined; preference make their return R  depositors
agents deposit shock realised; withdrawal realised repaid conditional
their funds; signal decisions; on the bank’s
the bank received by the bank solvency
invests informed may liquidate
type 2 depositors its assets
Figure 3: Timing 
Equilibrium
The equilibrium consists of the deposit contract at date 0, and of the withdrawal decisions of 
type 1 depositors and of informed type 2 depositors at date 1.
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a) THE DEPOSIT CONTRACT: The optimal contract choice problem in the absence of in­
terim information is solved by the vector w^ere cJj *s the optimal 
consumption at date i of an agent of type j  and Z  is the investment in the short-term technol­
ogy, satisfying:
V  = maxE {tC/1(cn,c2i(fl)) +  (1 -  t)U2(c12,c22(R))} (13)
{ c < j }  R
subject to:
ten +  (1 ~ *)ci2 < Z  (14)
tQ2i(R) + ( l - t ) c n ( R ) < R ( l - Z )  Vi? (15)
U3(cij,C2j) > U3(clk, c2k) for j ,k  =  1,2 and j  ±  k (16)
where constraints (14) and (15) are the resources constraints at dates 1 and 2, and constraint 
(16) is the incentive compatibility constraint. The optimal consumption levels determined in 
the contract are x\ =  cfj, X2 =  cJi, yi =  cj2> and 2/2 =  c2 2 • If R  =  H  is realised at date 2, the 
bank is able to pay depositors the promised amounts X2 and 7/2; conversely, if R  =  L is realised 
at date 2, the bank is insolvent and able to pay only a fraction L /H  of the promised amounts. 
Since depositors have RRA<1, the optimal consumption levels satisfy:
1 > Ci! > C12 and C22 > C21. (17)
Unlike Diamond and Dybvig (1983), type 1 agents are now promised an amount smaller than 
one at date 1. However, given the assumption of total illiquidity of the long-term technology, 
the bank is still vulnerable to runs. If more than t depositors ask for the type 1 withdrawals at 
date 1, then there will not be enough resources to satisfy them fully and the bank will be forced 
to close down. This situation is possible because the deposit contract is determined at date 0 
ignoring the impact of any interim information that some depositors receive on their preferred 
withdrawal profiles (see below for details).
b) DEPOSITORS’ WITHDRAWAL DECISIONS: At date 1 depositors choose between one of 
the two consumption profiles, (£1,0:2) and (7/1,7/2)» promised in the deposits contract. Their 
choice depends on the realisation of the preference shock and on the information they receive.
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The t agents that turn out to be of type 1 choose the profile ( z i ,^ )  = ( c n ^ i) -  The 
a informed type 2 depositors update the success probability of the bank’s project from p to 
p on the basis of the signal s they receive. Given this revised probability assessment, they 
update their expected utility with type 2 withdrawal and type 1 withdrawal and choose the 
profile which makes them better off. In other words, they update their incentive compatibility 
constraint, which is given by:
E  [U2(c12, c22)] §  E  [f72(cn ,c21)] (18)
where E  indicates the expectation calculated using the posterior p. Type 2 depositors choose 
the type 1 withdrawal profile whenever the inequality in (18) holds with the sign <. When this 
is the case, an information-based run takes place. The bank does not have enough funds to 
satisfy the demand for type 1 withdrawals at date 1 since the long-term technology is illiquid. 
Depositors are repaid randomly: The first t individuals arriving in the queue receive the full 
amount c*x while the remaining 1 —t agents only get the amount c*2. This resembles a suspension 
of convertibility clause, after t depositors have been dealt with.
Unlike in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), a run would not occur without the arrival of interim 
information. With a liquidation value of the long-term technology equal to zero and a relative 
risk aversion coefficient less than one, which implies 1 > Cll > <?2, the incentive compatibility 
constraint in (18) would never be violated and, thus, type 2 depositors would never prefer type 
1 withdrawal.
Conclusions
Introducing a random return on bank’s investments, Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) explain 
the occurrence of runs as the rational response of depositors to the arrival of negative informa­
tion on the bank’s future performance. A run occurs when informed type 2 depositors observe 
a sufficiently negative signal s. In other terms, when the return R  is observed to be negative 
with probability p < p where p is the threshold level which makes the expression (18) hold as an 
equality. This is because the arrival of a bad signal modifies informed type 2 depositors’ incen­
tive compatibility constraint and induces them to prefer the type 1 withdrawal. The threshold 
level p is positively correlated with the variance of the return R, that is with the dispersion
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between H  and L.12 Thus, the higher the variance of R, the higher the threshold p, and the 
more likely a run is to occur.
When a run occurs, the welfare of both types of agents decreases. This leads the authors 
to address the question of the relative performance of demand deposit economies versus equity 
economies. The comparison of the two economies for different parameterizations of the model 
shows that demand deposits would perform better for a low variance of R , whereas the equity 
economy would be preferred for a large dispersion of R. This is because when the variance of 
R  is high, the probability of runs increases, thus decreasing welfare.
The inflexibility of the deposit contract to the arrival of interim information is a major reason 
for the occurrence of runs in Jacklin and Bhattacharya. If the bank took such information into 
account, it could prevent runs by making the contract incentive compatible after type 2 agents 
have become informed. However, banks may prefer not to avoid runs if the costs of modifying 
the contract are too high. Alonso (1996) shows that the choice between contracts with runs 
and contracts without runs depends on the parameters of the model. Deposit contracts with 
runs are socially preferable if the probability of informed type 2 depositors receiving a bad 
signal is low enough. This is because, in order for informed type 2 depositors not to withdraw 
after receiving a bad signal, depositors’ payoffs have to be significantly modified in all states 
of nature. Thus, when the occurence of receiving a bad signal is not very likely, a high loss 
is incurred with high probability whilst the gain of avoiding runs is only realised with low 
probability.
The possibility of structuring deposit contracts without runs also sheds new light on the 
comparison between demandable deposit and equity economies. Alonso (1996) shows that 
deposit arrangements are superior to equity arrangements in most cases. This is because when 
deposit contracts achieve allocations which are inferior to those generated by equity contracts, 
the bank can modify the deposit contract to avoid runs and dominate equity performance (for 
example in the case of a high variance of the return of the bank’s investments).
l2Note that in the original paper, the threshold level p is inversely correlated with the variance of the returns. 
This is because, in line with the general model described in the first sectsion, I consider the posterior success 
probability of R  while the paper refers to the posterior failure probability of R.
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Panic Bank Runs
The paper of Chari and Jagannathan (1988) represents a synthesis of the models examined up 
to now, since it combines fundamental and speculative runs. The focus of the analysis is the 
signal-extraction problem faced by uninformed depositors in their withdrawal decision. The key 
assumptions are that the return of the bank’s investment is stochastic as well as the fraction of 
depositors turning to be of type 1 and the fraction of type 2 depositors becoming informed at 
date 1. Type 2 depositors who remain uninformed observe the total amount of withdrawals at 
date 1 and base on it their withdrawal decision. However, since the realisation of the random 
variables characterising the model is not observable, uninformed type 2 depositors may not 
be able to infer correctly the bank’s future performance. In particular, they may not be able 
to distinguish whether a long queue is due to some informed type 2 depositors withdrawing 
early or to a large proportion of type 1 depositors only. The equilibrium of the model has 
the property that runs can be both fundamental and speculative. A speculative, or ’’panic”, 
run occurs when all depositors withdraw prematurely for fear that some other depositors have 
received a bad signal on the bank’s investment returns in circumstances in which there is no 
information in the economy.
In what follows, I describe the model in detail. In doing this, I will not follow the original 
paper of Chari and Jagannathan, in which individuals invest directly in the technology, but, 
in line with the general framework, I consider the existence of an intermediary which collects 
deposits and invests them in the technology available. Notice that the intermediary does not 
really play any role in this model. Indeed, as depositors are risk neutral and the banking sector 
is perfectly competitive, the intermediary does not provide any liquidity service and optimal risk 
sharing. Neither it extends loans nor monitors them. In line with the first generation literature, 
this implies that runs are still seen as disruptive phenomena when they are not motivated by 
negative information on the bank’s future prospects. In the next chapter, I will develop a model 
in which the banker acts as delegated monitor and has the possibility to make an improper use 
of depositors’ money. Demandable debt will then be considered as a possible incentive device 
for the banker to act in line with depositors’ interests. The introduction of an agency problem 
between the bank and its depositors will lead to different conclusions on bank run efficiency 
and policy implications.
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Assum ptions
1) T=0,l,2 and a single good.
2) TECHNOLOGY: There is now only one long-term technology available with stochastic 
return. Its liquidation value depends on how many depositors withdraw early: Each unit 
invested yields a return £ =  1 if the fraction of depositors withdrawing at date 1, W, is lower 
than a certain threshold W, whilst it yields a return £ < 1 otherwise. Table 4 summarises the 
technology available.
TECHNOLOGY 0IIEh T = 1 II to
Long-term -1 £= <
1 H W  < W  
£ < 1 otherwise
( H >  1 P  
[ L = 0 1 - p
Table 4: Technology
3) DEPOSITORS: A stochastic fraction t of depositors turn out to be of type 1 at the beginning 
of date 1; the remaining 1 — t depositors are of type 2. The variable t is discrete, assuming three 
values t G {0,ti,t2} with probability qo,q\ and g2> respectively. Both types are risk neutral and 
their preferences are given by:
Ul (c\\) =  C\\ for type 1 agents 
m  (^22) =  C22 for type 2 agents
where is the consumption of an agent of type j  at date i.
4) INFORMATION: A stochastic fraction 5 of type 2 depositors, defined as informed, observes 
at date 1 a signal s on the future value of the bank’s assets. The signal is perfect, that is 
s — {if, 0}. The variable a  takes on two values, 5 =  {a,0}, with probability r and 1 — r, 
respectively. The remaining 1 — 5 type 2 depositors remain uninformed. The realisations of the 
three random variables t, 5 and R  as well as the signal received by informed type 2 depositors are 
not observable. The only public variable in the economy is the amount of aggregate withdrawals 
at date 1, defined as W. This is not always perfectly informative of the signal s received by the 
informed depositors if the following restrictions hold:
t\  =  a  (19)
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2^ =  1^ +  “  l^)* (20)
5) INTERMEDIARY: The bank operates in a perfectly competitive sector. In exchange for 
deposits, it offers individuals a contract which gives them the right to withdraw, per unit 
deposited, either the amount x\ at date 1 or the amount t/2 at date 2.
6) DEPOSITORS’ REPAYMENT: Depositors withdrawing at date 1 submit their demands 
simultaneously. If the bank has not enough resources, depositors are repaid according to a 
pro-rata rule. Bank resources at date 1 depend on the liquidation value of the technology 
which in turns depends on the threshold level W. The latter is assumed to be equal to 12.
7) TIMING: Figures 4 illustrates the timing of the model.
T=0 T=1 T=2
deposit 1 depositors 1 remaining
contract preference make their return R depositors
determined; shock realised; withdrawal realised repaid
agents fraction of decisions; conditional
deposit informed the bank on the bank’s
their funds; depositors may solvency
the bank realised; signal liquidate
invests received by 
informed type 2 
depositors, if any
its assets
Figure 4: Timing 
Equilibrium
The equilibrium consists of the deposit contract at date 0, and of depositors’ withdrawal deci­
sions at date 1.
a) THE DEPOSIT CONTRACT : The assumption of risk neutral individuals together with
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that of a competitive bank simplifies greatly the analysis of the deposit contract.13 The bank 
fixes x\ = cjx =  1 and 2/2 =  <%2 = Given H > 1, the promised repayments satisfy the 
incentive-compatibility constraints at date 0.
b) DEPOSITORS’ WITHDRAWAL DECISIONS: At date 1 depositors choose between one of 
the two consumption profiles, x\ and 2/2, offered in the deposit contract. Their decisions depend 
on their type and on the information they have.
Type 1 depositors demand x\ =  cjx =  1 to satisfy their consumption needs. Informed type 
2 depositors decide on the basis of the signal they receive: They leave their funds at the bank 
until date 2 if s is positive, whilst they withdraw at date 1 if s is negative.
Uninformed type 2 depositors observe the aggregate withdrawals at date 1, W , and update 
their expected utility accordingly. Given this revised assessment, they may prefer to withdraw 
at date 1 instead of waiting until date 2. Since W  is not perfectly correlated with s, however, 
uninformed type 2 depositors are not always able to infer the real state of their world. Thus, 
they may commit mistakes in their withdrawal decisions.
A run occurs in the rational-expectations equilibrium of the model when all depositors 
withdraw at date 1, that is when W  — 1. A panic run occurs when all depositors withdraw 
even if no one has received any information about the bank’s future solvency. Formally, a run 
is a panic if the equilibrium aggregate withdrawals W  at date 1 are equal to 1 for at least 
one state in which a  =  0. Under restrictions (19) and (20), a panic run can occur only if 
uninformed type 2 depositors are confounded, when observing a long queue, between a large 
number of depositors withdrawing for consumption needs and the possibility that some informed 
depositors have received poor information. A panic run is inefficient since, under the assumption 
pH  +  (1—p ) 0 > l ,  it would be socially optimal to let the bank continue the investment.
Conclusions
Chari and Jagannathan model runs as an equilibrium phenomenon in a framework where all 
equilibria are characterised by runs. The essential of the paper is the confusion faced by
l3Since there is only one technology available, the bank does not have to choose how to allocate the funds 
between short- and long-term investments. Thus, the deposit contract consists only of the amounts promised to 
depositors.
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uninformed depositors. Individuals decide to withdraw prematurely for different reasons: Some 
do it for consumption needs, some others because they receive bad information on the future 
returns of bank’s investment, some others, denominated uninformed, withdraw prematurely 
because they fear the bank will be insolvent.
Note that a run can never occur in states in which some type 2 depositors receive the signal 
(that is a = a) and the signal is positive (s =  H). A run can only occur in this framework 
when informed type 2 depositors receive a negative information or when there is no information 
in the economy. Thus, only panic runs are inefficient and, since they occur in the absence of 
information, they resemble the sunspot runs in Diamond and Dybvig. Such an observation will 
be useful in the next chapter where I will develop a model in which inefficient runs will occur 
despite the fact that some depositors know with certainty that the bank will be solvent.
Chari and Jagannathan do not provide a justification for the existence of banks. Indeed, 
they neither provide liquidity insurance as depositors are risk neutral, nor they monitor their 
debtors. All the bank can do is to prevent panic runs by suspending convertibility at date 
1 after more than t\ depositors have withdrawn. This arrangement saves on the liquidation 
costs associated with the interruption of valuable assets but induces a loss in terms of possible 
continuation of valueless assets and of rationing of type 1 agents when their proportion turns to 
be higher than t\. The suspension of convertibility improves upon the equilibrium allocations 
only when the first effect dominates. This depends, in turn, on the model’s parameters and 
especially on the liquidation value of the long-term technology and the probability of a fraction 
of depositors larger than t\.
2.3.3 A  N um erical Exam ple
I now describe a numerical example that illustrates how runs are generated in the first generation 
models.
I consider a simple framework similar to Diamond and Dybvig (1983) in which the long-term 
technology has a return R, depositors have comer utility functions with RRA>1 and there is 
a fraction t of agents of type 1 and 1 — t of agents of type 2.14
14 For simplicity, I use this framework to analyse all the models presented above even if it is not always coehrent 
with them. For example, concerning the shape of depositors’ utility functions, I use comer  preferences also to
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1) The ’’sunspot” approach
I also assume:
- R = 1.5 deterministic and I — 1;
- t  — 0.25 deterministic.
In line with the data described, the deposit contract specifies:
c i i  =  1-2
Z = 1.2 • 0.25 =  0.3 
1 - 1 0.75
If a fraction /  of depositors greater than /  =  0.5 withdraws prematurely, all other depositors 
find it optimal to withdraw at date 1 as well and a run takes place. Indeed, as /  =  0.5 is the 
number of withdrawals at date 1 that makes type 2 depositors indifferent between withdrawing 
and waiting, any /  > 0.5 makes it optimal for them to join the queue at date 1 and trigger a 
run.
Formally, for /  =  0.5, the bank has to liquidate 1.2 • 0.5 =  0.6 units of investment and, 
therefore, only 0.4 units are left at date 2 to repay remaining depositors, who would get:
0.34 -1.5 ,
C22 =  “ o T "  =  L2
and would therefore be indifferent between withdrawing at date 1 or at date 2.
2) The ’’asymmetric information” approach
(i) Information-based, runs
I assume now:
~ f  i f  =  1.5 p 
- R  = < stochastic and i  — 0;
{ L = 1.2 1 - p
- 1 =  0.25 deterministic.
analyse Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) in which, instead, they are smooth.
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Type 2 depositors receiving a negative signal s on the future value of the bank’s assets prefer to 
misreport their type and choose the type 1 withdrawal profile. This is because, if they waited, 
they would get:
. (1 -  Z)L  0.7 ■ 1.2 „
C22 -  ~ T T t 0J 5~  -  1>12 <  1 A
More precisely, as the signal is not perfectly informative of the bank’s future solvency but only 
indicates the posterior probability p of success of the bank’s assets, informed type 2 depositors 
prefer to withdraw when p is lower than the threshold level p, which makes them indifferent 
between withdrawing early and waiting until date 2. The threshold level is the solution to:
P : U(cn) =  E
(ii) Panic bank runs
I now assume the following:
f 1.5 p =  0.9
- R  = { stochastic and £ = 1;
1.1 1 — p =  0.1
f 0.25 q = 0.9 
- 1 = \  stochastic;
0.4 1 - q  = 0.1
f 0.15 r  =  0.5
- a  =  < stochastic.
0 1 -  r =  0.5
If uninformed type 2 depositors observe a queue W  =  0.4, they do not know whether it is 
composed by the sum of t =  0.25 and a =  0.15 or only by t =  0.4. Thus, they expect to obtain 
the following repayments:
R = 1.1, t = 0.25, q =  0.15 -» (1~0468)1,1 =  1-3
R =  1.5, t =  0.4, a  =  0 -* (1~°0^ 8)1'5 =  0.953
where 0.48 =  0.4 • 1.2. Then, given r =  0.5, uninformed type 2 depositors’ expected repayment 
from waiting until date 2 is given by:
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0.5 • 1.3 + 0.5 • 0.953 =  1.126 < cn  =  1.2.
Given this, uninformed type 2 agents prefer to misreport their type and withdraw at date 1 
when they observe W  =  0.4. This triggers a bank run which is a panic run if the queue is 
formed only by type 1 agents and no one has received any information on R.
Finally, it is interesting to note that, absent any interim information, there would be no 
sunspot runs as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). For example, for the same queue W  = 0,4, 
type 2 depositors would obtain at date 2:
and therefore they would not have any incentive to withdraw at date 1.
2.4 The ’’Second G eneration” Literature
The first generation literature provides an explanation of both the existence of banks and their 
vulnerability to runs. Banks provide flexibility to depositors who are uncertain in the timing 
of consumption. The maturity-mismatch between investments and deposits exposes banks to 
the possibility of massive withdrawals. Runs involve social costs as they break the risk sharing 
mechanism among depositors and/or force the liquidation of assets which may be valuable.
A question then arises spontaneously: Why have banks always used demandable debt if 
it involves high costs? Is it because of its liquidity characteristics only? Calomiris and Kahn 
(1991) and Chen (1999), provide an answer to these questions. The focus of these models is 
to explain the role of demandable debt as part of an incentive scheme for disciplining bankers. 
This will also be the focus of the model I will develop in chapter 3.
The starting point is the agency relation that arises between the banker and his depositors 
after the deposit contract is signed. Agents entrust their money to the banker that choose 
how to allocate them among different uses. The banker has an informational advantage in 
determining which investments are most profitable but he has also the possibility to act against
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depositors’ interests. For example, he can invest in projects which are not socially desirable or 
he can misuse investment returns for his own purposes. In this context, demandable debt can 
provide an incentive-compatible solution to the banker’s moral hazard problem. The right to 
take money out of the bank at any time gives depositors the possibility to register their lack 
of confidence in the activities of the banker. The threat of a run induces the banker to act in 
line with depositors’ interest, so to minimise asset liquidation and avoid the bank’s closure. In 
other words, demandable debt allows the banker to precommit to a behaviour he would not 
follow otherwise.
As in the asymmetric information approach, runs are depositors’ rational responses to the 
arrival of negative information on the bank’s future solvency and are therefore efficient if they 
force the liquidation of assets that would yield lower returns if continued until maturity. Further, 
runs have now the additional purpose of taking assets away from the banker, thus preventing him 
from misbehaving. However, runs can still induce costs and act as imperfect incentive devices. 
As in the asymmetric information approach, this emerges when depositors are imperfectly 
informed on the future value of the bank’s assets at the time of making their withdrawal 
decisions.
In the following, I present the papers by Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and Chen (1999). In 
the first one, demandable debt is part of an optimal arrangement for monitoring banks. Runs 
are efficient mechanisms to prevent the banker from absconding in states of the world where 
he would do it otherwise. They occur only when informed depositors have received negative 
information on the bank’s future performance. In Chen (1999), demandable debt acts as an 
incentive device for the banker but implies some costs as depositors at one bank can start to run 
when they observe many other banks failing. Even if this is not a precise source of information 
about their bank’s future solvency, uninformed depositors have strong incentives to respond to 
it, in order not to be rationed by the sequential service constraint.
In short, market discipline is inefficient in Chen (1999) because runs are contagious. In 
chapter 3 of this thesis, I will discuss another possible source of market discipline inefficiency, 
which originates within one bank.
The question of whether runs are efficient control devices for moral hazard problems is 
relevant for the debate on whether the banking sector needs to be regulated or not. Extra
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market arrangements, such as the suspension of convertibility, deposit insurance and lender of 
last resort, are desirable only if needed to correct market imperfections.
2.4.1 Bank Runs as Perfect D iscipline D evice
The paper of Calomiris and Kahn (1991) aims to explain the emergence of demandable debt as 
the main means of financing banks although it entails a cost in terms of bank suspension and 
liquidation. A plausible explanation is that demandable debt provides the correct incentives 
for the banker to act in line with depositors’ interests. The banker has the possibility of 
absconding with the investment returns and not repaying loans. Depositors have the possibility 
of acquiring a costly signal on the future value of the bank’s investment and of using it in making 
their withdrawal decisions. If the signal is negative, they prefer to withdraw and liquidate the 
bank as they anticipate that the banker would abscond otherwise. The threat of runs induces 
the banker to act in line with depositors’ interests and to attract deposits.
The assumption of costly acquisition of information provides a rationale for the sequential 
service constraint rule imposed in depositors’ repayment. As depositors are repaid according to 
their position in the queue, they have an incentive to monitor the bank and be the first in line if 
necessary. Thus, the sequential service constraint avoids the free riding problem in information 
gathering.
I now describe the model in detail. Given its complexity and its significant difference with 
the other papers presented, I restrict the attention to the simple case of a single agent who 
deposits at a monopoly bank. In this case, a run coincides with the depositor’s decision to 
withdraw at date 1 and liquidate the bank.
Assumptions
1) T=0, 1, 2 and a single good.
2) TECHNOLOGY: There is an investment opportunity that yields a random return R = 
{H, L} at date 2 for each unit invested, with H  > L > 0. The probability of the high return is 
p. The project is liquidated at date 1 if the bank is liquidated. In this case, the value of the 
investment is reduced by a proportion 77 £ [0, 1], which can be interpreted as the tax due to 
liquidation. Table 5 summarises the technology available.
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TECHNOLOGY T = 0 T = 1 T  = 2
Long-term -1 i  =  1 —  T]
~ \  H p
R  = < stochastic 
i  L 1 - p
Table 5: Technology
3) DEPOSITORS: There are many risk neutral agents, each endowed with one unit of the good. 
One of them deposits his funds at the bank at date 0 if he is promised a repayment at date 2 
at least equal to his reservation level S.
4) INFORMATION: After the agent deposits his funds at the bank, he has the possibility of 
acquiring, at the cost fc, a signal s on the future return R. The signal can take on two values 
s = {g,b}. The probability of R — H  contingent on s is ps with:
Pg > P > Pb •
The indicator variable e € {0,1} represents the depositor’s choice: e =  1 if he invests in the 
signal, e =  0 otherwise. The informed depositor’s decision to withdraw at date 1 after observing 
s corresponds to a run and implies the liquidation of the bank.
The decision of whether to invest in the signal or not and the value of the signal is private 
knowledge. Also, the realised return of the bank’s investment at date 2 is privately observed 
by the bank manager. Thus, the deposit contract cannot be directly conditional on the value 
of R .
5) INTERMEDIARY: There is a bank managed by a risk neutral monopoly banker. He collects 
deposits at date 0 in exchange for a contract which allows the depositor to withdraw, per unit 
of investment, either the amount x\ at date 1 or the amount yi at date 2. The banker operates 
subject to a moral hazard problem. At date 2, after the realisation of the investment return but 
before the depositor’s repayment, he can abscond with the funds beyond the reach of the law. 
Absconding allows the banker not to repay loans but reduces the realised value of the investment 
R  =  {H,L}  by a proportion A  € [0,1]. The loss from absconding can be interpreted as the 
cost of engaging in fraud. The banker chooses the action (absconding or not) that maximises 
his profits. Thus, he prefers to abscond when the tax on absconding, ARi , is lower than the 
promised repayment to the depositor at date 2, j/2* The banker’s action depends on depositors’
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reservation level, S', and on the tax on absconding, ARi. For example, under the assumption 
S  > A L , the banker absconds if R  = L as he has to repay the depositor at least S.
Some other assumptions are imposed. First, the investment is socially desirable (even 
considering the loss from absconding if R  =  L), that is pH  +  (1 — p)(l — A)L > S. Second, 
liquidation is less wasteful than absconding, that is 77 < A. Third, the maximum amount x\ 
that the bank can feasibly pay to the depositor in the case of liquidation is greater than what 
it can repay in the case of non liquidation, that is AH  > x \>  AL.
6) DEPOSITORS’ REPAYMENT: Depositors withdrawing at date 1 are repaid according to 
the sequential service constraint rule. This is not relevant, however, in the case of a single 
depositor.
7) TIMING: Figure 5 summarises the timing of the model.
T=0 T=1 T=2
deposit contract
determined;
an agent
deposits his
funds;
the bank
invests
the depositor
the depositor makes his 
can acquire withdrawal
the signal decision; 
the bank 
may be 
liquidated
| depositor
return R  repaid
realised unless 
the banker 
absconds
Figure 5: Timing 
Equilibrium
The equilibrium consists of the deposit contract at date 0. The banker offers the profit- 
maximising contract among those which yield the depositor at least S  in expectations. A 
contract is a function from a space of announcements ^  into outcomes. An outcome is a pair 
(y2,Q), where 2/2 is the repayment promised to the depositor at date 2 and Q £ {0, 1} is an 
indicator variable equaling 1 if the bank is liquidated and 0 otherwise.15 The contract is called
l5The contract should also specifies the banker’s response to the depositor’s announcement s and to the
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’’simple” if it specifies only one outcome; it is called ’’compound” if it specifies two outcomes. 
The simple contracts are the liquidating and the nonliquidating contracts. A compound con­
tract consists of the quartet (yb,Qb,yg,Qg). This is because in the single depositor case there 
can be only two outcomes as the signal can take only two values.
Each contract originates a sequential game in which the depositor chooses whether to invest 
in the signal and the announcement as a function of the signal received. The banker chooses his 
action (abscond or stay, repaying the depositor) as a function of the depositor’s announcement 
and the realised return R. An optimal contract is one for which there exists a sequential 
equilibrium that generates maximum profits for the bank and gives the depositor an expected 
return equal to S. The optimal contract can be either a simple or compound, depending on 
the value of S'. If this is relatively high, then the optimal contract takes on the form of a 
compound contract that resembles demandable debt. The depositor acquires the signal and 
takes his decision conditional on it. If s = b, the depositor liquidates the bank; if s =  g he lets 
it operate. This arrangement is optimal since it prevents the banker from absconding when 
s — b (the banker would abscond if not liquidated as AL < 2/2,6» where 2/2,6 is the amount 
effectively repaid to the depositor in the bad state) and avoids costly liquidation when s =  g 
(the banker does not have incentives to abscond in this case as 7/2,3 < AH, where 7/2,3 is the 
amount effectively repaid to the depositor in the good state).
Conclusions
Calomiris and Kahn show that demandable debt can be part of an incentive-compatible inter­
mediation in a context of asymmetric information and potential cheating on the part of the 
banker. Under some circumstances, the depositor acquires interim information and uses it to 
decide whether to liquidate the bank at date 1 or not. If the signal is good, the depositor lets 
the bank operate and the banker does not abscond; if the signal is bad, the depositor liquidates 
the bank and prevents the banker from absconding. Thus, demandable debt turns out to be 
the optimal arrangement.
The results obtained in the single depositor case can be generalised to the more complex
realised return. However, this can be easily derived: The banker absconds if 2/2,3 >  gARi and does not abscond 
if 2/2,3 <  ARi.
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case of multiple depositors acquiring independent and identically distributed signals on the 
future value of the bank’s investment. A run would then occur when enough depositors have 
received a bad signal. The sequential service constraint rule arises endogenously in the case of 
many depositors to discourage the free riding problem among them.
In focusing on the agency relation between the banker and depositors, the analysis abstracts 
from the role of banks as providers of liquidity to depositors. Further, as in Jacklin and 
Bhattacharya (1988), it considers only the withdrawal decisions of informed depositors without 
looking at the effects of the arrival of interim information on uninformed depositors’ decisions. 
The result is that runs occurs when informed depositors only decide to liquidate the bank. 
Therefore, run efficiency depends only on the informativeness of the signal. If the signal is 
perfect, depositors always choose the correct action and runs are socially efficient. They solve 
the banker’s moral hazard problem without entailing any unnecessary costly liquidation. In 
terms of policy implications, any extra market intervention in this framework is undesirable 
since it prevents the occurrence of efficient runs and its discipline effects on the banker.
2.4.2 Bank Runs as Im perfect D iscipline D evice
Chen’s (1999) paper investigates the efficiency of market discipline further. As in Calomiris and 
Kahn, demandable debt constitutes a discipline device for moral hazard problems in banking. 
The threat of runs induces the banker not to speculate with depositors’ money and not to invest 
in inefficient short-term projects.
However, market discipline can be an inefficient discipline device. Runs at some banks may 
cause panic and generate wasteful runs at other banks. At one bank, some depositors receive 
perfect interim information about the value of the bank’s investment. This gives them an ad­
vantage as they can withdraw earlier than uninformed depositors when the bank’s prospects 
are poor and avoid to be rationed. Given this, uninformed depositors have an incentive to 
respond to any information arriving before the value of the bank’s assets is revealed, such 
as the failure of other banks. When uninformed depositors observe a large number of other 
banks failing, they infer that the prospects for the economy are poor and respond to it. They 
withdraw their deposits from their bank, thus forcing informed depositors to run. Runs trig­
gered by bank-specific information (information-based runs) are efficient as they occur only if
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informed depositors receive negative interim information. Runs triggered by general-economic 
information (panic runs) entail higher social costs, as they are based on noisy information.
Assumptions
1) T =  0,1,2 and a single good.
2) TECHNOLOGY: There are many different long-term investments available; each of them 
requires an outlay of one unit of capital at date 0 and yields a stochastic return R  =  {H , L} at 
date 2, with H  > 1 > L  > 0. The probability of R  =  H  is p and that of R  =  L  is 1 — p.
The variable p is a random variable that depends on the prospects of the economy: p = pg 
when the prospects are favorable and p = Pb when the prospects are poor, with pg > pb. All 
the investments have the same expected return but, given the realisation of p , the returns of 
two different projects are independent. Let 7]0 be the prior probability of favorable prospects 
of the economy. Then, the expected value of p at date 0, denoted as po5 is given by:
Po =  VoPg +  (1 ~  Vo)Pb-
If liquidated at date 1, the investment yields a return equal to 1. Table 6 describes the returns 
from each investment available.
TECHNOLOGY T =  0 T  = 1 T  = 2
Long-term -1 £= 1 R =  <
H p 
L  1 —p
Tabella 6: Technology
3) DEPOSITORS: There are many depositors, each of them endowed of one dollar at date 0. 
A fraction of them equal to t becomes of type 1 at date 1; the remaining fraction 1 — t becomes 
of type 2. The variable t is deterministic. Depositors are risk averse, with RRA > 1 and corner 
preferences:
^ ( c n )  =  u(cii) for type 1 agents 
C^1(c22) =  u(c2 2) for type 2 agents
where Cy is the consumption at date i of an agent of type j .
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4) INFORMATION: At date 1 a fraction a of depositors at each bank, defined as informed, 
receives a perfectly informative signal s =  {#, L} on the future return of the bank’s investment. 
The remaining fraction 1 — a  remains uninformed. Unlike the previous models, depositors know 
at date 0 whether they will be informed at date 1 and both informed and uninformed depositors 
have the same chance of becoming of type 1 or of type 2.
5) INTERMEDIARY: There are N  competitive banks in the economy. Each of them is owned 
and managed by a risk-neutral banker. Banks collect deposits at date 0 in exchange for a 
contract which allows depositors to withdraw for each unit deposited either the amount x\ 
at date 1 or the amount 2/2 at date 2. Then, each banker invests in one of the investments 
available. There is a moral hazard problem between bankers and depositors. At date 1, after 
receiving perfect information on the return of the investment at date 2, the banker can decide 
to liquidate it and invest in a negative NPV short-term project. The new investment yields a 
random return Rs =  {HS,L S} with Hs > H  and Ls — 0. The probability of R  =  Hs is e with 
eHa < 1.
6) DEPOSITORS’ REPAYMENT: Depositors’ withdrawal demands at date 1 are repaid ac­
cording to the sequential service constraint rule.
7) INFORMATION TRANSMISSION AMONG BANKS: Agents can deposit their funds at 
one bank only. Banks do not have any interrelations, that is they are not linked through the 
payment systems and/or interbank markets.16 However, as depositors’ withdrawals at one bank 
can be observed by depositors at the same bank and at other banks, there can be informational 
externalities. These work as follows. The timing of the revelation of the liquidity shock and 
of the interim information at date 1 differs among banks. Revelation occurs first at N\ banks, 
randomly chosen among the existing AT, and later at the remaining N  — N \ . Depositors know 
whether their bank is in the first N\ banks before date 1.
The revelation of bad interim information at a bank (’’bank-specific information”) may cause 
its failure. Assume K\ < N\ the number of failed banks among the first N\ banks. A large 
K\ implies that the prospects in the economy are poor. The failure of one bank is publicly
16 The lack of interrelations among banks implies that if there is a propagation of failures from a group of banks 
to another, this takes place through the information channel. Using the terminology introduced in chapter 1, 
the propagation of failures in this model is an industry specific contagious run.
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observable. Thus, depositors at the N  — Ni remaining banks observe K \ (’’general-economic 
information”) before the revelation of their liquidity shock and of the interim information 
specific to their bank, and may respond to it.
8) TIMING: Figure 6 summarises the timing of the model.
T=0 T=1 T=2
1
agents
1
preference depositors at
1
1 the banker
1
1
deposit shock realised, remaining preference may return R
their funds information N  — N\ banks shock realised, decide to realised;
at one revealed at observe K \ information speculate remaining
bank; Ni banks; and make revealed if his depositors
banks depositors withdrawal at the bank repaid
invest make decisions; N  — N\ banks; has not
withdrawal N - N i depositors failed
decisions; banks make
K \ banks may fail withdrawal
fail decisions
Figure 6: Timing 
Equilibrium
The equilibrium consists of the deposit contract at date 0, and depositors’ withdrawal decisions 
at date 1. The model is solved backwards. Given the amounts x\ and 1/2 promised in the deposit 
contract, depositors’ withdrawal decisions are determined; then, given depositors’ decisions, the 
contract is determined.
a) DEPOSITORS’ WITHDRAWAL DECISIONS: The decision of depositors at each of the first 
N\ banks is as follows. Type 1 depositors withdraw at date 1. Informed depositors withdraw 
at date 1 if they receive s = L and wait otherwise. Uninformed depositors observe the queue 
at the bank and join it if this is longer than t. If all depositors demand x\ after the arrival of 
bank-specific information, then an information-induced run takes place: The bank liquidates
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all the assets and closes down. Informed depositors obtain the promised repayment x\ while 
uninformed depositors are rationed.
K\ banks fail among the first N\ banks. Depositors at the other N  — N\ banks observe 
K\ and use it to update the probability of favorable prospects of the economy (now equal to 
rh(Ki)) and the probability of success of their bank’s investment (now equal to p). The higher 
K\ the lower r]1 and p. The general-economic information has a different value for the different 
categories of depositors. Informed depositors do not have any incentive to react to it as they 
are fully repaid if a run occurs at their bank after the arrival of bank-specific information. 
Uninformed depositors have incentive to react to K\ as they are rationed if a run triggered 
by bank-specific information occurs at their bank. Thus, they compare the updated expected 
utility from waiting with that from withdrawing and choose to withdraw whenever convenient. 
This happens when the posterior probability assessment p is low enough (that is when K\ is high 
enough). Uninformed depositors’ decision to withdraw their money forces informed depositors 
to withdraw prematurely as well in order to avoid being rationed and a panic run takes place.
b) THE DEPOSIT CONTRACT: The determination of the optimal contract is quite difficult 
as it has to take into account the probability of runs, depositors’ incentive compatibility and 
participation constraints and the banker’s moral hazard. The optimal deposit contract has the 
following characteristics:
2/2 = C22; xi =  cJi with C22 > c*n  > 1.
The condition c£2 > cjx is necessary for individuals to make deposit at date 0, the condition 
cjx > 1, together with the assumptions of liquidation value 1 = 1  and of sequential service 
constraint rule, implies a payoff externality among depositors and makes the bank run out 
of funds at date 1 if all depositors withdraw at that date (this is analogous as in Diamond 
and Dybvig). The repayments promised in the contract make it convenient for the banker 
to speculate on the project at date 1 only in the bad state when, however, the bank will be 
liquidated. Thus, as in Calomiris and Kahn, the banker will never misbehave in equilibrium.
The optimal contract allows for the possibility of panic runs at date 1. A panic run could be 
eliminated by decreasing x\ or increasing 7/2 appropriately so to prevent uninformed depositors
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from reacting to the general-economic information. Decreasing a?i, however, reduces the insur­
ance service of demandable debt. A lower repayment at date 1 makes depositors of type 1 worse 
off. Thus, the optimal contract entails a positive probability of panic runs in circumstances in 
which the major concern is risk sharing rather then the prevention of panics.
Conclusions
Chen’s analysis shows that market discipline is an inefficient control device for banks’ moral 
hazard problems. Runs may be contagious, that is runs at some banks may trigger runs on 
others. This is due to both the sequential service constraint and the informational externalities 
among depositors, which stem from the different timing of information and preference shock 
revelation among banks. The sequential service constraint generates a payoff externality among 
depositors, forcing them to respond to noisy general-economic information, such as failures of 
other banks.
Chen’s result on the inefficiency of market discipline has important policy implications. Un­
like in Calomiris and Kahn (1991), now public interventions are desirable. Chen shows that 
there is a deposit insurance system that can induce depositors to respond to bank-specific in­
formation, thus eliminating contagious runs. This system fully protects uninformed depositors, 
whilst leaving informed depositors uninsured. The fully protected uninformed depositors do not 
need to withdraw early in response to bad general-economic information. Because uninformed 
depositors never start a run, the uninsured informed depositors at a bank can always wait 
until bank-specific information is revealed and withdraw only when this is bad. Thus, market 
discipline works efficiently since contagious runs are prevented.
Chen’s model shares some common features with the other models presented above. As in 
Diamond and Dybvig(1983), agents are very risk averse (RRA>1) and the liquidation value 
of the long-term investment equals 1. This implies that the bank offers depositors insurance 
against the shock of being of type 1, as it promises them an amount x\ > 1 at date 1, but it 
also implies a payoff externality that causes inefficient runs. As in Diamond and Dybvig, the 
deposit contract supports multiple equilibria, as depositors run if they fear that other depositors 
will start to withdraw early, independently of any information. However, the panic equilibrium 
in Chen does not rely on the existence of multiple equilibria. By introducing a stochastic
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technology and informational externalities among banks, Chen shows that a panic run can 
occur even when depositors choose the Pareto-dominant equilibrium (the one described above 
in the analysis) when there are multiple equilibria. The negative payoff externality generated 
is now used to analyse how depositors respond to the arrival of early and noisy information 
rather than to analyse how it generates multiple equilibria.
As in Chari and Jagannathan (1988), runs occur when all depositors withdraw prematurely 
and depositors are asymmetrically informed on the future value of the bank’s assets. This is 
the source of run inefficiency in both models. However, the mechanism generating it differs 
in the two models. In Chari and Jagannathan, the inefficiency is within one bank and there 
is no disciplinary effect on the asset side. Uninformed depositors use the public information 
available (the queue at their bank) to update their ex post probability of success of the bank’s 
investment and they withdraw when this is low enough. A panic run occurs when uninformed 
depositors commit a mistake in their updating process as they confuse a large realisation of the 
liquidity shock with an insolvency problem. In Chen, uninformed depositors at one bank make 
perfect inference of the signal received by the informed depositors by looking at the withdrawal 
queue. So, a run triggered by bank-specific information is always efficient as it occurs only if the 
bank will turn to be insolvent at date 2. However, because of their informational disadvantage, 
uninformed depositors are rationed in the case of a run triggered by bank-specific information. 
This makes them sensitive to the arrival of some external information and a panic run occurs in 
the model when they respond to it instead of waiting for more precise bank-specific information.
In the next chapter, I am studying further the character of demandable debt as imperfect 
discipline device, focusing on internal inefficiency instead of contagion phenomena.
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Chapter 3
Bank Moral Hazard and Market 
Discipline
3.1 Introduction
Bank stability has always been a major concern for policymakers and a major topic of debate 
among economists. The issue is not purely academic, as many and recurrent bank runs and 
failures demonstrate. There is a stark contrast between the variety of opinions expressed in the 
debate and the uniformity of policy stances. Since the devastating crises which undermined the 
stability of the US banking system in the 1930s, policymakers in industrialised countries have 
taken up a supervisory role and introduced deposit insurance. Also, they have often chosen to 
offer a de facto complete insurance to the banking system by forbearing financially distressed 
banks and bailing out insolvent ones.
This attitude, which has prevailed for the last half century, has been shaken by the many 
bank failures of the 1980s and 1990s. Systemic crises occurred both in developed and developing 
countries, such as the United States, Finland, Japan, Chile, Argentina, Mexico, Indonesia, and 
Russia. Regulators in the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany and France intervened to rescue 
individual banks in distress.1 According to many economists, the underlying cause of these 
crises was a problem of moral hazard. The de facto protection provided by regulators induced
^ e e  Caprio and Klingebiel (1996).
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excessive risk-taking on the part of banks.
These crises have renewed the debate on how to regulate the banking system. Several pro­
posals have been put forward to reduce the distortions induced by the protective attitude of 
regulators. Most suggestions revolve around the ideas of strengthening supervision or increas­
ing the price for bank protection by tightening capital adequacy ratios and deposit insurance 
premia.2 Apart from problems with the internal consistency of these approaches, their imple­
mentation may be too difficult. For example, risk-sensitive prudential regulation requires an 
amount of information often not available to regulators. Moreover, regulators may fail—for 
whatever reason—to use their supervisory tools to avert banks’ distress and to step in once a 
failure has occurred, as the Saving and Loans debacle has shown.
For these reasons, some researchers and policymakers have stressed the potential of market 
forces to overcome banks’ moral hazard problem. The idea is that market participants have 
stronger incentives than regulators to acquire information on banks’ risk exposure and to make 
use of the information they do have. Clearly, this requires that depositors or other creditors 
of banks do not anticipate being bailed out if their bank is in troubles. Debtholders can exert 
discipline on banks through the pricing and the growth of their claims. Two recommendations, 
usually seen as alternative, have been advocated: (i) introduce an uninsured subordinated debt 
requirement on banks;3 (ii) scale back deposit insurance and reintroduce uninsured depositors’ 
monitoring in the form of deposit withdrawals on demand.4 Proposal (i) relies on the idea that 
subordinated debt yields should be formally used as an early warning signal in the regulatory 
process of identifying banks with a high likelihood of distress. High yields would indicate 
high risk exposure and should trigger regulatory discipline on the bank. Proposal (ii) suggests 
instead that market intervention should substitute regulators in the closure decision of banks 
with a high likelihood of insolvency. While regulators are often prone to forbearance, uninsured 
depositors have strong incentives to run as soon as they have doubts on banks’ solvency. Hence, 
the credible threat of depositors’ withdrawals would restrain banks from taking on high risks.
The effectiveness of market discipline depends crucially on how good the information avail­
able to market participants is. Concerning proposal (ii), for example, if depositors have im­
2 An overview of these proposals has been presented in chapter 1.
3See, for example, Benston et al. (1986) and, more recently, Calomiris (1998).
4See, for example, Broaddus (1994), Federal Reserve of Chicago (1990) and Kaufman (1994).
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perfect information on the future value of bank assets, they may commit mistakes in their 
withdrawal decisions: They can either precipitate a run on a solvent bank or let an insolvent 
bank operate. If this is the case, then market discipline can entail high social costs and needs 
to be accompanied by regulatory measures.
In this chapter, I analyse from a theoretical point of view the effectiveness of the proposal of 
restoring market discipline, focusing on how depositors assess their bank’s financial conditions 
and react to the (asymmetrically distributed) information they have on the value of the bank’s 
assets.5 To address this issue, I develop a model in which a banker needs to raise external funds 
to invest in an illiquid and risky project. The banker operates under moral hazard since he 
can privately decide whether to monitor the project, thus increasing its probability of success, 
or not. To raise funds, he can issue either standard debt or demandable debt. With standard 
debt, investors deposit their funds at the bank and demand a predetermined repayment at 
maturity. With demandable debt, investors are allowed to withdraw at any point in time. 
Starting from a situation in which credit markets do not work with standard debt, I show 
that demandable debt can constitute a solution for the banker’s moral hazard problem and 
induce investors to deposit their funds at the bank. This is because demandable debt allows 
depositors to discipline the banker by observing the value of the bank’s assets and triggering a 
run whenever they (rationally) expect this value to be low.
However, market discipline can come at a cost. When not all depositors are equally informed 
on the value of the bank’s assets, it may happen that those who are uninformed commit errors 
in deciding when to run on the bank. They may either leave their deposits at the bank when 
prospects are in fact low, or they may withdraw their funds when prospects are in fact high. 
In the former case, an insolvent bank is let operate although it would be efficient to liquidate 
its investments and close it down. In the latter case, the erroneous withdrawal decisions of 
uninformed depositors can force informed depositors to disregard their information and with­
draw prematurely. Even if they know that the bank will be solvent, informed depositors find 
it optimal to precipitate a run since they would get nothing from leaving their funds at the 
bank. When this is the case, an ex post inefficient run occurs and a solvent bank is forced into 
liquidation.
5 For a theoretical analysis of the effectiveness of proposal (i), see, for example, Nagarajan and Sealey (1997).
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Therefore, market discipline is a feasible incentive device, but it can be imperfect and costly. 
The benefits of demandable debt consist of its incentive effect. The costs stem from the fact 
that, with demandable debt, profitable projects may be liquidated and unprofitable projects 
continued. These results provide a rationale for regulatory intervention, which should aim to 
eliminate the costs of market discipline while, at the same time, preserving its benefits.
The model I develop in this chapter relates to the literature reviewed in chapter 2. Diamond 
and Dybvig (1983) show that runs are an unfortunate and undesirable side-effect of demandable 
debt and they occur as a sunspot if depositors lose confidence in the bank’s solvency. The 
coordination problem among depositors results from the sequential service constraint imposed 
on depositors’ repayments. I do not need to impose such a constraint. Bank runs in my model 
are information-induced and the coordination problem among depositors arises from both the 
informational asymmetries among depositors and the costly liquidation of the bank’s assets.
The mechanism through which bank runs occur in my model is similar, though not identical, 
to that in Chari and Jagannathan (1988). Both models focus on a signal-extraction problem 
to analyse how information is revealed to uninformed depositors by the withdrawal decisions of 
other depositors. However, the two models differ in terms of the bank run inefficiency. Chari 
and Jagannathan argue that a panic run occurs when depositors fear that some of them possess 
(superior) negative information on the bank’s project returns. My model shows that an ineffi­
cient run can take place despite the fact that some depositors do have positive information on 
the bank’s returns. This is because, in addition to the signal-extraction problem, I also consider 
how the behaviour of uninformed depositors feeds bank to the withdrawal decisions of informed 
depositors. Furthermore, unlike Chari and Jagannathan, I examine the incentive effects of 
demandable debt by considering an agency problem between the bank and its depositors.
This latter aspect alone has been analysed earlier by Calomiris and Kahn (1991). They 
study the incentive effects of demandable debt in a context of asymmetric information between 
a bank and its depositors.6 By focusing on the endogenous acquisition of costly information 
by depositors, they show that the threat of bank liquidation restrains the banker from fraud­
6 Also Qi (1998) and Diamond and Rajan (1999) examine the disciplinary effect of liquid deposits but in a 
rather different framework. They build general equilibrium models where the role of the bank is either to issue 
liquid deposits against information-sensitive loan funding ( Q i ) or to solve liquidity problems of both depositors 
and borrowers (Diamond and Rajan). Both models abstract from issues of asymmetric information and of 
liquidation costs of premature withdrawals.
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ulently diverting resources ex post. Within this framework, market discipline turns out to be 
an efficient mechanism: The sequential service constraint induces some depositors to monitor 
the bank and to withdraw their deposits in case they receive negative information. Hence, 
Calomiris and Kahn always regard bank runs as socially beneficial, since they result from the 
withdrawal decisions of perfectly informed depositors. Similarly to Calomiris and Kahn, my 
results show that demandable debt acts as an incentive device, which mitigates the moral haz­
ard problem stemming from the banker’s discretionary choice of whether to monitor projects 
or not. However, unlike Calomiris and Kahn, I consider a context where bank runs arise from 
the co-existence of liquidity, informed and uninformed depositors. This allows me to explicitly 
model both the costs and the benefits of the incentive effects of demandable debt.
Chen (1999) also discusses whether depositors’ monitoring is an efficient device for control­
ling bankers’ moral hazard problems, but he focuses on an inefficiency different from the one 
studied here. He shows that market discipline is costly because bank runs are contagious, that 
is failures of a few banks may cause runs on others. In his model, a panic run occurs when 
depositors withdraw their funds from their bank in response to failures of other banks: The 
payoff externality generated by the sequential service constraint induces uninformed deposi­
tors to respond to early information and forces informed depositors to precipitate a run before 
more precise information on their bank is revealed. In my model, the inefficiency of market 
discipline originates inside the bank: Both inefficient runs and continuations can occur even 
if some depositors are already informed about the value of the bank’s assets. This is because 
depositors make mistakes in their information updating process, which takes place after specific 
information on their bank is revealed.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The model is described in section 2. The 
incentive effects of demandable debt are analysed in section 3. Section 4 concludes the chapter.
3.2 The M odel
Consider a three-date economy (T =  0,1,2) with two types of risk neutral agents: a bank 
and a continuum of depositors of measure one. The bank, which acts as a monopolist, can 
invest in a risky and illiquid project. Since it has no capital, the bank needs to raise funds
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from depositors. It can offer either a standard or a demandable deposit contract for different 
maturities, as specified below. Both deposit contracts are noncontingent, in the sense that the 
amount that depositors can withdraw at each date is not contingent on the returns of the bank’s 
project but it depends only on the timing of withdrawal. Depositors are perfectly competitive 
and each is endowed with one unit. The riskless interest rate is normalised to zero.
The bank and the moral hazard problem
The project the bank invests in requires an outlay of one unit of capital at date 0. At date 2, it 
yields x  =  H  per unit invested if it succeeds and x  =  0 if it fails. The probability of success of 
the project depends upon the behaviour of the banker, who is the manager and also the only 
owner of the bank: He can simply invest in the project or he can actively monitor it, increasing 
the probability of success. I denote the probability of success by pb in the former case, and by 
pg in the latter, with pg > pb. The subscripts b and g denote ’bad’ (no monitoring) and ’good’ 
(monitoring) behaviour on the part of the banker. The project is economically viable only if 
the banker monitors: pgH  >  1 > PbH. The banker may choose not to monitor in order to 
enjoy, at date 2, a non-transferable private benefit B. The private benefit can be interpreted as 
the opportunity cost of monitoring the project. Returns are observable but monitoring choice 
is not. This creates a moral hazard problem.
The severity of the moral hazard problem depends on the magnitude of the private benefit 
B  and on the cost of deposits, which, in turn, depends on the debt contract that the bank uses 
to raise funds. To provide a benchmark, I start by analyzing the situation in which the banker 
chooses between monitoring and not monitoring when he issues a standard debt contract. Then, 
I turn to the situation when the banker issues demandable debt.
The standard debt contract
A standard debt contract (S) is defined as a contract that requires one unit of investment 
at date 0 in exchange for the repayment, at date 2, of a sum Rs , which includes principal 
and interest. Repayment is conditional on the bank being solvent, i.e. the bank is protected 
by limited liability. The face value of debt, Rs , is determined at date 0 so as to guarantee 
depositors zero expected profits.
100
Since the project is economically viable only if the banker monitors, depositors leave their 
money with the bank only if they anticipate that the banker will indeed do so.7 The banker 
monitors only if:
nf = p„(H -  r s ) > n£ = Pi(H -  r s ) +  B
that is, only if:
(pg - p b) ( H - R s ) > B  (1)
where 11^  and 11^  are the bank’s expected profits from monitoring and not monitoring, respec­
tively, and Rs > 1 is the face value of debt conditional on the banker choosing to monitor. For 
simplicity, I assume that the banker behaves well when he is indifferent between monitoring 
and not monitoring. Perfect competition among depositors implies pgR s = 1, that is the face 
value of debt guarantees zero expected profits to depositors if the banker chooses to monitor. 
Condition (1) is satisfied whenever the moral hazard problem is not ’’too severe,” that is when 
B < B s  where B s  is defined as B s = (pg — pb)(H — R s ). In other words, B s  is the value of B  
above which the banker prefers not to monitor.
If condition (1) fails, the bank will be unable to raise funds using the standard debt contract 
because depositors anticipate that the banker will not monitor. Is there a way out to this 
problem? I now consider the situation in which the banker issues demandable debt and I show 
that the use of the demandable debt contract can solve the moral hazard problem by inducing 
the banker to monitor the project.8
The demandable debt contract
A demandable debt contract (D) is defined as a contract that requires one unit of investment at 
date 0 in exchange for the right to withdraw either (i) the initial unit of investment at date 1, 
or (%%) a sum R D, which includes principal and interest, at date 2. The amount that depositors 
can withdraw at date 1 is determined by their risk neutrality.9 The face value of debt, RD, is
7Since pbH <  1, no repayment R s  can guarantee depositors zero expected profits if the banker does not 
monitor.
8 Note that the moral hazard problem cannot be solved by the bank promising depositors a face value of debt 
greater than R s . Such promise would indeed only worsen the bank’s incentive compatibility costraint.
9 An analysis of the insurance provided to depositors by the bank goes beyond the scope of this model, which 
concentrates on the incentive effects of demandable debt. By assuming risk neutrality, I avoid worry about the
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determined at date 0 so as to guarantee strategic depositors (see below) zero expected profits.
Demandable debt allows depositors to choose their preferred consumption profile. There 
are two classes of depositors, liquidity depositors and strategic depositors. Both classes are a 
continuum of measure one half, so that the maximum total amount of funding available to the 
bank at date 0 is one unit.
Liquidity depositors simply respond to their liquidity needs. A random fraction of liquidity 
depositors, t € [0,1], withdraws its deposits at date 1 in response to a shock to consumption 
preferences. The remaining liquidity depositors, 1 — t, leave their funds at the bank until date 
2. Denote these two fractions ’early’ and ’late’ liquidity depositors, respectively. Without loss 
of generality, I assume that t can take three values, 0 < t\ < t%, with probabilities #o,<7i and 
<72, respectively. I also assume that the intermediate liquidity shock is more likely than the 
extreme ones: qi > <7o,<72-10
Strategic depositors compete for returns and behave strategically in order to maximise their 
utility, which is given by U(ci,C2 ) =  c\ 4- C2- At date 0, they deposit their funds at the bank 
in exchange for a repayment RD > 1 at date 2, which has to guarantee them zero expected 
profits. At date 1, after the arrival of information on the future return of the bank’s project 
(as specified below), they decide whether to leave their deposits until date 2 or to withdraw 
prematurely. Since a consumer’s type is not observable, strategic depositors can always imitate 
early liquidity depositors and withdraw at date 1 whenever they find it optimal.
The distinction between liquidity and strategic depositors suggests different interpretations. 
Liquidity depositors can be thought of as small depositors who are interested only in their 
consumption needs. Strategic depositors can be interpreted instead as wholesale depositors (or 
also other banks) who have the incentive and the ability to monitor and discipline the banker 
by reacting promptly to the information available at date 1 on the bank’s future solvency.
Information
A crucial element of the model is the information that strategic depositors have at date 1 on 
the future return of the bank’s project. In the following, I focus on the situation where strate­
relationship between the shape of depositors’ utility function and the project’s liquidation value. On this issue, 
see Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) and also Allen and Gale (1998).
l0A generalization to a continuous t would require its density function f ( t)  to be single peaked.
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gic depositors are asymmetrically informed. This is the economically interesting information 
structure, which allows me to analyse both the benefits and the costs of the incentive effect of 
demandable debt.
At date 1, a fraction a of strategic depositors receives a perfectly informative signal, s 
£ {H, 0}, on the future value of the bank’s assets. The signal is the same for all informed 
strategic depositors. The remaining strategic depositors, 1 — a, remain uninformed. Denote 
these two fractions ’informed’ and ’uninformed’ strategic depositors, respectively. At date 0, a 
strategic depositor does not know whether he will become informed or not.
Uninformed strategic depositors have an informational disadvantage: They cannot observe 
the realisation of either the fraction t of early liquidity depositors or the return x of the bank’s 
assets, as well as the signal s received by informed strategic depositors. The only variable 
that they can observe (and that also informed strategic depositors can observe) is the amount 
of aggregate withdrawals at date 1, W. In other words, uninformed strategic depositors can 
observe the total fraction of depositors who withdraw at date 1 but not the reason behind each 
individual withdrawal decision.
The amount of aggregate withdrawals W  is correlated with the signal s received by informed 
strategic depositors and, therefore, with the future value of the bank’s assets. By observing W, 
uninformed strategic depositors try to infer s. If W  is perfectly correlated with s, then their 
signal extraction problem is trivial and all strategic depositors are equally and perfectly informed 
on the future value of the bank’s assets. If W  is imperfectly correlated with s, then uninformed 
strategic depositors have a non-trivial signal extraction problem and strategic depositors are 
asymmetrically informed.
In order for uninformed strategic depositors to have a non-trivial signal extraction problem, 
I assume:
t x = a  (2)
t2 — t\ a = 2t\. (3)
Assumption (2) states that the fraction of informed strategic depositors equals the intermediate 
fraction of early liquidity depositors. Assumption (3) states that the largest fraction of early liq­
uidity depositors equals the fraction of informed strategic agents plus the intermediate fraction
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of early liquidity depositors. With these restrictions in place, uninformed strategic depositors 
observe a noisy indicator of the signal received by informed strategic depositors, from which 
they may be unable to infer the bank’s future solvency. Without these restrictions in place, 
uninformed strategic depositors would always be able to infer the signal in equilibrium. Hence, 
assumptions (2) and (3) are neither restrictions on the structure of the economy nor are they 
necessary for the existence of an equilibrium. Rather, they allow me to model confounding.11
Depositors’ withdrawal demands and bank’s project liquidation
At date 1, all depositors decide whether to withdraw prematurely or to leave their deposits at the 
bank until date 2. All depositors withdrawing at date 1 submit their requests simultaneously. 
Depending on the value of aggregate withdrawals W , each depositor receives either the initial 
unit of deposit or a pro-rata share of the value of the bank’s assets. Similarly, depositors waiting 
until date 2 receive either the promised repayment RD or a pro-rata share of the value of the 
bank’s assets.12 Depositors who do not withdraw at date 1 are not taken into account in the 
splitting of the value of the bank’s assets.
The bank pays off depositors who demand early withdrawals by liquidating the project. 
Liquidation is costly in the following sense. If only (relatively) few depositors ask for repayment 
at date 1, that is if W  is low, liquidation yields the initial unit of investment. If (relatively) 
many depositors withdraw at date 1, that is if W  is high, liquidation yields an amount i  which 
is less than the initial unit of investment. Let LV  represent the liquidation value of the project. 
Then, I assume:
f 1 i iW  < W  
L V = {  (4)
[ e nw>w
where is W  equal to:
& = J  (5)
and i  < 1 is exogenously specified below.
“ Without assumptions (2) and (3), the model would be similar to Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and bank runs 
would always be triggered by perfect information on the bank’s state of solvency.
l2Since I do not consider the issue of costly acquisition of information about the project’s returns of the on 
parts of depositors, I do not impose the sequential service constraint rule for depositors’ repayment. Indeed, this 
rule has been criticised as being not an optimal arrangement when depositors’ information acquisition problem 
is exogenous (see Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and Allen and Gale (1998)).
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Assumption (4) describes the liquidation value of the project conditional on the aggregate 
withdrawals. Assumption (5) fixes the threshold level of aggregate withdrawals beyond which 
the liquidation value of the project reduces to L Together these two assumptions attempt to 
capture, in a reduced form, the determination of the price of the bank’s assets in a secondary 
market where, in the spirit of Akerlof (1970), the presence of asymmetric information on the 
bank’s future solvency generates a ’’lemons” problem. The secondary market prices the assets 
according to the only observable variable, W,  which is correlated—albeit imperfectly—with 
their value. When aggregate withdrawals exceed W,  the liquidation value falls, reflecting the 
market’s expectation of a lower value of the assets. Indeed, when W  > W,  the market infers 
that some, if not all, strategic depositors are withdrawing prematurely. This conveys negative 
information on the bank’s future solvency and, consequently, induces the market to offer a lower 
price for its assets.
The liquidation value of the project determines the bank’s liquidation policy and affects 
strategic depositors’ behaviour by specifying the resources available for redemption at the bank 
at dates 1 and 2. In order to simplify the analysis, I assume:
(6)
Assumption (6) is a further specification of the liquidation value t  in (4). It simplifies the 
analysis in that it completely isolates strategic depositors’ withdrawal decisions from the value 
of I. Note that (6) is stronger than necessary. As I will discuss further below, the main results 
summarised in proposition 1 still hold for a much wider range of values for i.
Timing and Notation
The time structure of the model is summarised in Figure 1. At date 0, the bank issues demand- 
able debt and investors deposit their funds. The promised repayment to depositors at date 2, 
Rd , is determined and the banker chooses whether to monitor the project or not.
At date 1, the fraction t of early liquidity depositors is realised and the signal s is observed 
by the fraction a of informed strategic depositors. Then, all depositors make their withdrawal 
decisions simultaneously. If (relatively) many depositors withdraw at date 1, the bank liquidates 
the entire project and is closed down. Otherwise, at date 2 the project’s returns are realised and
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claims are settled. Conditional on the bank being solvent, each remaining depositor receives 
R d and the bank retains the surplus.
T=0 T=1 T=2
investors deposit 
their funds; 
the banker
fraction of 
early liquidity 
depositors realised
chooses whether informed strategic 
to monitor depositors receive
the project
Figure 1: Timing
the signal
depositors make 
the withdrawal 
decisions; 
the bank may 
liquidate 
the project
project 
returns 
are realised
depositors 
are repaid; 
the bank 
retains the 
surplus
Table 1 provides the list of notation that describes the model.
x  =  random return of the project at date 2 (x = H, 0)
PgiPb) =  success probability of the project when monitoring (no monitoring)
B  =  private benefit
R s  =  face value of Standard debt (S)
n£(n£) =  bank’s expected profits when monitoring (no monitoring) with S
Rd — face value of Demandable debt (D)
11^(11^) = bank’s expected profits when monitoring (no monitoring) with D
W  =  aggregate withdrawals
W  =  aggregate withdrawals beyond which LV  =  £
£ =  liquidation value when W  > W
t  =  fraction of ’early’ liquidity depositors (t = 0 , t i , t 2 )
qi =  probability distribution of t, i = 0,1,2
ol — fraction of informed strategic depositors
Table 1: Notation
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3.3 The Incentive Effects o f Dem andable D ebt
The equilibrium consists of three elements: the face value of debt R D and the banker’s mon­
itoring choice at date 0, and depositors’ withdrawal decisions at date 1. The model is solved 
backward. I first analyse depositors’ withdrawal decisions at date 1, given RD and the banker’s 
choice of monitoring the project. Then I compute R D and the banker’s monitoring choice at 
date 0, taking into account depositors’ withdrawal decisions at date 1.
3.3.1 D epositors’ W ithdraw al D ecisions at D ate 1
At date 1, the liquidity shock is realised and informed strategic depositors receive the signal. 
Then, all agents choose simultaneously whether to withdraw or not, according to their type, 
to the available information and to others’ decisions. I analyse the decisions of each type of 
depositors in turn.
The decision problem of liquidity depositors is trivial: A fraction equal to the realisation of 
t withdraws deposits at date 1. The remaining fraction 1 — t waits until date 2.
Informed strategic depositors make their withdrawal decisions after observing the signal s 
and the aggregate withdrawals W. When s =  0, they find it optimal to withdraw at date 1, 
irrespective of W, since they know they would get nothing from waiting until date 2. When 
they observe a large enough W , they choose to withdraw at date 1, irrespective of s. Indeed, 
when enough depositors withdraw at date 1, informed strategic depositors know they will get 
less at date 2 if they do not withdraw. This is because the bank has to liquidate assets to 
satisfy withdrawals at date 1 and it may not have enough resources for redemption at date 2. 
Let w ^s, W) be the solution to informed strategic depositors’ decision problem.
Uninformed strategic depositors make their withdrawal decisions after observing W. They 
realise that W  is correlated with s, although imperfectly. Indeed, W  could be high either be­
cause the realisation of the fraction of early liquidity depositors t is high or because informed 
agents have received a signal s =  0 on the future value of the bank’s assets. This confounding 
is crucial for the results. Conditional on the observed value of W , uninformed strategic de­
positors compute the expected utility from waiting until date 2 and choose to withdraw if this 
expected utility is greater than the utility from withdrawing early. Let wu (W) be the solution
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to uninformed strategic depositors’ decision problem, which is given by:
max ci +  I c2dF(e\W) 
ivu (W) J
subject to:
ci =  maxwu (W) j
C2 =  max {i?D(l — wu (W)), 0}
where 0 =  (t , x) is the state of the world, which is described by the two independent random 
variables t and x, and F(6\W) denotes the distribution of 0 conditional on W.
The aggregate demand for withdrawals , Wd , is then given by the sum of depositors’ indi­
vidual withdrawal decisions, that is by:
WD = \[ t  + awr(s,W ) +  (1 -  a)wu (W)}
where the terms on the right-hand side are the aggregate withdrawal decisions of early liquidity 
depositors, informed strategic depositors and uninformed strategic depositors, respectively. In 
equilibrium Wd =  W. Table 2 describes the state of the world 6 and its probability distribution 
and it shows the value of Wd for every 9.
State 6 = (t,x) Probability Aggregate demand for withdrawals Wo
1 0 ,H qoPg i  [era/(ZT, W) + (1 -  a)wu {W)\
2 0,0 0o(l -Pg) jfcnu^O, W)  +  (1 — a)wu {W)\
3 tu H QlPg i[ti +  aw'^H, W) +  (1 -  a)wu {W)]
4 *i,0 91 (1 -Pg) i[ ii +  awr(0, W) + (1 -  a)wu (W)]
5 *2,# Q2Pg \  [t2 +  aw'(H, W) + (1 -  a)wu (W)]
6 *2,0 1
i—icsCP £[«2 +  cno/ (0) W)  +  (1 -  a)wu {W)\
Table 2: Aggregate demand for withdrawals
The equilibrium concept I use for depositors’ withdrawal decisions is that of rational expec­
tations. This requires that strategic agents make their optimal decisions conditional on their 
information, that is the volume of aggregate withdrawals, and any signal they observe. 
Formally, a rational expectations equilibrium consists of:
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(i) an aggregate withdrawal function W(9) that specifies aggregate withdrawals for each state 
of the world 0, and
(ii) withdrawal demands wI (s,W(9))  and w u {W{9)) for informed and uninformed strategic 
depositors, respectively, such that:
(a) W(9)  =  \ [ t  +  a w I {s,W{9)) +  (1 -  ct)wu (W{9))\, for all 9;
(b) w I(s,W(9)) and w u (W(9)) are the optimal solutions to informed and uninformed strate­
gic depositors’ decision problems, respectively;
(c) ifWb(0) =  Wd(9'), that is if ^ [t-\-awI (s,W(9))-\-(l—a)wu (W(9))] = ^[t'+awI (s,W(9'))+  
(1 — a)wu (W(9'))\, for any two states 9 = (t,x) and & =  (t7,#'), then W{9) =  W(9').
A rational expectations equilibrium is then characterized by the vector of aggregate with­
drawals in each state of the world, W  =  which satisfies conditions
(a), (b) and (c). Condition (a) is a market-clearing condition, which requires that aggregate 
withdrawals equal the sum of individual withdrawals. Condition (b) requires that depositors 
behave optimally. Condition (c) requires that if the aggregate demand for withdrawals is the 
same for two states of the world, then the equilibrium outcome should also be the same. Propo­
sition 1 characterises the equilibrium. The formal proof of the proposition is in the appendix 
while the intuition is discussed below.
Proposition 1 Under assumptions (2) and (3), there exists a rational expectations equilibrium 
W  = (0, f ^ 2), provided that:
 ?.oqiRD > 1 (7)
PgQl +  (1 ~  Pg)<10
Proposition 1 describes the aggregate withdrawals in each state of the world and it implies that 
a run takes place in states 4, 5 and 6. Condition (7) implies that uninformed strategic depositors 
do not withdraw in states 2 and 3 since they expect to receive more by leaving their funds than 
by withdrawing. Condition (8), instead, implies that uninformed strategic depositors withdraw 
in states 4, 5 and 6 since they expect to receive more by withdrawing than by leaving their 
funds. Proposition 1 also states that informed strategic depositors withdraw in states 2, 4, 5
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and 6. The complete characterisation of the equilibrium withdrawals for each state of the world 
is summarised in table 3. In particular, the table describes the solutions wI (s, W)  and wu (W) 
to informed and uninformed strategic depositors’ respective decision problems (indicating with 
1 the decision to withdraw at date 1 and with 0 that of waiting until date 2), the aggregate 
withdrawals in each state of the world and the occurrence of runs.
State 0 =  (t,x) Probability wJ(s,W) wu (W) W Run
1 0  ,H QoPg 0 0 0 no
2 0 , 0 9o(l - P g ) 1 0 a2 no
3 t i ,H QiPg 0 0 *12 no
4 * i , 0 g i( l-P s ) 1 1 l+*i2 yes
5 t * H Q2Pg 1 1 1+fa 2 yes
6 *2,0 02(1 - P g ) 1 1 l+to2 yes
Table 3: Summary of equilibrium situations in proposition 1
Runs occurring in states 4, 5 and 6 are information-induced since they stem from strategic 
depositors’ rational response to the information they have at date 1. Runs occurring in states 
4 and 6 are efficient since they induce the liquidation of assets that would yield nothing if 
continued until date 2. The run occurring in state 5 is however inefficient since it forces the 
liquidation of valuable assets. Likewise, continuation in states 1 and 3 is efficient since it allows 
valuable assets to mature and to yield a high return. Continuation in state 2 is inefficient since 
the project should be optimally liquidated at date 1.
Where do these inefficiencies come from? Both stem from the fact that uninformed strategic 
depositors’ inference problem is noisy: Conditional on the observation of the aggregate with­
drawals, uninformed strategic depositors are not always able to infer the state of the world 
and, therefore, whether the bank is facing an insolvency or just a liquidity shock. Given this 
confounding, uninformed strategic depositors may make erroneous withdrawal decisions. They 
may withdraw when the project’s returns are high or leave their deposits until date 2 when 
the project’s returns are low. Uninformed strategic depositors realise that the magnitude of 
aggregate withdrawals is positively correlated with the probability of the bank being insolvent. 
Therefore, they withdraw erroneously when aggregate withdrawals are large (state 5) and wait
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mistakenly when aggregate withdrawals are low (state 2).13
The erroneous decision of uninformed strategic depositors in state 5 forces informed strategic 
depositors to precipitate a run even if they know that the bank will be solvent. They find 
it optimal to join the queue and share the bank’s resources at date 1 since they would get 
nothing from waiting until date 2. Indeed, given the liquidation value equal to ft, the bank 
has to liquidate the entire project prematurely to satisfy the withdrawal demands of early 
liquidity depositors and of uninformed strategic depositors. So, in the equilibrium described in 
proposition 1, informed strategic depositors do not withdraw only when they receive a negative 
signal (states 2, 4 and 6) but also when the aggregate withdrawals are large enough, irrespective 
of the signal they observe (state 5).
Both the two inefficiencies in strategic depositors’ withdrawal decisions (inefficient contin­
uation and liquidation) stem from ’rational’ coordination problems among depositors, but the 
coordination failure is different in each case. The inefficient continuation in state 2 is due to the 
inability of uninformed strategic depositors to realise that the queue consists only of informed 
strategic depositors. The inefficient run in state 5, instead, is due to the inability of uninformed 
strategic depositors to realise that the queue consists only of early liquidity depositors and to 
the feedback effect that uninformed strategic depositors’ mistakes have on informed strategic 
depositors’ decisions. This is different from both the coordination failure in Diamond and Dy- 
bvig (1983) and the panic equilibrium in Chari and Jagannathan (1988) and in Chen (1999). 
The coordination problem occurring in strategic depositors’ withdrawal decisions is not trig­
gered by sunspots, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), but it is caused by both informational 
asymmetries among depositors and the costly liquidation of the bank’s project. Unlike Chari 
and Jagannathan (1988), in which panics occur only when all depositors remain uninformed at 
date 1, the inefficient run takes place despite the fact that some depositors are aware of the 
future solvency of the bank. Informed strategic depositors know that the bank’s project is valu­
able but they are forced to withdraw at date 1 by uninformed strategic depositors’ erroneous 
decision. This ’feedback’ inefficiency is different from that in Chen (1999), where panics take 
place when uninformed depositors’ response to early information forces informed depositors to
13Since q\ >  go, <72, when uninformed strategic depositors observe high aggregate withdrawals they expect the 
bank being insolvent with a higher probability than when they observe low aggregate withdrawals.
I l l
run on the bank without waiting for more precise ’bank-specific’ information.
The equilibrium behaviour of strategic depositors summarised in proposition 1 has been 
derived under assumption (6) for the liquidation value £. However, from calculations available 
from the author, it can be shown that it still holds for £ G [£,?), where £ =  (1+*2)Pgfl and 
1 = ' The intuition can be explained as follows. For £ < £, bank’s resources for
redemption at date 1 are not enough to induce uninformed strategic depositors to withdraw 
when they observe a long withdrawal queue, that is in states 5 and 6. Condition (8) does not 
hold anymore and uninformed strategic depositors expect a higher utility from waiting until 
date 2 than from withdrawing early.14 Differently, for £ > £, bank’s resources at date 2 are 
enough to guarantee informed strategic depositors an utility from waiting greater than when 
withdrawing in state 5. Then, they do not join the queue even if uninformed strategic depositors 
withdraw mistakenly. In other words, for £ > £ informed strategic depositors condition their 
withdrawal decisions only on the signal they observe, irrespective of the amount of aggregate 
withdrawals. The inefficiency in state 5 becomes partial: The bank continues until date 2 but it 
has to liquidate valuable assets at date 1 to satisfy uninformed strategic depositors’ erroneous 
withdrawal demands.
3.3.2 D eb t Face Value and Banker’s M onitoring Choice at D ate 0
I now turn to date 0 when the bank offers the deposit contract and chooses between monitor­
ing the project or not. The banker makes the decision about monitoring so as to maximise 
expected profits given that he must ensure zero expected returns to strategic depositors and 
given aggregate withdrawals as in proposition 1.
The face value of debt, RD, is determined by strategic depositors’ participation constraint, 
taking into account that they do not know at date 0 whether they will be informed or not 
at date 1 and that they deposit their funds only if the banker monitors the project.15 Table 
4 shows strategic depositors’ payoff in each state of the world given their equilibrium with­
u Note, however, that uninformed strategic depositors might still withdraw in states 4 and 5, even if (8) is 
violated. This is the case when <  m a x f ^ - ,  1} but pgRD >
15If the banker does not monitor, strategic depositors would not leave their funds with the bank because they 
would expect to make losses. Strategic depositors’ partecipation constraint in equilibrium is then calculated 
given that the banker monitors the project. Proposition 2 below will describe when the banker finds it optimal 
to do so.
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drawal decisions at date 1, wr(s,W)  and wu (W), as described in proposition 1. There is no 
participation constraint for liquidity depositors because they are not utility maximizers.
State 9 =  (t,x) Depositors’ payoff
Probability Informed strategic Uninformed strategic
1 0 ,H QoPg R d RP
2 0,0 4o(l ~Pg) 1 0
3 tUH QiPg R d RP
4 *1,0 <li{l-Pg) 2* = 1  i+ti 1
21 _  1
i+ti “  1
5 t2, H Q2 Pg 2e _  l+t, l+t2 ~  l+*2
21 _  i+t, 
l+t2 l+t2
6 *2,0 92(1 -Pg) 21 _  l+ti l+*2 l+t2
21 _  1+t, 
l+t2 l+*2
Table 4: Strategic depositors’ payoffs
The participation constraint for strategic depositors is given by:
q0pgRD 4- qiP9RD +  q0( l - p g)(a • 1 +  (1 -  a) • 0) +  qx( l - p g) • 1 +  $2( ^ 7^ )  -  1 > 0 
where:
i) the first two terms are the expected repayments for both informed and uninformed strategic 
depositors at date 2, conditional on the bank being solvent and on no run occurring at date 1 
(states 1 and 3);
ii) the third term is the expected repayments when informed strategic depositors correctly 
withdraw their funds at date 1 after receiving a negative signal, while uninformed strategic 
depositors erroneously wait until date 2 (state 2);
iii) the fourth term is the expected repayments for both informed and uninformed strategic 
depositors when they correctly withdraw at date 1 and the bank has enough funds to repay 
them in full (state 4);
iv) the fifth term is the expected repayments for both informed and uninformed strategic de­
positors when they withdraw at date 1 and get only a pro-rata share of the bank’s funds. It 
includes not only the case of the ex post inefficient run (state 5) but also the case of the efficient 
run with the highest realization of the liquidity shock (state 6).
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The face value of debt, RD, is then equal to:
(9)
Note that condition (8) implies that 1 < RD < R s , where R s  is the repayment promised to 
depositors when the bank issues standard debt. This is because pgRs = 1, while pgRD < 
< 1. Depositors have different rights under the two types of contracts. With standard 
debt they must keep their funds with the bank until date 2, when they get either Rs  or 0. 
With demandable debt they can protect—albeit partially and sometimes erroneously—their 
investment by withdrawing at date 1. Therefore, they are ready to pay a ’price’ for this right. 
This is a benefit, for the bank, of the ’discipline’ function of demandable debt.16
It is worth pointing out that RD < Rs  despite the fact that information is imperfect. Hence, 
with demandable debt, the larger payoffs received by strategic depositors who withdraw cor­
rectly (states 4 and 6) and by informed strategic depositors in the case of inefficient continuation 
(state 2) more than compensate (ex ante) for the smaller payoffs received by strategic depositors 
who incorrectly withdraw prematurely (state 5) and by uninformed strategic depositors in the 
case of inefficient continuation (state 2).
I now turn to the banker’s monitoring choice. Table 5 shows the bank’s payoffs when the 
banker monitors the project and when he does not, depending on the state of the world and on 
depositors’ withdrawal decisions as in proposition l .17
If the project is monitored, the bank makes positive profits when there is no run and 
returns are high (states 1 and 3). If the project is not monitored, the bank makes positive 
profits whenever no run occurs. In particular, the bank gets the pecuniary payoff if there is no 
run and the project is successful (states 1 and 3) and the private benefit whenever it remains 
active until date 2, irrespective of the project’s returns (states 1, 2 and 3).
16 Of course, R °  would be even lower if all strategic depositors had perfect information on the future value of 
the bank’s assets.
17Note that in computing the bank’s expected profits I take into account that, at date 2, the bank repays R D 
to all depositors—both strategic and ’late’ liquidity— because it cannot distinguish among them.
r d =
pg(qo + qi) i -  (i -  p9)(qo<x + gi) -  42(^jr^)
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State Monitoring No monitoring
Probability Payoff Probability Payoff
1 QoPg H - R d QoPb (.H - R d ) + B
2 4o(l - P g ) 0 0o(l ~Pb) (1 -  f  ) B
3 QiPg (1 - $ ) ( H - R d ) 01 Pb ( l _ k ) [ H - B D + B]
4 < l l ( X - P g ) 0 01 (1 -Pb) 0
5 qiPg 0 02 Pb 0
6 02(1 - P g ) 0 02(1 -Pb) 0
Table 5: Bank’s payoffs
The bank’s expected profits are then given by:
11° =  qopg(H -  R d ) + qlPg( 1 -  | )(H -  R D) (10)
when depositors correctly anticipate that the banker will monitor the project, and by:
n ?  =  qoPb [(H -  RD) +  B] +  ®( 1 -  p4)(l -  | ) B  + qlPb(l -  | )  [(B -  R °) + B] (11)
when depositors anticipate that the banker will monitor but he does not.
The banker finds it optimal to monitor the project, and the moral hazard problem is solved, 
if > I lf .  For simplicity, I assume that the banker behaves well when he is indifferent 
between monitoring and not monitoring. Given R D and depositors’ withdrawal decisions as in 
proposition 1, the banker’s choice is determined by the magnitude of the private benefit B. The 
condition under which the banker monitors the project is shown in proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Given RD and depositors’ optimal withdrawal decisions, there exists a level of
A
the private benefit, B, such that demandable debt solves the banker’s moral hazard problem for
A  A
all B  < B, where B is equal to:
* [go +  gi(l -  %)l(Pa - Pi)(ff -  R D) fl21
[go +  gipt(i -  ^-) -  go^(i -  pi)]
Proof I define B  as the value of B  which makes the banker indifferent between monitoring
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and not, that is 11  ^ =  Il£\ After substituting the expressions for the bank’s expected profits 
given in (10) and (11), I obtain (12). It follows immediately that, for all B <B , 11^ > I l f ,  
while for all B > B, I l f  <  I l f .  □
Proposition 2 states that market discipline is effective in resolving the banker’s moral hazard 
problem, provided this problem is not too severe. The incentive effect of demandable debt 
depends on the different consequences of the threat of a bank run on the bank’s expected 
profits. When the banker does not monitor, he is always penalized when a run takes place 
in that he loses his private benefits in states 4, 5 and 6 and his pecuniary profits in state 5. 
However, when he monitors, he is penalized less often since he only loses his pecuniary profits 
(in state 5) when a run forces him to liquidate the (valuable) project. He does not lose anything 
when efficient runs take place (states 4 and 6). This is the incentive mechanism through which 
the threat of bank runs induces the banker to monitor the project.
Demandable debt may constitute a solution to the consequences of asymmetric information 
between the banker and depositors. When credit markets do not work with standard debt, the 
introduction of demandable debt may be the solution, as stated in proposition 3.
Proposition 3 Since B s < B , for all B  G (Bs ,B]i demandable debt solves the banker’s moral 
hazard problem but standard debt does not.
P roof By comparing expressions (12) and B s  =  (pg —pb)(H — R s ), it follows that B s <B• 
Therefore, for all B  G (BS,B], it follows that > n ^ , but < I lf. This implies the second 
part of the claim. □
Proposition 3 shows that demandable debt is attractive because, unlike standard debt, it allows 
depositors to react, although imperfectly, to the arrival of information, in the interim period, on 
the future value of the bank’s assets. However, if the banker’s moral hazard is too severe, that
A
is for B >B, market discipline is not effective in inducing the banker to monitor the project. 
Then, the market collapses: Depositors do not make deposits at date 0 since they expect to 
make negative profits, and investment does not take place.
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3.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have addressed two questions: (i) Can bank runs discipline bankers who face a 
moral hazard problem? (ii) What are the costs and benefits of demandable debt? With regard 
to the first question, I have shown that the threat of bank runs may constitute an effective 
incentive device. In particular, I have shown that demandable debt can induce bankers to 
monitor the projects they finance in situations in which the standard debt contract cannot. 
With regard to the second question, I have shown that market discipline is costly. If some 
depositors are imperfectly informed on the value of the bank’s assets, they may make mistakes 
when deciding whether to run on a bank or not: An insolvent bank may then be allowed to 
continue or a solvent bank may be erroneously forced into liquidation.
These results suggest a new perspective on bank regulation. Since market discipline works, 
but imperfectly, any sensible attempt to make it have the desirable effects should entail adequate 
regulatory measures aimed to eliminate its inefficiencies. One possibility would be to increase 
the amount of information available to depositors. If depositors are perfectly informed, market 
discipline would work perfectly. The recent experience of Argentina, Chile and Mexico, for 
example, can be read in this perspective (Peria and Schmukler (1998)).
Alternatively, regulators should secure the survival of solvent banks that are subject to a 
run. The historical experiences of suspension of convertibility can be looked at from this angle. 
For instance, before the creation of the Federal Reserve system in 1914, the US banking system 
often relied on the existence of clearinghouses to reduce the probability of inefficient bank 
runs. Clearinghouses checked the solvency of member banks when a run occurred, acting as a 
delegated certifier on the part of depositors and punishing banks that suspended convertibility 
without being solvent while, at the same time, allowing solvent institutions to stop inefficient 
massive withdrawals (Gorton (1985), Gorton and Mullineaux (1987)).
Recent empirical studies provide some support for the hypothesis that market discipline 
works. Park and Peristiani (1998) and Peria and Schmukler (1998) show that, in both developed 
and developing economies, depositors do react to the deterioration of banks’ balance sheets. 
They find that depositors, whether small or large, punish risky banks by withdrawing their 
funds or by requiring higher interest rates. However, the ex ante effect of possible depositor 
withdrawals on banks’ propensity to take risk remains difficult to measure.
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My framework could be extended in several directions. The first concerns the analysis of 
information. I have focused on depositors’ ability to respond to the information they have. In 
this light, I have abstracted from the information acquisition problem by simply assuming that 
some depositors receive a costless signal on the value of bank assets. Future research could 
make the acquisition of information costly and endogenous. Second, one could further examine 
the role of depositors’ risk aversion in order to assess the extent to which demandable debt can 
be successful in solving moral hazard, while at the same time being able to guarantee optimal 
risk sharing among depositors. Third, one could consider a framework with multiple banks 
and analyse the effects of both ’specific’ and ’outside’ information on depositors’ withdrawal 
decisions. Finally, future research could extend the framework by introducing explicitly a role 
for a financial regulator. This would allow to study in greater depth the complementarity 
between market discipline and supervision, which arises from my results.
118
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
The proof consists of three steps:
Step (i): I start by assuming that informed strategic depositors’ decisions depend only on the 
signal s, that is w7(s). Given u/(s), I compute uninformed strategic depositors’ withdrawal 
decisions, wu (W ^ ),  conditional on the conjectured equilibrium at this point,
Step (ii): I then show that wI (s) is not optimal in the conjectured equilibrium and I show 
that informed strategic depositors’ optimal withdrawal decisions, wr(s, W ^ ) ,  depend also on 
the amount of aggregate withdrawals W^n\  where is the conjectured equilibrium at this 
point;
Step (iii): I check finally that wu (W W) is still the optimal solution to uninformed strategic 
depositors’ decision problem in the conjectured equilibrium W and I show that W(M) is then 
the actual equilibrium W.
Note that since depositors make their withdrawal decisions simultaneously in the rational 
expectations equilibrium, steps (i) and (ii) never take place. Nevertheless, I go through them in 
order to highlight the interaction between depositors’ withdrawal decisions and the mechanism 
through which ex post inefficient bank runs take place. I now go through each step in detail.
Step (i): The withdrawal decision of each informed strategic depositors conditional only on s 
is:
J o  i f s = H  
w (s) = \y i  i f  s = o .
The aggregate demand for withdrawals W ®  for every state of the world 9 and the conjectured 
equilibrium given w7(s), are shown in table 6.
State 6  =  (£,x) Probability W ®
1 0 , H QoPg \ { l  - a ) w u (WW) 0
2 0,0 9o(l ~ P g ) ^[a +  (1 — a)wu (W ^)] a _ ti2 ~  2
3 t u H 9 l  Pg ^[*1 +  (1 -  a)wu (W ^)] h.2
4 *1,0 Q l ( l ~ P g ) ^ [ t i  4- a +  (1 — a)wu (W ^)\ l+U2
5 t 2 , H Q2Pg \ \ t 2 + (1 -  a)wu (W W)] t2+( 1-a) _  1+f, 2 ~  2
6 *2,0 92(1 - p g) [^*2 +  ot +  (1 — a)wu (W W)] 1+t? 2
Table 6: Aggregate demand for withdrawals and conjectured equilibrium in step (i)
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The information partitions of uninformed strategic depositors in the conjectured equilibrium 
W®  are:
W® — 0 implies 9 =  {1}
flrtO =  § =  implies 9 =  {2,3}
W(0 =  i± k  =  impUes 6 =  {4,5}
W(*) =  implies $ =  {6}.
Aggregate withdrawals are perfectly informative in states 1 and 6 but not in states 2, 3, 4 
and 5. Since R D > 1, uninformed strategic depositors find it optimal not to withdraw when 
the observe =  0, that is in state 1. Since the bank’s assets are valueless, that is x  =  0, 
uninformed strategic depositors find it optimal to withdraw when they observe W®  = -My2, 
that is in state 6.
The left hand side of (7) is the expected utility from waiting until date 2 when 6 =  {2,3}. 
Since this is greater than 1, uninformed strategic depositors find it optimal not to withdraw 
when they observe W W = that is in states 2 and 3.
The expected utility from waiting until date 2 when 9 =  {4,5} is Pggf+(i-Pg)gi • Since this 
is smaller than 1 (indeed condition (8) implies Pg^ + (i-Pg)gi < PgRD < < 1), uninformed
strategic depositors find it optimal to withdraw when they observe W® = that is in states 
4 and 5.
The solution to uninformed strategic depositors’ decision problem in the conjectured equi­
librium W®  is then equal to:
wu (W®) =
0 i fWW=0, f , 4j*
1 ifwrtO =  ijjpL,i^i.
Step (ii): The conjectured equilibrium W®  is not an equilibrium since wJ(s) is not the optimal 
solution to informed strategic depositors’ decision problem. In state 5, in fact, they would get 
nothing from waiting until date 2, even if s = H. Given W W =  > & and £ =
the bank liquidates the project in order to pay off depositors withdrawing early. It is then 
optimal for informed strategic depositors to join the withdrawal queue so as to share the bank’s 
resources at date 1. The optimal solution to informed strategic depositors’ decision problem in
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the conjectured equilibrium at this stage W ^  is then:
wf (s, W ^ )  =
0 if s =  H  and W <«> < ^
1 if a =  0 or > ^ .
Step (iii): I now verify that wu (W W) still constitutes uninformed strategic depositors’ optimal 
withdrawal decisions in the conjectured equilibrium W^x%\  Table 7 describes the aggregate 
demand for withdrawals for every state of the world 9 and the conjectured equilibrium 
given u /(s , W). Note that W ^  and differ from and W^%\  respectively, only 
in state 5.
State 9 =  (*,#) Probability Run
1 0 ,H qoPg ^(1 -  ol)wu(W W ) 0 no
2 0,0 <lo(l-Pg) i[a  +  (l - a ) w u (WW)] a _ ti2 ~  2 no
3 tu H 91 Pg i[ti +  (1 -  a)wu {WM)] k2 no
4 *i,0 91 (1 ~Pg) ^[ti +  a  +  (1 — a)wu (WW)\ 1+ti2 yes
5 *2,# 92 Pg [^*2 +  c* +  (1 — a)wu (W ^)] 1+fa2 yes
6 *2,0 92(1 ~Pg) \\t2 4- a  +  (1 — a)wu (W ^)] 1+tc> 2 yes
Table 7: Aggregate demand for withdrawals and conjectured equilibrium in step (ii)
The information partitions of uninformed strategic depositors in the conjectured equilibrium 
are:
W(M) =  0 implies 0 =  {1}
w (u) =  |  =  k  implies 9 =  {2,3}
W'C**) =  -My1 implies 9 =  {4}
W(n) — l± k  implies 9 — {5,6}.
Aggregate withdrawals are now perfectly informative only in states 1 and 4. As in step (i), 
uninformed strategic depositors find it optimal not to withdraw in states 1, 2 and 3. Since 
x = 0, uninformed strategic depositors find it optimal to withdraw when =  ^ y 1, that is 
in state 4.
The left hand side of (8) is the expected utility from waiting until date 2 when 9 = {5,6}.
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Since this is smaller than the utility they would get by withdrawing early, that is than 
(since W M > W  and t  =  -Mr1 < 1), uninformed strategic depositors find it optimal to withdraw 
when they observe W(M) =  that is in states 5 and 6.
The solution to uninformed strategic depositors’ decision problem in the conjectured equi­
librium W is then:
wu(WW)  =
Given wu (W ^ ) ,  it is straightforward to verify that wI (s,W (”)) is still the optimal solution 
to informed strategic depositors’ decision problem (indeed wu (W W) =  w Therefore,
the conjectured equilibrium coincides with the actual equilibrium W. □
0 if =  0, §,h.
1 if W(") =
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Chapter 4
The Structure of Bank 
Relationships, Endogenous 
M onitoring and Loan Rates
4.1 Introduction
The modern theory of financial intermediation suggests that banks are valuable because of 
their superior ability to reduce costly information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders 
relative to other financial institutions. In the seminal paper by Diamond (1984), banks arise 
as an efficient way of delegating project monitoring, as they avoid the problems of duplica­
tion of monitoring and of free-riding that characterise direct lending. Building on this idea, 
several contributions in the literature argue that close bank-firm relationships facilitate banks’ 
acquisition of information through screening and monitoring and improve firms’ financing pos­
sibilities through other special features, such as contractual discretion and flexibility, collateral 
and covenants.1
Most of this literature proceeds by assuming that firms borrow from a single bank, since 
there is no gain in having more than one delegated monitor. Multiple banking is inefficient, as 
it involves high transaction costs, duplication of screening and monitoring as well as free-riding.
^ e e  Freixas and Rochet (1997) for a review of the modern theory of financial intermediation and Boot (2000) 
for a more specific review of relationship banking.
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This immediately raises a question: Why do we observe that in many countries even small 
firms maintain multiple bank relationships if they are costly?2 How can this be reconciled with 
theory?
The existing literature has proposed two potential explanations for the benefits of multiple 
bank lending, the hold up and the soft budget constraint problems. Sharpe (1990) and Rajan 
(1992) argue that after acquiring private information about its borrowers, a relationship bank 
may use this informational monopoly to extract (ex post) rents. The hold up cost reduces 
entrepreneurial ex ante incentives to exert effort and leads to inefficient investment choices. 
Multiple relationships are a way for firms to avoid being locked in with a sole provider of 
funds and paying high rates. Sharing of proprietary information and competition among banks 
compete monopoly rents away and restore incentives for firm managers to exert effort (Padilla 
and Pagano (1997)).3
The soft budget constraint problem refers to the possibility that a relationship bank is 
unable to commit not to refinance unprofitable projects ex post. Firms may need additional 
credit when problems arise. A relationship bank may extend further credit even to unprofitable 
projects in the hope of recovering its initial loan. The possibility of renegotiating the loan 
reduces entrepreneurial effort in preventing default. Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) argue 
that multiple banking may represent a solution for the soft budget constraint problem, as it 
offers a way for banks to commit not to refinance unprofitable projects. This is because multiple 
creditors with limited funds find it more difficult to communicate and coordinate their actions, 
thus reducing the profitability of refinancing. In a similar spirit, Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) 
show that multiple banking complicates debt renegotiation but the ex post inefficiency may be 
beneficial ex ante, since it reduces entrepreneurial incentives to default strategically.4 5
As a consequence, theories of multiple banking, building on the hold up and the soft budget 
constraint problems, suggest that firms borrowing from multiple banks should represent better 
risks and therefore pay lower loan rates than firms borrowing from a single bank. Evidence on
2 Cross-country evidence on the number of bank relationships is provided in Ongena and Smith (1998) and 
Ongena and Smith (2000).
3A similar conclusion is reached by Von Thadden (1992).
4 A similar conclusion is found by Povel (1995).
sDetragiache, Garella and Guiso (1999) offer an alternative rationale for why multiple banking may be bene­
ficial. They argue that, when banks face a high risk of default, firms may have an incentive to establish multiple 
relationships to insure themselves against the loss of valuable information.
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the impact of multiple banking on credit pricing and firm quality is mixed however. Petersen 
and Rajan (1994) find that multiple banking increases lending rates for small US firms and is 
not associated with an improvement of loan quality. Studies on Germany show that multiple 
banking does not increase lending rates but that it rather has negative effects on firm quality.6 
Foglia, Laviola and Marullo Reedtz (1998) find that multiple banking in Italy reduces lending 
rates and has a negative impact on firm quality. This result is justified by the parcellization of 
loans, weakening banks’ disciplinary role and thus making borrowers more fragile.
How to explain the puzzles emerging when comparing the theory on multiple banking with 
these empirical results? One potential explanation is that the theoretical literature has not 
considered explicitly banks’ incentives to monitor. In most of the contributions on multiple 
banking (such as Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992) and Padilla and Pagano (1997)), banks acquire 
information on their borrowers simply as a by-product of their lending activity. In others (Von 
Thadden (1992)), banks’ monitoring is costly but its level is exogenous. Banks can commit 
to monitor firms and, in equilibrium, they provide the right monitoring level, irrespective of 
whether they are single lenders or finance firms jointly with other banks. This chapter adds to 
the existing literature on multiple banking by addressing how the structure of credit relation­
ships affects banks’ monitoring decisions and how, in turn, these decisions affect loan rates and 
firms’ choices between single and multiple lending relationships.7
Multiple banking creates duplications of costs in processing loan applications and reduce 
banks’ willingness to exert an intensity of monitoring consistent with the total volume of credit 
granted. Without intensive monitoring, firms may find it easier to improperly use the funds 
obtained from banks. To address these issues, I develop a simple one-period model characterised 
by overlapping moral hazard problems between firms and banks.
6 See Elsas and Krahnen (1998) and Harhoff and Koerting (1998). Ongena and Smith (1998) offer a more 
general review of the European evidence about the effects of relationship banking on credit pricing and firm 
quality.
7 Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) also analyse banks’ incentives to monitor firms and show that decentralisation 
of credit reduces the equilibrium level of monitoring. However, their analysis is quite different from the one 
developed in this chapter. In Dewatripont and Maskin, multiple banking refers to the situation in which the 
bank that has initially started a credit relationship with a firm does not have enough funds to refinance it in the 
interim period. Thus, the firm is forced to borrow from another bank. The sharing of benefits from the project 
with another lender reduces the incentives of the relationship bank to monitor, which however remains the sole 
monitor of the firm. In contrast, in this chapter multiple banking refers to the situation in which two banks 
finance and monitor the firm at the same time.
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An entrepreneur needs bank financing in order to undertake a project. After obtaining the 
loan, he decides whether to exert effort and increase the success probability of the project. 
Effort is costly and the entrepreneur may not have incentives to exert it (firm moral hazard). 
Monitoring is a way for banks to control the entrepreneur’s behaviour, by forcing him to exert 
effort and to increase the success probability of the project. However, monitoring is not con­
tractible and is costly, exhibiting diseconomies of scale (bank moral hazard). This reduces its 
use as a control device, because banks choose the monitoring intensity that maximises their 
profits, given the terms of the loan contract, rather than the financial return of the project.
Banks’ profits and, therefore, banks’ incentives to monitor, depend on the size of monitor­
ing costs, on the entrepreneur’s behaviour and on the number of lenders. To keep the analysis 
simple, I assume that the firm has the possibility of borrowing either from one bank or from 
two banks. The equilibrium levels of monitoring and loan rates depend on which structure of 
bank relationship the firm chooses. Borrowing from two banks always implies a lower level of 
discipline. Multiple banking entails duplication of effort and sharing of the benefits of monitor­
ing, which reduce banks’ incentives to control the firm. However, two banks do not necessarily 
require a higher loan rate than a single bank as a premium for the lower probability of being 
repaid. The loan rate with multiple lenders depends on how the duplication of effort and the 
sharing of benefits interact with the convexity of monitoring costs. Under some parameter 
values, the relative importance of these factors is such that two lenders become cheaper than a 
single lender.
The firm chooses ex ante whether to borrow from one bank or from two banks. Its choice 
depends on the level of bank monitoring and the expected loan obligation in the two scenarios 
and, more precisely, on the relative difference between these two variables in the two cases. 
The structure of the credit relationships depends on the parameterisations of the two moral 
hazard problems in the model. In general, the firm tends to prefer a single relationship when 
bank moral hazard is weak and multiple relationships when bank moral hazard is strong. For 
intermediate values of bank moral hazard, the firm’s choice depends on its own inclination for 
moral hazard. The greater the private return for the entrepreneur when he does not exert effort, 
the more likely the firm will find it optimal to borrow from two banks, although it may require 
a higher loan rate than with a single bank.
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The present chapter makes two main contributions. The first contribution is to derive 
endogenously banks’ monitoring decisions and loan rates as a function of the structure of bank 
relationships. The second contribution is to show that firm’s choice between single and multiple 
relationships depends on both the level of discipline that banks exert through monitoring and 
the loan rate they require. This is in contrast to most of the literature on multiple banking, 
which assumes banks’ monitoring activity to be exogenous.
Of course this is not the first model to address banks’ incentives to monitor. Besanko 
and Kanatas (1993), Covitz and Heitfield (1999) and Cerasi and Daltung (1999) use a similar 
modelling approach of bank monitoring but in different contexts. Besanko and Kanatas (1993) 
rely on the non-contractibility of bank monitoring to explain the coexistence of banks and 
capital markets. Covitz and Heitfield (1999) focus on banks’ incentives to monitor in order to 
analyse the relation between market power, loan rates and bank risk. Starting from the idea 
that delegated monitoring implies an incentive problem between banks and debtholders, Cerasi 
and Daltung (1999) show that diversification can improve bankers’ incentives to monitor, if 
banks are debt financed. All these models restrict the analysis to the case where firms borrow 
from a single bank, which is also the sole monitor. I focus here on the relation between banks’ 
monitoring activity and the structure of bank relationships.
The remaining of the chapter is organised in three sections. Section 2 describes the model. 
Section 3 derives the competitive equilibrium with bank monitoring. I proceed in three steps: 
I first analyse the equilibrium monitoring activity and loan rate with one bank, then with two 
banks, and, finally, I examine the firm’s choice between the two scenarios. Section 4 concludes.
4.2 A  Sim ple M odel of Firm and Bank Moral Hazard
Consider a two-date economy (T  =  0,1) with two classes of risk neutral agents: a single firm 
and a perfectly competitive banking sector. The firm has access to a risky investment project 
but, since it has no capital, needs to raise external funds. Only bank lending is available and 
the firm can choose whether to borrow from one bank or from two banks simultaneously.8 A
8The assumption that only bank lending is available to the firm is restrictive but the analysis of the interaction 
of bank lending and arm-length financing goes beyond the scope of this paper.
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credit contract with a bank specifies the loan amount and the repayment obligation.9 The 
firm is protected by limited liability, so that banks can be repaid only if the project succeeds. 
Project returns are observable. Banks raise capital at a cost equal to the riskless interest rate 
and lend to the firm only if they expect non-negative profits. The riskless interest rate and the 
discount rate are normalised to zero and one, respectively.
The firm and the moral hazard problem
The project available to the firm requires an outlay of one unit of capital at date 0 and yields 
x = R  per unit invested if it succeeds and x = 0 if it fails, at date 1. The success probability 
of the project is determined by the effort exerted by the entrepreneur, who is the manager and 
also the sole owner of the firm. The project succeeds with probability pn  if the entrepreneur 
behaves well and with probability pl if he misbehaves, with Ph > Pl - The subscripts H  and 
L  denote high and low effort on the part of the entrepreneur. The project is creditworthy only 
in the case of good behaviour, that is puR  > 1 > PlR- Exerting effort is however costly for 
the entrepreneur and he may decide to misbehave in order to enjoy a non-transferable private 
benefit B. There is a moral hazard problem because the behaviour of the entrepreneur is neither 
observable nor contractible.
Banks ’ financing and monitoring activities
Since the project is economically viable only if the entrepreneur behaves well, banks are willing 
to finance the firm only if they anticipate that he will indeed do so. Denoting the (gross) loan 
rate as r, the entrepreneur prefers to exert a high level of effort only if:
pH( R - r ) > p L{ R - r )  + B. (1)
The entrepreneur’s incentives depend upon the size of the private benefit B  and the cost of exter­
nal financing r. To provide a benchmark against which to analyse the role of bank monitoring, 
I assume that the private benefit is sufficiently large to induce the entrepreneur to misbehave 
for all loan rates that would give banks an expected return equal to one. Substituting the
9 As it will be clear in the following, the loan amount will be relevant only in the case of two lenders.
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competitive loan rate r  =  ^  in (1) and rearranging it gives:10 
Assumption 1 Ph R  — 1 — (p£-PL)B  < 0-
Assumption 1 implies that the project is not undertaken if banks lend to the firm without 
monitoring: The entrepreneur will not be able to raise funds because lenders anticipate that 
he will misbehave. One way to solve the problem is allow banks to observe and control the 
entrepreneur’s behaviour through monitoring.
The monitoring technology is as follows: Each bank chooses the intensity of its monitoring 
activity Me [0,1], which corresponds to the probability of observing the entrepreneur’s behav­
iour. If the bank monitors and finds that the entrepreneur is not behaving well, it forces him to 
do so. The idea is that bankers can get involved in the decision making of the firm and make 
sure that funds are appropriately used. Monitoring is costly and implies diseconomies of scale: 
An intensity M  costs c(M) = | M 2.
The first best monitoring level maximises the financial return of the project when the 
entrepreneur misbehaves, that is:
M p H R  +  (1  -  M ) p L R  -  1 -  ^ M 2
and is then given by M FB =  min{^ - ^ ^ -, 1}.
I assume that the maximised financial return of the project is non-negative, that is:
M F B p H R  +  (1 -  M F B ) p L R  -  1 -  ^  ( M f b ) 2 >  0 .  (2 )z
Substituting M FB in (2) implies:
2(p h R -  1) if rn< {jpH - Pl )R
Assumption 2 m < <
. i f m > (p h - pl)A-
Assumption 2 puts an upper bound on the monitoring costs for the first best monitoring level 
to be feasible. Note that > 2(ph R — !)• This implies that the project is worth
10Note that, in absence of monitoring, the loan rate r does not depend on the number of lenders. Indeed, r is 
simply the total repayment the firm has to pay on one unit of external financing.
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undertaking in a broader set of circumstances when M FB is an interior solution than when it 
is a corner solution.
There is a moral hazard problem in banks’ monitoring activity because the intensity is 
neither observable nor contractible. This assumption reduces reliance on monitoring as control 
device for the entrepreneur’s moral hazard problem: Given the inability to commit to a specific 
monitoring level, banks choose the intensity that maximises their expected profits and not the 
financial return of the project. Their expected profits, and therefore their monitoring choice, 
depend on the entrepreneur’s behaviour and on the number of lenders, as specified below.
Timing
At the beginning of date 0, the firm chooses whether to borrow from one bank or from two 
banks. The choice between these two scenarios is observable to the market. Then the firm 
contacts lenders and a two-stage game starts. In the one bank game, the firm offers in the first 
stage a contract to one bank, which specifies the loan rate r. The bank decides whether to 
accept or reject the contract. If the bank rejects the offer, the firm does not raise funds and 
the game ends. If the contract is accepted, the project is financed and the second stage of the 
game (the continuation game) takes place. The entrepreneur chooses whether to behave well 
or to misbehave and the bank chooses its monitoring intensity. At date 1 project returns are 
realised and claims are settled. Conditional on the firm being solvent, the lender receives the 
loan rate r  and the firm retains the surplus. The two bank case has the same time structure. 
Figure 1 summarises the time structure of the model when the loan contract is signed.
T=0 T=1
the firm chooses loan contract 
whether to offered to
borrow from one the bank(s) 
or two banks
Figure 1: Timing
the entrepreneur the bank(s) returns 
chooses Ph (Pl ) chooses realised
M  and claims 
settled
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4.3 The C om petitive Equilibrium w ith  Bank M onitoring
The equilibrium of the model consists of four elements: The firm’s decision to borrow from one 
bank or from two banks at the beginning of date 0, the loan rate r at date 0, the entrepreneur’s 
behavioural decision and the banks’ monitoring choice after financing has been secured.
I solve the model as follows: I first take the firm’s choice on the number of lenders as 
given and I solve the two-stage continuation games with one bank and with two banks; then I 
analyse the firm’s choice of borrowing from one bank or from two banks, taking into account 
the equilibrium of the continuation game in each scenario.
4.3.1 One Bank Financing
I start with the simple case in which only one bank finances and monitors the entrepreneur. 
I model the interaction between the firm and the bank as a two-stage game with imperfect 
information and I look for subgame perfect equilibria.
The assumption of a perfectly competitive banking system implies that the firm sets the 
loan rate ri at the lowest level which satisfies the zero-profit condition for the bank. In order 
for the project to be undertaken, the contract has to be feasible, that is r\ must not exceed the 
total available cash flow R  on a successful project.
If financing has been secured at the loan rate ri, the entrepreneur and the bank choose 
their actions in the behaviour/monitoring stage simultaneously so to maximise their expected 
profits.11
Given r\ and the bank’s monitoring intensity Mi, the firm’s expected profits are given by:
■^Fx = P H {R -ri)  (3)
when the entrepreneur behaves well and by:
11^ =  M\pH{R -  n )  +  (1 -  Mi)\pL(R -  n )  +  B] (4)
11 The choice of a simultaneous second stage game between the firm and the bank does not affect the results, as 
long as agents’ decisions are not observable. Results are affected only if the bank chooses its monitoring intensity 
first and its choice is observable by the entrepreneur before he moves. This order of moves would correspond to 
the situation in which banks can commit to a specific monitoring intensity.
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when the entrepreneur misbehaves.
If the bank monitors with intensity Mi, its expected profits are given by:
(5)
when the entrepreneur behaves well and by:
11^ = MipHn  + (1 -  Mi)pLn  -  1 -  y  (Mi)2 (6)
when the entrepreneur misbehaves.
Formally, a competitive equilibrium in which the project is undertaken with one bank is a 
subgame perfect equilibrium of the continuation game that satisfies the feasibility condition, 
that is a vector {rf, {# ,£} , MJ1} such that:
1) The firm sets r\ so as to maximise its expected profits subject to the bank’s zero profit 
condition and the contract feasibility condition, correctly anticipating its behavioural choice 
and the bank’s monitoring intensity M]*;
2) The firm and the bank maximise their expected profits given ri, so that the firm’s 
behavioural choice {H , L} and the bank’s monitoring intensity constitute a Nash equilibrium 
of the behaviour/monitoring subgame.
The comparison of the profit functions of the entrepreneur given in (3) and (4) shows 
that the entrepreneur’s incentives to behave well are decreasing in the loan rate ri, for given 
monitoring intensity Mi. Further, assumption 1 implies that in equilibrium the entrepreneur 
always misbehaves for any Mi G [0,1). Indeed, he finds it optimal to do so if IIjj: > Il^f, that 
is if:
(1 -  Mi)[(pH ~ Pl)(R  - r 1) - B } <  0 (7)
which is satisfied given assumption 1 for any Mi G [0,1). When M  =  1 the entrepreneur is 
indifferent between behaving well and misbehaving but the bank always forces him to behave 
well.
Assumption 1 also implies that, after financing has been secured, the bank always exerts a 
positive intensity of monitoring. Indeed, monitoring is the only way to eliminate entrepreneurial
132
moral hazard and to have a sufficient probability of success of the project to guarantee the bank 
zero-profit. The equilibrium monitoring intensity maximises the bank’s expected profits. The 
maximisation problem has a corner solution if m  < m, and an interior solution if m > m. Prom 
equation (6), m  =  (see below for details). This means that although bank monitoring
is not contractible, it can still eliminate the entrepreneurial moral hazard if it is not too costly.
Proposition 1 states conditions for the existence of a competitive equilibrium of the one bank 
game in which the project is undertaken and characterises the equilibrium. I restrict attention 
to pure strategy equilibria and I show in the appendix that this is without loss of generality. 
The following definition is useful for characterising the equilibrium.
Definition 1 Define the function:
gi(m) = <
2P H  bJ ~  P H + P L
- m p L + y / m 2p l + 2 m ( p H - p L ) 2   _  2(pH - p L)
( p h - p l Y  i j  m > m -  P H + P L
The function gi(m) is continuous in m, with continuous derivatives. Further, it is increasing 
and concave in m, that is g[ (m) > 0 and g'{(m) < 0.
Proposition 1 There exists a competitive equilibrium of the one bank game in which the fir­
m ’s project is financed if  and only if R >  pi(ra). I f  it exists, the equilibrium is unique and has 
the following features:
V  r i= g i(m );
2) the entrepreneur always chooses L and the bank monitors with intensity:
1 if m < m
—r n p c + y /m 2p j  +2 m{pH - p L)2 ^  1 .£ __________ ________----- < 1  if m > m .
(8)
m{pH-pL)
Proof:
I solve the game backwards: I find the Nash equilibrium of the behaviour/monitoring subgame 
given r \ ; then I solve the loan rate setting in the first stage.
i) The behaviour/monitoring subgame: Define se1 =  {H,L} the pure-strategy space for the
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entrepreneur and M\ € [0,1] that of the bank. The (pure) strategy Nash equilibrium of the 
behaviour/monitoring game is a profile (sEi , MJ) such that:
(se! » )  > n Fl (sEl, M l) Vs^
MJ =arg max UBl (s*E , M i).
Mi
If the entrepreneur chooses H , then the bank maximises (5) and chooses MJ =  0. This is not 
an equilibrium: If MJ = 0, the entrepreneur would prefer to deviate to L since, as shown in 
(7), > n g  for any Mi < 0.
If the entrepreneur chooses L, then the bank chooses Mi so to maximise (6), which is 
differentiable and strictly concave in Mi. The first condition gives:
d l l k  ,
= (Ph  -  Pl F i -  mMi =  0
and, as Mi must be in [0,1], M*(ri) =  min{^?-/f'^ L^ 1,1}. If M i(r\) =  < i } the
entrepreneur still prefers L; if Mj* =  1, he is indifferent between H  and L. Therefore, the 
profile (L, M*(ri)) is the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the behaviour/monitoring 
subgame.
ii) The loan setting stage: Given (L, Mj*(ri)), the firm chooses r\ to solve the following problem: 
max Il£ =  M i(ri)pn(R  -  ri) +  (1 -  M{(ri))\pL(R -  ri) +  B\T\
subject to:
n Bi =  Mi(ri)pHri +  (1 -  Mi(ri))pLri  -  1 -  y ( M i ( r i ) ) 2 =  0.
Solving n £  =  0 after substituting Mi(r{) gives the solution rj. As 11  ^ is continuous and 
increasing in ri, there is only one value of r* which satisfies II^U =  0. This is a continuous, 
differentiable and increasing function of m and coincides with gi(m).
Substituting r\ in M{ (rj) gives the equilibrium monitoring intensity Mf. This is a corner 
solution if and only if \  that holds, given r j,  if and only if m < m. MJ is an interior
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solution if and only if (PH~£L)Vl < i  that holds, given rf, if and only if m > m  = •
The vector {rJ,L, M{} is therefore the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the one bank 
game. If r j  < R, the contract is feasible and the project is undertaken. □
Proposition 1 is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it shows that in this model monitoring 
does not change entrepreneurial incentives to behave well. Rather, it worsens them because it 
increases the loan rate, which has to cover both the amount of the loan and the monitoring 
costs.12
Second, proposition 1 implies that, given assumption 1 on the size of entrepreneur’s private 
benefit from misbehaving, monitoring is a necessary condition for the existence of an active 
credit market. In the absence of monitoring, the project is never financed because of the 
entrepreneurial moral hazard. In its presence, the project can be financed. Monitoring forces 
the entrepreneur to behave well, thus increasing the probability that the project succeeds.
The parameter m  measures the severity of the bank moral hazard problem and determines 
the equilibrium monitoring level. When m  < m, the bank monitors with intensity =  1. The 
loan rate r j  is increasing in m  as monitoring costs increase with it. When m > m, the bank 
monitors with intensity M{ < 1, which is decreasing in m. The loan rate r\ is still increasing 
in m: When M f is an interior solution, both the monitoring intensity and the monitoring costs 
are decreasing in m  but the first effect dominates, thus increasing the loan rate.
In both circumstances, the contract between the firm and the bank is feasible and the 
project is always financed in equilibrium. Substituting rj in rJ < R  requires m < 2(pnR — 1) 
for m, < m  and m < o^r 771 > which is always satisfied given assumption 2. When
rj =  R, the equilibrium monitoring intensity M* equals the first best monitoring level M FB\ 
when r j  < R, M{ =  M FB if M{ =  1 and M[ < M FB if M{ < 1. This is because the bank 
chooses its monitoring intensity as a function of its return r j  instead of as a function of the 
project return R.
12Note that this result derives from assumption 1 but it is a more general consequence of the ’autorithy’ 
aspect of monitoring. Indeed, the negative relation between entrepreneurial incentives and bank’s monitoring 
would emerge even if, relaxing assumption 1, the entrepreneurial moral hazard problem would be less severe and 
monitoring would affect the entrepreneur’s incentives. See for example the trade-off between loss of control and 
initiative in Aghion and Tirole (1997) and also in Bukart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997).
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4.3.2 Tw o Bank Financing
I turn now to the case in which two (identical) banks (i =  A ,B )  finance and monitor the 
entrepreneur. As before, the interaction between the firm and the two banks is a two-stage 
game with imperfect information and I look for subgame perfect equilibria. I look in particular 
for symmetric equilibria, in which the two banks lend a half unit each to the firm against the 
same loan rate and exert the same monitoring intensity.
The firm sets the loan rate 7*2 at the lowest level which satisfies the zero-profit condition 
for each bank. The project is financed only if the contract is feasible, that is if does not 
exceed the return R  of the project. Once financing has been secured at the loan rate 7*2, the 
game enters the behaviour/monitoring stage in which simultaneously the two banks and the 
entrepreneur choose their respective actions.
The difference between single and multiple lending crucially depends on how the two banks 
interact in their monitoring decisions. I assume the following decision process, which implies 
a trade-off in the optimality of multiple lenders (see below for details): The two banks choose 
their individual monitoring intensities simultaneously and independently of each other. Their 
monitoring efforts are however interrelated in the effect they have on the entrepreneur’s behav­
iour. In particular, when one bank discovers the entrepreneur misbehaving, it forces him to
behave well on the whole project. The idea is that the decision to undertake the monitoring 
activity is private information for each bank but the outcome of such an activity is publicly 
known. The aggregate monitoring intensity (also referred as total impact of monitoring) is 
then given by:
M 2 =  Ma  +  Mq  — M aM b  (9)
where the first two terms reflects the ’positive externality’ between the two banks’ monitoring 
activities and the last term reflects the duplication of effort due to the independence of banks’ 
decision process.
Given 7^  and the total monitoring impact M2, the firm’s expected profits are given by:13
n F2 =PH (R~r2) (10)
13 Note that r2 corresponds to the loan rate the firm pays to each bank but also to the repayment that the firm 
pays on the total loan of one unit.
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when the entrepreneur behaves well and by:
n £2 =  m 2ph(R -  ri) +  (1 -  Mi)]pL(R -  n )  + B] (11)
when the entrepreneur misbehaves.
If banks A  and B  monitor with intensities Ma and Mb , respectively, then for each bank i 
(i =  A, B) the expected profits are given by:
n £  (12)
when the entrepreneurs behaves well and by:
=  M iP H j + (1 -  M2)Pl j  -  \  -  y (M .)2 (13)
when the entrepreneur misbehaves.
Comparing expressions (5) and (6) with (12) and (13) highlights the differences between one 
and two banks: On the benefit side, two banks face a duplication of effort in the aggregate impact 
of monitoring M 2 and each of them gets only ^  while paying the full cost of its monitoring 
activity (’’sharing of monitoring benefit”); on the cost side, they gain from the diseconomies of 
scale implied by the convexity of monitoring costs. The duplication of effort and the sharing 
of benefit affect banks’ monitoring choice and, together with the convexity of monitoring costs, 
determine the equilibrium loan rate.
Formally, a competitive equilibrium in which the project is undertaken with two banks is 
a subgame perfect equilibrium of the continuation game that satisfies the feasibility condition, 
that is a vector {r^, {if,L},M i*,Vi} such that:
1) The firm sets 7*2 so as to maximise its expected profits subject to the banks’ zero profit 
condition and the contract feasibility condition, correctly anticipating its behavioural choice 
and the bank’s monitoring intensity M* for i — A ,B \
2) The firm and the banks maximise their expected profits given 7*2, so that the firm’s 
behavioural choice {H,L} and the bank’s monitoring intensity M* for i =  A, B  constitute a 
Nash equilibrium of the behaviour/monitoring subgame.
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As in the one bank case, assumption 1 implies that the entrepreneur prefers misbehaving 
for any M 2 G [0,1) and is indifferent between behaving well and misbehaving for M 2 =  1. This 
is because njj; > Hp2 simplifies to:
(1 -  M 2)[(p h  ~ Pl ) ( R  -  r 2) -  B] < 0 (14)
which holds with strict inequality for any M 2 E [0,1) by assumption 1 and with weak inequality 
for M 2 =  1. This also implies that banks always monitor after financing the firm so as to increase 
the probability of success of the project.
Proposition 2 states conditions for the existence of a competitive equilibrium of the two bank 
game in which the project is undertaken and characterises the equilibrium. Again, I restrict 
attention to pure strategy equilibria and I show in the appendix that there are no mixed 
strategy equilibria for the two bank game. The following definition is useful for characterising 
the equilibrium.
Definition 2 Let:
/ t e )  =  P H (P H -P L )292+(PH-PL)(^TnpH+TnpL - ( p H - P L ) ) 92 - ^ ( ( P H - P L ) - m p L)92-^ rn 2 =  
0.
f(g 2 ) is a cubic in g2, with a positive coefficient on g%, /(0) =  —4m2 < 0 and /'(0) < 0. 
Therefore, the equation f(g 2) =  0 has a unique positive real solution. Denote this solution by 
02 =  02 (771).
Proposition 2 There exists a symmetric competitive equilibrium of the two bank game in 
which the firm ’s project is financed if and only if  R  > 02(771). I f it exists, the equilibrium is 
unique and has the following features:14
1) *2 =  02(771);
2) the entrepreneur always chooses L and each bank monitors with intensity:
f o r i = A B ■ (15)
141 restrict attention to symmetric equilibria since I am interested in situations of multiple lending where both 
banks monitor the firm actively. Note however that for (j >h — p l)t-z >  2m there exists also an asymmetric 
equilibrium in which only one bank monitors the firm, that is M, =  1 and Mj  =  0 for i j ^j .
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Proof:
I solve the game backwards: I find the Nash equilibrium of the behaviour/monitoring subgame 
given r2; then I analyse the loan rate setting in the first stage.
i) The behaviour/monitoring subgame: Define se2 — {H, L} the pure-strategy space for the 
entrepreneur and Mi E [0,1] that for each bank i. The (pure) strategy Nash equilibrium of the 
behaviour/monitoring game is a profile M*,Vi) such that:
Il Fl(s*Ei,M?,Vi) > n Fl(sEl,M?,Vi) VsEl
M* = argm axII^(sj. ,Mt) for all i.
Mi
If the entrepreneur chooses H  and bank B  chooses ME, then bank A  maximises (12) and 
chooses M J — 0. By symmetry, Mg =  0. This is not an equilibrium: If M J =  M J =  M* = 0 
and M 2 =  2M* — (M*)2 =  0, the entrepreneur would prefer to deviate to L, since, as shown in 
(14), > I lf2 for any M 2 < 1.
If the entrepreneur chooses L  and bank B  chooses Mg, bank A  chooses Ma so to maximise 
(13), which is continuous and strictly concave in Ma - The first-order condition gives:
dUk A ro
=  (1 -  Mb )(ph - P l ) ~ 2  -  m M A  =  0
which implies:
Ma = (Pff2mL)r2(1 “  M b)‘ (16)
Substituting Ma =  ME in a symmetric equilibrium gives MJ =  M J =  M*(r2). Note that 
M*(r2) < 1, so that M 2 =  (2M*(r2) — (M*(r2))2) < 1. Thus, the entrepreneur still prefers L 
and the profile (L, M /(r2) Vi) is the unique pure strategy symmetric Nash equilibrium of the 
behaviour/monitoring game.
ii) The loan setting stage: Given (L, M*(r2) Vi), the firm chooses r2 to solve the following 
problem:
max Il£ =  M*2(r2)pH(R -  r2) +  (1 -  ’M*2{r2))\pL{R -  r2) + B\
r2
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subject to:
n B< =  M*2{r2)pHi£ +  (1 ~ M 2(r2))pLy  y (M * (r2))2 for all z.
Solving n£. =  0 after substituting M*(r2) gives the solution r2. The expression 11^ . =  0 
coincides with f(g 2(m)) =  0 and r2 =  p2(^)>
Substituting r2 in M*(r2) gives the equilibrium monitoring intensity M* =  M2.
The vector {r2,L, M* Vz} is therefore the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the two 
bank game. If r2 < R, the contract is feasible and the project is undertaken. □
Proposition 2 states that the entrepreneur always chooses to misbehave and both the two banks 
monitor the firm in equilibrium. The expression M2 =  (p^-p^r*+2m reflects the drawbacks 
of multiple lending: The term 2m in the denominator results from the sharing of monitoring 
benefit; the term {pn — Pl)^2 in the denominator stems from banks’ interaction in the mon­
itoring decision process and reflects the duplication of monitoring effort. For given loan rate, 
the reaction function of each bank is downward sloping: In expression (16), the higher the 
monitoring intensity of bank z, M*, the lower that of bank j ,  M f, for each z =  A, B  and z ^  j. 
This is because the negative effect of the duplication of monitoring effort on each bank’s deci­
sion becomes more important as banks monitor more. The final result is that in equilibrium 
M2 < 1 for any Ph ,P l , r2, and m. This implies that two banks do not fully monitor even in 
the aggregate, that is ~M*2 =  (2MJ — (M2 )2) < 1.
The equilibrium loan rate r2 depends on how the duplication of effort and the sharing 
of benefit interact, through the level of M2, with the convexity of monitoring costs. Given 
the expression of the function f(g 2), the analytical expression for r2 is quite complicated and 
economically uninteresting. I proceed as follows: Firstly, for given loan rate, I compare the 
monitoring levels and the total monitoring costs in the one bank game and in the two bank 
game; secondly, I analyse numerically the equilibrium loan rates r j  and r2.
Lemma 1 compares the monitoring levels with one bank and two banks for given loan rate.
Lemma 1 For given r\ =  r2 =  r, the monitoring intensity in the one bank game is greater 
than the aggregate monitoring intensity in the two bank game, which is greater than each indi-
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vidual monitoring intensity, that is:
M{{r) > M*2{r) > M j(r).
Proof:
Comparing the expressions M*(ri), MJ fa )  and Mjjj(r2) for ri =  7*2 =  r  and manipulating them 
gives the result:
(i) for m < ( p H - P L ) r ,  JKJ(r) =  1, A^(r) =  (2M2* (r)-(M 2*(r))2) =  < 1
and M l(r) > M2*(r) =  <  1.
(ii) for m > (p H - p L)r, JWJ(r)-M*2(r) = >  0 and j0J(r) > M2*(r).□
Lemma 1 states that, for given loan rate, banks monitor more when they are single lenders than 
when they finance the firm jointly. This is because the duplication of effort and the sharing of 
benefit in multiple banking affect negatively individual banks’ incentives, thus worsening their 
moral hazard problem. Such effects are so strong that two lenders monitor less than a single 
lender even in the aggregate.
Figure 2 illustrates the dependence of MJ(r), MJ(r) and M 2(r) on m G [0,1] and shows 
that the differences Mf(r) — M 2(r) and M*(r) — M2(r) are not monotonic in m: They increase 
for m < (ph — Pl )r and decrease for m  > (pn — Pl )t . This can be explained as follows. For 
wi < (ph  ~ Pl )'!', MJ(r) and M 2(r) decrease as m increases while M*(r) remains constant and 
equal to 1; for m > (pn — PL)r > a higher m  reduces all MJ(r), MJ (r) and M 2(r). However, 
MJ(r) and M 2(r) decrease less than MJ(r). This is because the higher m  the lower MJ(r) 
and therefore the lower the importance of the duplication of effort in affecting the two banks’ 
monitoring incentives.
Insert figure 2
Lemma 2 compares the total monitoring costs in the one bank case with the total monitoring 
costs in the two bank case for given loan rate.
Lemma 2 For given r\ =  7*2 =  r, the difference between the total monitoring costs with one 
and two banks is:
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c1(M1* (r ))-2 c 2(M2*(r))=  <
( P H ~ P L ) r> 0  /o r m > ^
Proof:
Comparing the relevant expressions for c\(Mi (n)) and (r2)) with ri =  r2 =  r  gives the
result:
(i) for m < { p H - P l )t, Ci{Mf(r)) -  2c2(MJ(r)) =  f  ~ m (m(pH -f3+^ 2 which is Positive only
if m  > (PH-pL)r
> 2(i+V2) *
(m) for m > (pH -p i,)r , ci(Mf(r)) -  2c2(M2*(r)) =  {pH~ ^ } ~  -  m (( p ^ ) r + 2m)2 > °* D
Lemma 2 states that, for given loan rate, the difference between the total monitoring costs with 
one bank and with two banks depends on the value of the parameter m: It is negative when m  
is low relative to the marginal benefit of monitoring {pu —Pl and positive otherwise. Figure 
3 illustrates the dependence of ci(M{{r)) and 2c2(M2(r)) on m  E [0,1]. The intuition is as 
follows: For m  close to 0, M ^r)  tends to Mf(r) =  1 and 2c2(M2(r)) tends to m, which is 
greater than c\(M {(r)) =  y . That is, when monitoring costs are very low, each of the two 
banks monitors approximately as much as a single bank but together they face nearly double 
costs. This is due to the high duplication of effort and the low importance of diseconomies of 
scale when m  is low. As m  becomes larger, the relative importance of the duplication of effort 
and of diseconomies of scale change. The total monitoring costs 2c2(M2(r)) in the two bank 
case increase for m < P^H~^L)r and decrease thereafter. The monitoring costs c\(M {(r)) in the 
one bank case increase m < (j?h —Pl )r and decrease thereafter. Therefore, 2c2(M2(r)) crosses 
ci(MJ“(r)) and remains below it.
Insert figure 3
Given lemmas 1 and 2, I now illustrate in figures 4-6 the equilibrium loan rates r j  and r% as 
a function of m  £ [0,1]. Letting Ph = 1 for simplicity, the figures are drawn for different 
values of the success probability pl of the project when the entrepreneur misbehaves. In figure
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4 pl = 0.4, in figure 5 pl = 0.5 and in figure 6 pl =  0.6.
Insert figures 4-6
These figures are significant for two reasons. Firstly, they show that, as with r j, r j  is increasing 
in m  for any parameter configuration. The graphs of the monitoring intensity MJ(r) and 
of the monitoring costs 2c2(MJ(r)) illustrated in figures 2 and 3 explain this result. When 
m < the equilibrium loan rate r j  increases with m  as MJ (r) (and thus the probability
of success of the project) decreases and 2c2(MJ (r)) increases. When m > (pH~Px,)r , both MJ(r) 
and 2c2(MJ (r)) decrease with m  but the first effect dominates, thus increasing r%.
Secondly, figures 4-6 show that two lenders do not always require a higher loan rate than a 
single lender. The relation between r j  and r j  depends on the parameters of the model. When 
Pl is low (pl  < 0.5) r j  > r j  for any m  E [0,1] —see figure 4—; when pl is high {pi > 0.5), 
r2 > r i f°r l°w values of m but r j  > r j  for m sufficiently high. The two loan rates intersect 
at the value fh € [m, 1] —see figure 6—. The result is due to the joint effects of p i  and m  on 
banks’ expected profits and can be explained as follows. Banks require an expected repayment 
sufficient to cover the amount of their loan and their monitoring costs, so that they break even. 
Formally, the equilibrium loan rate satisfies:
M i(ri)pHri + (1 -  M {(ri))pLri =  1 +  y (M J(ri))2 (17)
in the case of one bank and:
M l(r2)pHr2 +  (1 ~ M 2 (r2 ))PLr2 =  1 +  m (M j(r2))2 (18)
in the case of two banks. As M J(ri) ^  M Jfo), expressions (17) and (18) differ in the expected 
repayment (terms on the left hand side) and in the monitoring costs (last term on the right hand 
side). Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that, for given loan rate, pn  and pl-, the expected repayment is 
higher with one bank for any m E [0,1], whilst the monitoring costs are higher with two banks 
for low values of m  and become smaller as m  reaches ' Fbdng PH — 1 and given the
loan rate, the relative differences in expressions (17) and (18) change with m  and pl as follows.
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An increase in p i  reduces the severity of the firm moral hazard, thus making bank monitoring 
less important. The higher p l , the lower the impact of monitoring on the success probability 
of the project and, thus, the lower the equilibrium monitoring intensities.
In the one bank case, a higher pl shrinks the range of parameters for which the bank 
monitors fully, as it reduces the threshold level m  =  below which MJ(r) =  1, and
reduces the monitoring intensity M f(r) when this is an interior solution. For m < m, the 
expected repayment and the total monitoring costs in (17) are unaffected by pl as MJ (r) =  1. 
For m > m, the expected repayment decreases as pl increases for m < m  < 2(pn —.pi)r 
and increases thereafter (when the direct effect of p i  on the expected repayment starts to 
dominate that of a lower MJ (r)), whilst the monitoring costs are decreasing in pl for all 
m > m .  The loan rate r  J is decreasing in pl for any given m > m, as the effect of a higher pl 
on the monitoring costs (through a lower MJ(r)) dominates that on the expected repayment 
for m < m < 2{jpH — PL)r, whilst reinforcing it for m > 2(j>h — Pl )p > m.
In the two bank case, a higher pl reduces MJ (r) and M 2(r) for all m. In (18) the expected 
repayment decreases as pl increases for m  < and increases thereafter (when the direct
effect of pl on the expected repayment starts to dominate that of a lower M 2(r)) and the 
monitoring costs decrease for all m. An increase in pl lowers the importance of the duplication 
of effort through a lower MJ (r); thus, MJ (r) and M^(r) decrease less than MJ (r) when this 
is an interior solution. The loan rate r2 is decreasing in pl for any given m G [0,1]. This is 
because, as with r j, the effect of a higher pl on the monitoring costs dominates that on the 
expected repayment for m < {PH~VL)r ^  whilst reinforcing it for m > (pH~PL)r .
These considerations show that the effects of a change in pl on the relative differences in 
(17) and (18) depend on the value of m. When m < m, an increase in pl leaves (17) unchanged 
whilst it modifies both the expected repayment and the total monitoring costs in (18). The 
expected repayment in (18) increases for < m  < m  whilst the total monitoring costs
decrease on the whole range m  < m. The net effect in (18) is not sufficiently important, 
however, and r 2 remain bigger than r j  for all values of p l -
When m > m, an increase in pl affects both expressions (17) and (18). As MJ (r) decreases 
more than MJ (r) and MjJO*) but MJ (r) > M^(r) > MJ (r), the expected repayment increases 
more in (18) than in (17), whilst monitoring costs decrease more in (17) than (18). For relatively
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high values of m  and the effect on the expected repayment dominates that on monitoring 
costs and r\ becomes smaller than rj.
In summary, when m  and pl are sufficiently high, the firm pays a lower loan rate when it 
borrows from two lenders than when it borrows from one. This is because a higher p i  reduces 
the level of bank monitoring and high values of m  reduce the importance of the duplication of 
effort with two lenders whilst increasing that of diseconomies of scale. These effects reinforce 
each other, making it cheaper for the firm to borrow from two banks.
The parameters m  and pl capture the severity of the bank and the firm moral hazard 
problems, respectively. Regarding the firm, in the following I distinguish between the financial 
and the private moral hazard problem. The former, measured by p l , concerns the financial 
return of the project when the entrepreneur misbehaves; the latter, measured by the private 
benefit R, relates to the private return that the entrepreneur enjoys from misbehaving. The 
two problems have different effects in the model. The financial moral hazard influences banks’ 
monitoring incentives and the equilibrium loan rates, while the private moral hazard affects 
only the firm’s choice between one and two banks, as I will show in the next section.
Proposition 3 summarises the equilibrium relationship between the loan rates with one and 
two banks.
Proposition 3 When the firm has weak financial moral hazard ( p l  > 0.5^ and banks have 
strong moral hazard (m  > m), two banks require a lower loan rate than a single bank for 
m > rh € [m, 1]. In all other circumstances, two banks require a higher loan rate than a single 
bank.
4.3.3 T h e  F irm ’s C hoice b e tw een  O ne an d  Tw o B anks
I now turn to the firm’s choice between one and two lenders. The firm makes its decision at the 
beginning of date 0, taking into account the equilibrium of the two-stage game with one and 
two banks. Bank loans are zero NPV and the entrepreneur would always prefer to misbehave 
but is forced to behave well by bank monitoring. Thus, after substituting (17) and (18) in (4) 
and (11), the firm’s expected profits are given by:
n£i =  [MIphR  +  (1 -  M[)Pl R\ +  (1 -  M {)B -  [M{P„r\ +  (1 -  Ma*)pt rJ] =
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= [MtpHR + (1 -  M t)pLR] +  (1 -  M {)B  -  [1 +  y  (M,*)2] (19)
when the firm borrows from one bank and as:
n k  =  (M*2p h R  +  (1 -  m I ) p l R ] +  (1 -  M l ) B  -  W i P H T l  +  (1 -  T T 2) p L r \ \  =
=  {M^phR  +  (1 -  M ^ plR] +  [(1 -  W2)B) -  [1 +  m (M |)2] (20)
when the firm borrows from two banks. In expression (19), the first term is the total expected 
financial return of the project, the second term is the expected private return for the entrepre­
neur and the last term is the bank’s total expected repayment, which has to cover both the 
amount of the loan and the total monitoring costs. Terms in expression (20) have exactly the 
same meaning.
The firm prefers to have a single lender if (19) >(20) and two lenders otherwise. Firm’s 
expected profits are a function of the parameters m, pff, p i, B  and R. The parameter m 
captures the size of the monitoring costs; p n  and p l  are the success probability of the project 
when the entrepreneur behaves well and misbehaves, respectively; B  is the private benefit that 
the entrepreneur enjoys from misbehaving while R  is the financial return of the project in 
case of success. In the following, I fix pn  and R  and analyse the firm’s expected profits as 
a function of m, B  and p l - These parameters measure, respectively, the bank moral hazard, 
the firm private moral hazard and the firm financial moral hazard. Thus, I can interpret the 
firm’s choice between one lender and two lenders in terms of the relative severity of bank moral 
hazard as compared to firm moral hazard, as I will discuss below.
Letting Ph = 1 and R  =  1.6, figures 7-9 show the firm’s expected profits given in (19) and 
(20) as a function of m, B  and p l- In each figure, which is drawn for given p l , m  G [0,1] is 
depicted on the x-axis while the different curves for Ilj^ and 11^ are associated with different 
values of B  G [0.4,0.8], with a jump of 0.1 on each curve. The three figures differ in the value 
of pi,. In particular, pl =  0.4 in figure 7, pl = 0.5 in figure 8, and pl = 0.6 in figure 9. These 
configurations of parameters satisfy assumptions 1 and 2 and guarantee that the loan contract 
is feasible with both one bank and two banks for any m  G [0.1]. The graphs do not change 
appreciably with other parameter configurations.
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In the one bank case, the monitoring intensity M{ is a corner solution for m < m  and an 
interior solution for m > m .  This implies that IIjj. depends on B  only for m > m . Thus, the 
graph of n £  in figures 7-9 is a single line for m < m and a bundle of curves for m > m, each 
of them corresponding to a different value of B. The corner solution M* =  1 implies also that 
Il£ does not depend on p l  for m  < ra. Thus, the graph of for m < m  is the same in all 
figures. However, as the threshold level m =  ,2^ + p ^ ' is decreasing in p^, it reduces in figures 
7-9, as p l  increases. In particular, m — 0.85 in figure 7, m  =  0.66 in figure 8 and m  = 0.5 in 
figure 9. This implies that the range of values of m  in which M{ =  1 and the graph of is a 
single line reduces from figure 7 to 9 as p l  increases.
In the two bank case, the monitoring intensity MJ is always an interior solution, which 
implies that the aggregate monitoring intensity M 2 is also less than 1. Thus, n p depends on 
B  for all m G [0,1] and its graph in figures 7-9 is always a bundle of curves, each of them 
corresponding to a different value of B.
insert figures 7-9
These figures show that the structure of bank relationships crucially depends on the values of 
777, B  and p i .
For 772 < m, in each figure there exists m(l?,p£,) G [0,m] such that, for given p l  and £ ,  the 
firm prefers to borrow from one bank if m < m (B ,p i)  and from two banks if 777 > fh(B,pL)- 
For given p l , the threshold level m {B,pi) is decreasing in B. In each figure, the higher B, the 
smaller the value of which determines the firm’s choice. In figure 7, for example, for
given p l — 0.4, rh(QA,pL) =  0.58, m(0.5,pz,) =  0.46, m(0.6,p£) =  0.36, m(0.7,px,) =  0.27 and 
ra(0.8,p l )  = 0.21. For given B ,  the threshold level t t i ( B , p l )  is decreasing in p l -  Comparing 
figures 7-9 shows that the higher p l ,  the lower is the threshold m(B,pL) for a given level of 
B .  For example, fixed B  =  0.4, f h ( B ,  0.4) =  0.58 in figure 7, f h ( B , 0.5) =  0.41 in figure 8 and 
m(H, 0.6) = 0.24 in figure 9.
For 777 > 777, the firm prefers two lenders for all B  G [0.4,0.8] and for p l  € [0.4,0.6].
This result can be explained as follows. The firm decides between one and two lenders on 
the basis of two variables: loan rate and bank monitoring activity. These two elements affect
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the firm’s expected profits in the two scenarios differently, depending on the parameters of the 
model.
In the one bank case, is decreasing in ra for m < ra, independently of B  and p i , as 
Mf =  1 and r£ increases with ra. For ra > ra and given p l , is decreasing in ra for low values 
of B  but is increasing in ra for higher values of B. This is because a higher ra reduces M f, thus 
increasing r J. For given p i , a lower Mf reduces the total expected financial return of the project, 
M{phR +  (1 — M {)plR , decreases the total expected repayment, Mfp//Tf + (1 — Mf )px,rj, and 
increases the expected private return, (1 — M{)B. For high B, these two last effects dominate 
and increases with ra. The level of B  above which njfi depends positively on ra decreases 
with p l- This is because, as illustrated in figures 4-6, for given ra, r{ decreases with p i when 
ra > ra, although Mf decreases too.
In the two bank case, Iljj; is decreasing in ra for low values of ra and £?, whilst it increases 
with ra for higher values of ra and B. The higher pl the more significant the positive relation 
between Il£.2 and ra is. The explanation is similar to that in the one bank case for ra > ra.
Given a level of p i, the firm prefers to borrow from a single bank for very low values of ra, 
independently if B. This is because when ra is very low, r2 > r j  whilst MJ tends to M f. Thus, 
the firm pays a lower loan rate with one bank, while facing a similar monitoring discipline.
As ra increases for ra < ra, the difference (r2 — rj) increases even further but MJ de­
creases and Mf remains constant. This implies a lower expected financial return of the project 
M 2Ph R  +  (1 — M 2)plR > a lower total expected repayment +  (1 — MjJjpzTj but a
higher expected private return (1 — M 2)B  in the two bank case relative to the one bank case. 
Thus, for given B  and p i, there exists a level rh(B,pL) < ra beyond which the firm chooses to 
borrow from two banks as the higher expected private return and the lower expected repayment 
dominate the lower financial return of the project . The higher B , the more the firm benefits 
from not being monitored and, therefore, the lower the threshold level ih(B,pL) for given pl .
As ra increases further and reaches ra, the difference (rj — rj)  decreases (and it becomes 
negative in the case p i > 0.5 for ra > ra > ra, as illustrated in figure 6), as well as the difference 
(Mi — M 2) (but M l > ’M*2 for all ra > ra and all pl 6 [0.4,0.6]). The first effect dominates 
and the firm finds it convenient to borrow from two lenders for all ra > ra, independently of B.
The value of pl affects the range of parameters in which the firm prefers two lenders. A
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higher p i  reduces both the threshold level m  and the critical value m(i?,p£,), thus making the 
firm’s choice of two banks more likely. This is due to the effects of a higher pi, on the loan 
rates and the monitoring intensity in the one bank case and in the two bank case, which in 
turn affect the total expected financial return of the project, the expected private return for 
the entrepreneur and the total expect repayment in the two scenarios.
As before, the parameters m, p i  and B  can be interpreted as a measure of the bank moral 
hazard, the firm financial moral hazard and the firm private moral hazard, respectively. Propo­
sition 4 summarises the firm’s choice between one and two lenders in terms of these moral 
hazard problems.
P ropositon 4 When bank moral hazard is very weak, the firm prefers to borrow from one 
bank, independently of its own moral hazard.
As bank moral hazard becomes more severe for m < m , there exists a level of fh(B,pi,) £ [0,m], 
such that, given the firm financial and private moral hazard, the firm borrows from one banks 
for m < fh(B,pL) and from two banks for m > m(B,pL). The more severe the firm private 
moral hazard and the weaker the firm financial moral hazard, the lower the threshold fh{B,pL) 
and thus, the more likely the firm borrows from two banks.
When bank moral hazard is very strong (m  >rn), the firm prefers to borrow from two banks, 
independently of its own moral hazard.
4.4 Conclusions
Monitoring of entrepreneurs is widely recognised as one of the main roles that banks play in the 
economy. However, how much monitoring they exert and the effects of this activity on credit 
pricing and the structure of bank relationships is not much explored in the existing literature 
of financial intermediation.
In this chapter I have developed a one-period model of overlapping moral hazard problems 
between borrowers and lenders, which focuses on banks’ incentives to monitor and analyses why 
firms may find it optimal to establish multiple relationships, although they entail duplication 
of effort, free riding and potentially also a higher repayment obligation.
The idea is quite simple. An entrepreneur may prefer not to exert enough effort and enjoy
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a private benefit instead of being diligent and increasing the success probability of the project. 
Banks can control the entrepreneur’s behaviour through monitoring but they cannot commit to 
a predetermined monitoring level. The number of lenders affects the monitoring intensity that 
banks exert in equilibrium as well as the loan rate they require. Multiple banking always implies 
a lower level of discipline than single banking, whereas -as a consequence of diseconomies of scale 
in monitoring- the relation between the number of lenders and the loan rate is not monotonic. 
The firm’s choice between single and multiple relationships is not univocal but depends on the 
relative parameters of the two moral hazard problems in the model.
Future research could extend the analysis in several directions. First, by using a one-period 
model with a perfectly competitive banking system, I have abstracted from the potential hold­
up problem that might arise in the case of a single lender. This could be considered by extending 
the model to two periods and by allowing banks to either extract a surplus ex post or operate 
in an imperfectly competitive sector. A two-period model would also allow for an analysis 
of renegotiation with single and multiple banking. Second, the entrepreneur’s effort choice is 
modelled as a discrete variable and he always chooses not to exert effort, independently of bank 
monitoring. One could model the entrepreneur’s choice as a continuous variable and analyse 
the impact of bank monitoring on entrepreneur’s incentives.
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Appendix: Mixed Strategy Equilibria in the Behaviour/Monitoring Subgame
1. One Bank Financing
I now look for mixed strategy equilibria in the behaviour/monitoring subgame with one bank 
and show that restricting attention to pure strategy Nash equilibria in Proposition 1 is without 
loss of generality.
Entrepreneur’s indifference between H  and L  implies:
pH(R -  n )  =  MipH(R -  ri) +  (1 -  Mi)\pL(R -  n )  +  B\ 
which has solution Mi =  1.
If the entrepreneur chooses H  with probability x , then the bank maximises:
x\pHri -  1 -  y  (Mi)2] +  (1 -  x)[MipHri +  (1 -  M x)pLri -  1 -  y  (Mi)2] 
which simplifies to:
xpHri +  M i(l -  x)pnri +  (1 -  M i)(l -  x)plT\ -  1 -  y  (Mi)2.
The first-order condition with respect to M\ gives:
(1 - x ){ p H - P l ) t \  = m M i. (21)
Substituting Mi =  1 in (21) implies:
(PH ~  Pl Y i
where 0 < x < 1 if < 1. Thus, the strategy profile (x, Mi) is a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium of the game if < 1-
The outcome of the mixed strategy equilibrium is ’equivalent’ to that of the pure strategy 
equilibrium (L,min{*‘PH~^£^ r i , 1}) shown in Proposition 1. In both equilibria, if ( p n  ~ P l Y i >  
m, Mi =  1 and the entrepreneur is always forced to behave well, independently of his strategy
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(x or L). Therefore, restricting attention to pure strategy equilibria is without loss of generality. 
□
2. Two Banks Financing
I now show that the behaviour/monitoring subgame with two banks has no mixed strategy 
Nash equilibria.
Entrepreneur’s indifference between H  and L  implies:
pH(R -  r2) = M 2PH(R ~ r2) +  (1 -  M 2)\pL(R -  r2) +  B]
where M 2 =  2Mi —  (Mi)2 with i — A ,B . The solution is M, =  Ma =  Mb =  1.
If the entrepreneur chooses H  with probability x  and bank B  chooses Mb , then bank A  max­
imises:
y  -  i  -  y  (Ma )2] +  (1 -  x)[M2P H y  +  (1 - M 2)PLy y  (Ma)2]
which simplifies to:
X^i/y + M 2(1 -  X)p#y + (1 - M 2)(l -  x)pLy  -  1 -  y  (Ma)2- 
The first-order condition with respect to Ma gives:
(1 -  Mb )( 1 - x ) ( pH -  p l ) ^  =  m M A• (22)
Substituting Mj =  Ma = Mb =  1 implies that the game has no (nondegenerate) mixed strategy 
Nash equilibrium since there does not exist any x > 0 which satisfies (22). □
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Figure 2: Monitoring intensities with one bank and with two banks for given r
m
Figure 3: Total monitoring costs with one bank and with two banks for given r
m
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Figure 4: Loan rates with one bank and with two banks for pl=0.4
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Figure 5: Loan rates with one bank and with two banks for pl=0.5
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Figure 6: Loan rates with one bank and with two banks for pl=0.6
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Figure 7 : Firm’s e x p e c te d  profits with one bank and with two banks as a funetron of
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Figure 8: Firm’s expected profits with one bank and with two banks as a function of m and B for pl=0.5
n
n 0 . 6
0 . 5 5
B =0.
B =  0 . 7
0 . 4 5
B =  0 . 6
0 . 4
a  =  0 .5
0 . 3 5
fl = 0.
a  =  0 . 4
0.6
0.6
-a = o.50 . 2 5
a = 0.4
159
T
j'
"
Figure 9: Firm’s expected profits with one bank and with two banks as a function of m and B for pl=0.6
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